<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[THE WIRE TAP]]></title><description><![CDATA[Independent reporting and live conversations from Kyiv on Russia's war, intelligence and extremism.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 23:36:50 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[natsecmedia@gmail.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[natsecmedia@gmail.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[natsecmedia@gmail.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[natsecmedia@gmail.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Nobody Came Down to Us]]></title><description><![CDATA[A Kherson Oblast villager on the occupation, the village leader he lost, and the road home]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/nobody-came-down-to-us</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/nobody-came-down-to-us</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 12:30:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224593514/29c4c0cbbab74d2e915b9d80234a4c63.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>DEAR READER: If independent journalism matters to you, please consider a $5/month membership. I report daily from inside Ukraine&#8217;s war &#8212; through blackouts, through attacks &#8212; and your support makes that possible. These dispatches will remain free to all readers. This work depends on those willing to sustain it, and I&#8217;m grateful to everyone who does. &#8212; Chris Sampson, Kyiv, November 12, 2026, Day 1722 of the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.</em></p><p>After Kherson was liberated on November 11, 2022, we loaded up with supplies and headed back to the city and surrounding villages. On one of those aid runs, my colleague Andriy asked a man named Serhiy how he&#8217;d got through the occupation. Serhiy asked if he could answer in Russian. Andriy said yes.</p><p>Russian troops reached his village on March 16, Serhiy recalled. By then, people who had grown up there had come back from Kherson with their children. The village was full. He remembers the KamAZ trucks in the Russian column. &#8220;It was terrifying,&#8221; he said.</p><h2>The mill and the oil press</h2><p>Viktor Oleksiyovych, the former head of the village council, came to talk to the residents. &#8220;Guys, let&#8217;s start up the mill and oil press, even if only a little,&#8221; Serhiy remembers him saying, &#8220;so we can grind some grain from somewhere, because who knows how long this will last.&#8221;</p><p>They had nearly got both running when the shelling began. By ten at night, Serhiy said, they would change clothes, gather in a corner and wait. The first rounds came at 11:05. &#8220;You could set your watch by it.&#8221; The shelling usually let up around 11:30.</p><p>They were short of gasoline, food and water. Viktor Oleksiyovych brought back gasoline when he could, and families shared what they had. &#8220;That was all fine,&#8221; he said, &#8220;except that nobody came down to us.&#8221; They still needed permission to leave. &#8220;We just sat in this pit,&#8221; Serhiy said, &#8220;with no right to leave.&#8221;</p><p>Serhiy said Viktor Oleksiyovych had asked the Russians to let the children out. The children left in the first convoy. When Serhiy asked whether he would go too, Viktor Oleksiyovych told him, &#8220;If I go, I&#8217;ll be the last one out of the village.&#8221;</p><p>On June 6, according to Serhiy, Viktor Oleksiyovych went to ask the Russian battalion commander for permission to leave the village to get gasoline. A shell hit and killed him. We have not independently verified the circumstances of his death.</p><h2>The road home</h2><p>Around July 3, a strike hit a yard, wounding Serhiy and a woman. Neighbors got them to Kakhovka. Serhiy had surgery there. The woman was taken on to Kherson, where she also had surgery.</p><p>While Serhiy was away, neighbors told him Russian soldiers took bicycles, mopeds and washing machines. He lost his car. &#8220;They stole things. They took my car.&#8221; He said he didn&#8217;t know where it went.</p><p>Serhiy stayed in the Kozyatyn district of Vinnytsia Oblast after he left the village. He wanted to thank the people who took in displaced families, the head of the local administration and the priests who helped, including Father Roman.</p><p>When he told people at the market he was going home, they asked if it was too early. &#8220;It&#8217;s never too early or too late to go home,&#8221; he told them. &#8220;Only home.&#8221;</p><p>In rehab he&#8217;d met soldiers from the Kozyatyn district who told him they would never give up the land. One of them, Sasha, was killed in a neighboring village. Serhiy went to his funeral. He told us he wanted to put up a cross where Sasha died and visit his mother.</p><p>When Andriy asked how it felt to be back, Serhiy said, &#8220;I&#8217;m home.&#8221; He asked if we&#8217;d come by.</p><p>&#8220;My place is already heated,&#8221; he said. &#8220;The kettle&#8217;s hot.&#8221;</p><p><em>Chris Sampson is Editor-in-Chief of NatSecMedia and host of The Wire Tap. He has lived in Ukraine since January 31, 2022, holding Ukrainian military press accreditation. His investigative journalism is published through The Wire Tap on Substack.</em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[BREAKING: Starshield Is Capped at 100 Miles Per Hour Again, 19 Days After Ukraine Said Full Speed Was Back]]></title><description><![CDATA[Zelenskyy says the limit has run for days along the front, and Russian jet-powered drones are getting through.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/breaking-starshield-is-capped-at</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/breaking-starshield-is-capped-at</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 12:17:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>DEAR READER: If independent journalism matters to you, please consider a $5/month membership. I report daily from inside Ukraine&#8217;s war &#8212; through blackouts, through attacks &#8212; and your support makes that possible. These dispatches will remain free to all readers. This work depends on those willing to sustain it, and I&#8217;m grateful to everyone who does. &#8212; Chris Sampson, Kyiv, November 12, 2026, Day 1722 of the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg 424w, 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2EFK!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa51d521e-3fc3-4e46-a87f-f6479b5d70de_1600x1066.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">Apartment in Solomiansky District hit by Russian drone November 12, 2022, killing 44 year old woman. Photo by DSNS emergency services. </figcaption></figure></div><p>President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced this morning on his Telegram channel that Starshield has been capped at 100 miles per hour over Ukraine for several days.</p><p>It is the same ceiling that grounded Ukraine&#8217;s fastest interceptors in October.</p><p>His <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21792">statement</a>, translated from the Ukrainian:</p><blockquote><p>There were reports from Ukraine&#8217;s Minister of Defense Yevhenii Khmara and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Mykhailo Drapatyi.</p><p>Our units, unfortunately, have for several days been recording significant disruptions in the operation of Starshield over the territory of Ukraine: along the entire front line and in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.</p><p>Specifically, systematic Starshield speed limits of 161 kilometers per hour (100 miles per hour) are in effect. The Ukrainian military has already checked the circumstances, and these are not random errors but a systematic speed limit.</p><p>For us this is above all a significant complication in intercepting Russian jet-powered drones. Unfortunately, there have already been hits because the interception assets do not reach sufficient speed and do not have time to intercept.</p><p>Unfortunately, this helps the Russians kill more Ukrainians and land more accurate strikes on Ukraine. We are trying to establish all the circumstances with the American side.</p></blockquote><p>Zelenskyy did not say who imposed the limit. He said Ukraine was seeking answers from U.S. officials.</p><p>In October, Ukraine passed the question on to America too. Ukrainian officials say they called the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon, and were told it was a White House decision. We later learned, <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-death-of-starlink-how-elon-musk">Elon Musk did it.</a></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thechrissampson.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">THE WIRE TAP is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><h2>Why that number</h2><p>A jet-powered Shahed flies at more than 400 kilometers per hour. Months ago, Ukrainian officials warned that some could exceed 700 kilometers per hour.</p><p>An interceptor that loses its satellite link above about 160 cannot chase it down. This affects so many operations across the country that defend civilian population and infrastructure. Today, here in Kyiv, a 44-year-old woman was killed in her apartment by such a drone.</p><p>In October, the cap hit Starshield, the military version of Starlink. Commercial Starlink had long carried speed limits in Ukraine. Starshield had not.</p><p>Serhii &#8220;Flash&#8221; Beskrestnov, Zelenskyy&#8217;s adviser on defense technology, described Starshield to the Associated Press as a package managed by the Pentagon, with separate fees and terms and a more stable, higher-priority connection. He called it the backbone of Ukraine&#8217;s drone operations.</p><h2>The October events, in order</h2><p>On October 11, Volodymyr Stepanets, founder of the nongovernmental group Narodnyi Starlink, sent a confidential memo to military officers across Ukraine. The Atlantic obtained it.</p><p>The memo warned that Musk might soon restrict service. It told users to &#8220;keep all communication alternatives to Starlink on standby, ready for immediate use, and develop contingency plans.&#8221;</p><p>The cap took effect overnight on October 13 to 14. Terminals began dropping their connections above about 160 kilometers per hour. No notice reached Ukrainian units.</p><p>Serhiy Sternenko, the activist who works closely with drone units, was first to report it on October 14. Later, Beskrestnov confirmed it and said forces got no warning.</p><p>That day Musk wrote that Starshield limits are &#8220;decided by the US military and ultimately POTUS.&#8221;</p><p>On October 15, Musk posted &#8220;Time for Zelensky to go.&#8221; The same day Reuters reported, citing two U.S. officials and a Western official, that the order came from inside the White House. A senior U.S. official told Reuters the president never made such a request. A senior White House official told Axios the White House &#8220;had nothing to do with restricting Starlink&#8217;s operation in Ukraine.&#8221;</p><p>On October 16, The Telegraph, citing four sources, reported that Musk had brought the idea to Trump and Trump agreed.</p><p>On October 20, The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk ordered the slowdown after discussing it with Trump and other senior officials. CBS News, citing sources, reported that it was Musk who chose to restrict the service. The same day, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters: &#8220;We haven&#8217;t pulled anything back. There are terms of service that ultimately need to be complied to, and that&#8217;s where Starlink has the option to make those decisions.&#8221;</p><p>Secretary of State Marco Rubio said decisions on Ukraine&#8217;s access rest with SpaceX and Musk under a private commercial contract.</p><p>On October 22, the Journal reported that Trump called Musk the day before and asked him to lift the cap. Trump was asked that day whether he made the call; he said, &#8220;I don&#8217;t want to comment on it.&#8221; Then came, &#8220;The bottom line, he put it back.&#8221;</p><p>On October 24, Zelenskyy wrote that &#8220;the speeds are now where they need to be.&#8221; Ukraine&#8217;s Defense Ministry put Starshield above 400 kilometers per hour.</p><p>Within hours, Musk wrote that the Ukrainian military violated Starlink&#8217;s terms of service and that the &#8220;loophole was closed last week.&#8221;</p><p>Full speed had been gone for ten days.</p><h2>Nineteen days</h2><p>Ukraine&#8217;s military says it checked, and what it found along the entire front line was a systematic limit at the same 161 kilometers per hour. A malfunction does not clear on October 24, return at the identical number on the other side of three weeks, and show up everywhere at once.</p><p>On October 14, Musk wrote that Starshield limits are decided by the U.S. military and ultimately the president. On October 24, he said SpaceX had closed a loophole, which makes the cap SpaceX enforcing its own terms. Those two statements describe one event only if the U.S. government directed or approved what SpaceX then enforced. If SpaceX acted alone, Musk spent October 14 pointing at the president for a decision his own company made.</p><p>In March 2025, he promised that &#8220;no matter how much I disagree with the Ukraine policy, Starlink will never turn off its terminals.&#8221; He kept to the letter of it. The terminals stayed on, capped below the speed an interceptor needs to catch a jet-powered drone.</p><p>Hegseth said SpaceX had the option to make those decisions. Rubio said they rested with Musk&#8217;s company under a private contract. A senior White House official told Axios the White House had nothing to do with it. Each of them now has to account for a second cap.</p><h2>The loophole</h2><p>When Musk said on October 24 that the Ukrainian military had violated Starlink&#8217;s terms by using it for drone strikes, he was describing commercial Starlink. The cap, by every Ukrainian account, hit Starshield. Sternenko pointed at that gap the same day. It was &#8220;technically impossible to use civilian Starlink specifically to carry out missions with drones,&#8221; he said, because since February a terminal that works on the move has to sit on a white list and connect through Starshield.</p><p>The Atlantic reported that Starshield terminals make up &#8220;less than one percent of all the terminals in the war zone,&#8221; and the rest are retail Starlink, many of them bought in bulk by Poland and Germany and used by soldiers whatever the terms of service said. SpaceX, the magazine reported, did not enforce that rule in Ukraine.</p><p>Most of the terminals in the country are retail units doing military work, and the drones that have to fly fast depend on the small number of Starshield terminals. If so, a complaint about retail terminals gives no reason to throttle a military service.</p><p>No Ukrainian or American official has said how the two fit together, and nobody has said whether the November limit rests on the same claim.</p><h2>The pressure around it</h2><p>The first cap landed in the middle of an American push to stop Ukraine from hitting Russian oil refineries. Trump blamed Ukraine for driving up diesel prices.</p><p>On October 9, Senators Roger Wicker and Kevin Cramer came to Kyiv and, according to the Wall Street Journal, offered a trade. Ukraine would pause its strikes on Russian energy facilities for 100 days, and Starlink coverage would extend about 300 kilometers into Russia, far enough to reach the launchers firing missiles at Ukrainian cities. The Journal reported that Zelenskyy said he would accept. The deal never took effect, but the offer had already turned Starlink coverage into a bargaining chip.</p><p>The next two days, U.S. defense officials phoned Ukrainian and European officials and, the Financial Times reported, threatened to halt intelligence sharing and to block PURL, the channel European governments use to buy American weapons for Ukraine. On October 11, Trump announced an energy ceasefire that Zelenskyy said was news to him.</p><p>Russia kept striking. It hit six Ukrainian energy facilities on October 12, and Zelenskyy said Ukraine got no timely warning of the missile attack that evening. The cap followed overnight on October 13 to 14.</p><p>On October 15, Zelenskyy told the Financial Times the refinery pause was over. &#8220;We&#8217;re done,&#8221; he said, and the strikes resumed.</p><p>Within a week, Ukraine had been offered Starlink coverage for a pause in its refinery strikes, threatened with losing intelligence and weapons over the same strikes, and left without warning of two Russian missile attacks. Then Starshield was capped.</p><h2>The money</h2><p>The Atlantic reported that when U.S. military officials asked SpaceX about the October outage, the company &#8220;advised switching to an upgraded contract to restore Ukraine&#8217;s access,&#8221; according to U.S. officials. SpaceX did not respond to the magazine.</p><p>Beskrestnov told the AP that Starshield&#8217;s aviation package carries no speed limit and costs much more.</p><p>In May, Reuters reported that SpaceX argued the Pentagon&#8217;s drones belonged on an aviation tier priced closer to $25,000 per terminal per month, against roughly $5,000 the military had been paying. The Pentagon agreed to an increase. Musk called the story &#8220;false.&#8221;</p><p>SpaceX recommended an upgrade after the October outage. The reporting leaves open why the cap was imposed.</p><h2>What Congress has done</h2><p>On October 15, nine senators asked the Pentagon&#8217;s inspector general to investigate: Democrats Jeanne Shaheen, who led the letter, Jack Reed, Dick Durbin, Chris Coons and Richard Blumenthal, and Republicans Thom Tillis, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski and John Cornyn.</p><p>In a letter dated October 27, Inspector General Platte Moring declined and told them to take their questions to the Air Force and Space Force.</p><p>On October 22, Blumenthal, the ranking Democrat on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, sent letters to Hegseth and Musk asking who ordered each restriction.</p><p>&#8220;The events in Ukraine show how a single point of control can be turned against the forces that depend on it,&#8221; he wrote to Musk.</p><p>He set November 5 for the Pentagon&#8217;s answers and today, November 12, for a briefing from SpaceX officials with knowledge of the Starshield limits.</p><h2>Europe&#8217;s answer, on paper</h2><p>On October 22, the Ukrainian and Finnish prime ministers signed seven agreements worth nearly &#8364;300 million, one of them committing Ukraine to greater use of Finnish satellite capabilities through Nokia and ICEYE.</p><p>The same day Ukraine&#8217;s military signed a letter of intent with Nokia and ICEYE to explore a sovereign satellite communications network. No scale, timeline or funding has been disclosed.</p><p>The European Commission is negotiating Ukraine&#8217;s full association with GOVSATCOM, the EU&#8217;s government satellite service, with commercial capacity possible from early 2027.</p><p>Denys Shtilerman, one of Ukraine&#8217;s most prolific drone developers, told The Atlantic: &#8220;We have one very serious weak spot, and that&#8217;s our dependence on Starlink. Next year we&#8217;ll address it. Before that, America will have enormous leverage, the ability to blackmail us.&#8221;</p><h2>Talks in Abu Dhabi, Moscow and Dublin</h2><p>U.S.-mediated talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations ran two days in Abu Dhabi, the first trilateral round since February. They ended Wednesday with a major prisoner exchange agreed. The American side said differences remain on territory. Kushner wrote that &#8220;significant differences remain.&#8221;</p><p>This morning Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner landed in Moscow to see Putin. It is Witkoff&#8217;s tenth in-person meeting with him. They are due in Dublin later today to meet Zelenskyy.</p><p>Ukraine goes into both conversations with its interceptors capped at a speed Russian jet-powered Shaheds exceed.</p><h2>The impact of the October cap</h2><p>On October 14, the first day, missions were disrupted or canceled outright. Ukraine&#8217;s 7th Corps reported communication failures in the Huliaipole sector. Drones that normally fly fast had to fly slower, which the Associated Press noted made them easier for Russian forces to target or evade. Two people familiar with one mission told The Atlantic the outage cost Ukraine naval drones in the Black Sea.</p><p>The interceptors built for jet-powered Shaheds could not close on them. Zelenskyy said so on October 16: because of the cap, Ukraine could not shoot down some of those drones. Helicopters that hunt the slower, propeller-driven Shaheds were affected too.</p><p>Russia attacked the whole time. The night the cap took effect, it struck all three thermal power plants in Kyiv and more than 600,000 people lost electricity. On the night of October 20 to 21 it launched 186 attack drones, 88 of them jet-powered. Four people died, two of them in a 24-story apartment building in Kyiv&#8217;s Sviatoshynskyi district.</p><p>On October 22, at lunchtime, a jet-powered Shahed and a Banderol missile hit the central market in Lozova, in Kharkiv region. Two women were killed and 36 people wounded.</p><p>Drone attacks were still underway in Kyiv when Zelenskyy made the announcement.</p><div class="native-video-embed" data-component-name="VideoPlaceholder" data-attrs="{&quot;mediaUploadId&quot;:&quot;14c308bc-788e-4d45-9755-ec0bf565309b&quot;,&quot;duration&quot;:null}"></div><p><em>Chris Sampson is Editor-in-Chief of NatSecMedia and host of The Wire Tap. He has lived in Ukraine since January 31, 2022, holding Ukrainian military press accreditation. His investigative journalism is published through The Wire Tap on Substack.</em></p><div><hr></div><h2>Notes</h2><ol><li><p>Zelensky, Volodymyr, Telegram, post on Starshield speed restrictions (@V_Zelenskiy_official, post 21792), November 12, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Zelensky, Volodymyr, Telegram, post on restoration of Starshield speeds, October 24, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris, The Wire Tap, &#8220;The Death of Starlink: How Elon Musk Broke the One Thing His Network Was Selling,&#8221; October 30, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Arhirova, Hanna, Associated Press, &#8220;Presidential Adviser Says Ukraine Is in Talks to Lift Speed Limit on Military Satellite Network,&#8221; October 16, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Shuster, Simon, and Isaac Stanley-Becker, The Atlantic, &#8220;How Elon Musk Turned on Ukraine,&#8221; October 28, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Savi&#263;, Nina, Kyiv Post, &#8220;Musk Says US Government Controls Ukraine&#8217;s Starshield Limits as Zelensky Accuses Russia of Exploiting Outage,&#8221; October 14, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Heins, Jonas, and Volodymyr Ivanyshyn, Kyiv Independent, &#8220;Starshield Operations Restored to Normal Speed, Zelensky Confirms as Elon Musk Claims Ukraine Violated Starlink Terms,&#8221; October 24, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Musk, Elon, X, posts on Starshield limits and the Ukrainian military, October 14, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Musk, Elon, X, post &#8220;Time for Zelensky to go,&#8221; October 15, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Orlova, Alisa, Kyiv Post, &#8220;Musk Tells Zelensky to &#8216;Go&#8217; as Ukraine Questions US Support,&#8221; October 15, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Musk, Elon, X, post on Starlink terms of service, October 24, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Silverman, Hollie, Newsweek, &#8220;Elon Musk Says Ukraine Broke Starlink Rules With Drone Strikes,&#8221; October 24, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Banco, Erin, and Gram Slattery, Reuters, &#8220;Order to Limit Starshield for Ukraine Came From Inside White House, Sources Say,&#8221; October 15, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Meduza, &#8220;Axios: White House Denies Role in Starlink Restrictions in Ukraine,&#8221; October 15, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Fenbert, Abbey, and Polina Moroziuk, Kyiv Independent, &#8220;&#8217;They Were Both in on It,&#8217; Musk Suggested Trump Restrict Ukraine&#8217;s Starlink Service, Telegraph Reports,&#8221; October 16, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Pequeno IV, Antonio, Forbes, &#8220;Elon Musk Ordered Slowdown on Military Starlink Assets in Ukraine, Report Says,&#8221; October 20, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Jacobs, Jennifer, CBS News, &#8220;Musk Chose to Restrict Ukraine&#8217;s Access to SpaceX Satellite Network, Sources Say,&#8221; October 21, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Devdiscourse, &#8220;US Hasn&#8217;t Pulled Back Ukraine&#8217;s Satellite Service, Hegseth Says,&#8221; October 21, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Al Jazeera, &#8220;Ukraine&#8217;s Access to Starlink a Decision for Elon Musk, Rubio Says,&#8221; October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Ward, Alexander, and Lara Seligman, Wall Street Journal, &#8220;Trump Called Musk and Asked Him to Lift Ukraine Starlink Restrictions,&#8221; October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Moscow Times, &#8220;Trump Says Musk Restored Ukraine&#8217;s Starlink Access, Declines to Say if They Spoke,&#8221; October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Khlyudzinsky, Vadim, UNN, &#8220;This Is Untrue: Sternenko Refuted Musk&#8217;s Statement About Using Starlink for Strikes,&#8221; October 24, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Ukrinform, &#8220;Musk Promised Not to Disconnect Ukraine From Starlink,&#8221; March 2025.</p></li><li><p>Meduza, &#8220;U.S. Lawmakers Reportedly Offered Ukraine Starlink Coverage Inside Russia in Exchange for Halting Refinery Strikes. Zelensky Was Receptive, WSJ Says,&#8221; October 16, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Meduza, &#8220;Financial Times: US Threatened to Cut Off Weapons Deliveries and Intelligence Sharing With Ukraine Unless Kyiv Stopped Striking Russian Oil Refineries,&#8221; October 12, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Orlova, Alisa, Kyiv Post, &#8220;&#8217;We&#8217;re Done&#8217;: Zelensky Says Ukraine Will Resume Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries,&#8221; October 15, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Jeans, David, Reuters, &#8220;Exclusive: Pentagon Spars With SpaceX Over Starlink Price Hike During Iran War,&#8221; May 26, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Boston Globe, &#8220;N.H., R.I. Senators Demand Investigation Into Ukraine Satellite Disruption,&#8221; October 16, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Blumenthal, Richard, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, letter to Elon Musk, October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Blumenthal, Richard, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, letter to Pete Hegseth, October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Toropin, Konstantin, Associated Press, &#8220;Pentagon Watchdog Tells Lawmakers It Won&#8217;t Investigate Starlink Slowdowns to Ukraine,&#8221; October 28, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Svan, Jennifer H., Stars and Stripes, &#8220;Pentagon IG Rejects Senators&#8217; Call to Investigate Ukraine Starlink Disruptions,&#8221; October 30, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Savi&#263;, Nina, Kyiv Post, &#8220;Ukraine Expands Satellite Cooperation With Finland as Starlink Doubts Linger,&#8221; October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Zavadska, Yuliia, Kyiv Post, &#8220;EU Eyes Starlink Alternative for Ukraine in Early 2027,&#8221; October 15, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Vysotska, Tetyana, European Pravda, &#8220;Zelenskyy Confirms Starlink Speed Restrictions Hindered Interception of Jet-Powered Shaheds,&#8221; October 16, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Zoria, Yuri, Euromaidan Press, &#8220;Not Just the Grid: Russia Struck a 24-Story Block, a University, and Warehouses Overnight, and Four People Are Dead,&#8221; October 21, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Savi&#263;, Nina, Kyiv Post, &#8220;Russia Strikes Crowded Market in Lozova, Killing 2, Wounding 36,&#8221; October 22, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Moscow Times, &#8220;U.S. Envoys Arrive in Moscow for Latest Round of Talks With Putin,&#8221; November 12, 2026.</p></li><li><p>Brennan, David, ABC News, &#8220;Witkoff and Kushner Arrive in Moscow to Meet With Putin, Discuss Ukraine Peace Talks,&#8221; November 12, 2026.</p></li></ol><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thechrissampson.substack.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">THE WIRE TAP is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 12, 2026: Overnight strikes hit homes and energy sites in Rivne region]]></title><description><![CDATA[Ukraine&#8217;s Air Force reported 94 aerial targets downed or suppressed by 08:00 Kyiv time.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-12-2026-overnight</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-12-2026-overnight</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 06:21:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reporting cutoff: November 12, 08:20 Kyiv time.</em></p><p>Emergency crews in Rivne region finished their work Thursday morning after overnight Russian strikes hit energy facilities, businesses and residential areas. Ukraine&#8217;s State Emergency Service said it had received no reports of deaths. Its notice gave no injury count. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/80243">State Emergency Service</a></p><p>In Dnipropetrovsk region, authorities reported more than ten drone attacks across three districts. Fires broke out in Pavlohrad district, where vehicles, farm machinery and storage buildings were damaged. Drones targeted Nikopol, and warehouses were damaged in the Dubovykivska community of Synelnykove district. The regional report gave no casualty count. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33286">Regional administration</a></p><h3>The overnight air attack</h3><p>Ukraine&#8217;s Air Force reported 123 drones in the attack that began at 18:00 on November 11, including 73 jet-powered Shaheds. It also reported ballistic and Zircon missile launches and gave no separate missile count. By 08:00 it had counted five Banderol/Dan-T aircraft and 89 other drones downed or suppressed, including 51 jet-powered drones among the 89. Several attack drones were still airborne at that cutoff. The preliminary report recorded impacts at 17 locations and falling debris at 18. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/95391">Air Force</a></p><h3>November 11 on the ground</h3><p>The General Staff reported 167 engagements, 84 Russian airstrikes, 238 guided bombs and 2,371 shelling incidents, nine involving multiple-launch rocket systems. It reported 7,137 frontline kamikaze drone uses during November 11. The Air Force count above covers the overnight aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42875">General Staff</a></p><p>The briefing listed 14 attacks in the Kostiantynivka sector, six in Pokrovsk, five each in Lyman and Huliaipole, two in southern Slobozhanshchyna and one in Sloviansk. It reported no assaults in Kupiansk, Kramatorsk, Oleksandrivka, Orikhiv or Prydniprovske. The explicit sector attack counts add up to 33. The briefing leaves the gap between that subtotal and its headline figure of 167 engagements unexplained. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42875">General Staff</a></p><p>Ukraine&#8217;s General Staff estimated daily Russian losses of 2,150 personnel, three tanks, 14 armoured fighting vehicles, 47 artillery systems, three multiple-launch rocket systems, eight ground robotic systems, 1,013 UAVs, 312 vehicles and five pieces of special equipment. These are daily increments in Ukraine&#8217;s estimates. The personnel figure is an estimate of losses and carries no independently verified death count. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42875">General Staff briefing</a> &#183; <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42874">Loss graphic</a></p><h3>Electricity restrictions</h3><p>Ukrenergo announced rolling outages of one to three groups and industrial power limits in some regions throughout November 12. The grid operator cited damage from attacks on the energy system and directed customers to regional operators for local schedules. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5632">Ukrenergo</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 11, 2026: Thirty-eight garages and fifteen cars burned in Kharkiv]]></title><description><![CDATA[Overnight strikes injured civilians in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine&#8217;s Air Force reported 144 aerial targets downed or suppressed.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-11-2026-thirty</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-11-2026-thirty</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 07:19:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reporting cutoff 08:20 Kyiv, November 11. Air Force results remain preliminary as of 08:00. Ground activity and Russian loss estimates cover November 10.</p><p>A missile strike set a garage cooperative in Kharkiv&#8217;s Saltivskyi district on fire overnight. The fire covered 900 square metres. Thirty-eight garage units and fifteen cars burned. One person was reported injured, and nearby residential buildings, vehicles and garages sustained damage. Emergency crews, psychologists and explosive-ordnance specialists responded. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/80168">DSNS</a></p><p>In the Zaporizhzhia district, rescuers pulled two injured women from a damaged building while fighting a fire after an evening November 10 attack. Six people were injured in that incident. The two rescued women are included in that total. Fires affected four private houses, a third-floor apartment, a shop fa&#231;ade and a semitrailer wheel. DSNS published its account on November 11. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/80164">DSNS</a></p><h3>The overnight attack</h3><p>The Air Force reported one Kh-59/69 guided air-launched missile and 163 UAVs launched from 18:00 on November 10. The UAV mix included Shaheds, with 91 jet-powered aircraft, Gerberas, S8000 Banderol/Dan-T aircraft and Parodiya decoys. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/95044">Air Force</a></p><p>By 08:00, the preliminary report listed 14 Banderol/Dan-T aircraft and 130 other UAVs downed or suppressed. Of those 130, 72 were jet-powered. These figures account for the report&#8217;s 144-target headline. The statement supplied no separate outcome for the Kh-59/69 missile. It reported impacts at 17 locations and falling debris at seven. Several drones remained airborne. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/95044">Air Force</a></p><p>Dnipropetrovsk regional authorities reported more than ten attacks across four districts using drones and artillery. Infrastructure was damaged in Pavlohrad and Kryvyi Rih. Nikopol, Pokrovske and Marhanets communities came under attack. A garage was damaged and a fire broke out in the Verkhivtseve community of Kamianske district. The regional account supplied no casualty total. Its separate report of 28 UAVs downed overnight is a regional component of the national air picture. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33271">Regional administration</a> <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33270">Regional air-defence report</a></p><h3>November 10 on the ground</h3><p>The General Staff reported 125 combat engagements during November 10, alongside 65 Russian airstrikes, 222 guided aerial bombs and 2,653 shelling incidents, including eight involving multiple-launch rocket systems. It also reported 8,781 frontline kamikaze-drone uses. Those tactical drone operations have a separate reporting period and category from the overnight long-range aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42862">General Staff</a></p><p>The briefing gave the following sector counts.</p><ul><li><p>Southern Slobozhanshchyna &#8212; 7 attacks</p></li><li><p>Kupiansk &#8212; no assaults reported</p></li><li><p>Lyman &#8212; 2</p></li><li><p>Sloviansk &#8212; 1</p></li><li><p>Kramatorsk &#8212; 1</p></li><li><p>Kostiantynivka &#8212; 15</p></li><li><p>Pokrovsk &#8212; 11</p></li><li><p>Oleksandrivka &#8212; 2</p></li><li><p>Huliaipole &#8212; 3</p></li><li><p>Orikhiv &#8212; 1</p></li><li><p>Prydniprovske &#8212; no assaults reported</p></li></ul><p>The explicit sector counts total 43. The same briefing&#8217;s overall figure is 125 engagements. Its northern Slobozhanshchyna/Kursk passage gives airstrike and shelling figures without a ground-engagement count. The published text leaves that numerical gap unresolved. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42862">General Staff</a></p><h3>Ukrainian estimates of Russian losses</h3><p>The General Staff estimated the following daily increments for November 10.</p><ul><li><p>Personnel losses &#8212; 2,580</p></li><li><p>Tanks &#8212; 3</p></li><li><p>Armoured fighting vehicles &#8212; 10</p></li><li><p>Artillery systems &#8212; 73</p></li><li><p>Air-defence systems &#8212; 2</p></li><li><p>Ground robotic systems &#8212; 5</p></li><li><p>UAVs &#8212; 1,559</p></li><li><p>Vehicles and fuel tankers &#8212; 513</p></li><li><p>Special equipment &#8212; 2</p></li></ul><p>These are Ukrainian military estimates. The personnel figure carries no independently verified death count. All figures in this list are daily additions to the General Staff&#8217;s running estimates. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42862">General Staff</a></p><h3>Electricity restrictions</h3><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice for November 11 announced rolling household outages and industrial capacity restrictions in some regions throughout the day, citing damage from Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The household restrictions range from 1.5 to four groups. Regional operators supply the actual local schedules. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5630">Ukrenergo</a></p><p>The morning&#8217;s figures remain provisional. Air defence was still operating at the Air Force&#8217;s cutoff, while rescue accounts documented damage from both the previous evening and the overnight attack. The ground briefing&#8217;s unexplained engagement-count gap also limits any sector-by-sector reading of its national total.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Drunk Captain Pete And The Dog And Pony Show]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Head Disgrae at the Pentagon reponded]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/drunk-captain-pete-and-the-dog-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/drunk-captain-pete-and-the-dog-and</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 05:48:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224312097/9656f9a6caf8a062a012f675be5ae8b3.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is the new article</p><div class="digest-post-embed" data-attrs="{&quot;nodeId&quot;:&quot;17c809a1-9401-4a67-b4b5-39a17fdcfff0&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;DEAR READER: If independent journalism matters to you, please consider a $5/month membership. I report daily from inside Ukraine&#8217;s war &#8212; through blackouts, through attacks &#8212; and your support makes that possible. These dispatches will remain free to all readers. This work depends on those willing to sustain it, and I&#8217;m grateful to everyone who does. &#8212; Ch&#8230;&quot;,&quot;cta&quot;:null,&quot;showBylines&quot;:true,&quot;showDescription&quot;:true,&quot;showImage&quot;:true,&quot;size&quot;:&quot;lg&quot;,&quot;isEditorNode&quot;:true,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;THE WAR CRIMINAL CAPTAIN&quot;,&quot;publishedBylines&quot;:[{&quot;id&quot;:11696490,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Chris Sampson&quot;,&quot;bio&quot;:&quot;Journalist-Photographer - Videographer -Musician- Based in Ukraine - Writing about people and the war. I've been in country the entire full scale invasion and I'm not giving up on our people.&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/67b16196-85a0-432d-be95-cfe5948cecd8_1258x1258.jpeg&quot;,&quot;is_guest&quot;:false,&quot;bestseller_tier&quot;:100}],&quot;post_date&quot;:&quot;2026-11-10T16:15:00.096Z&quot;,&quot;cover_image&quot;:&quot;https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zKAR!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa972c683-4160-499e-8c0e-00f57cf70174_1672x941.png&quot;,&quot;cover_image_alt&quot;:null,&quot;cover_image_crop&quot;:null,&quot;canonical_url&quot;:&quot;https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-war-criminal-captain&quot;,&quot;section_name&quot;:&quot;FEATURE ARTICLES&quot;,&quot;video_upload_id&quot;:null,&quot;id&quot;:224324660,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;newsletter&quot;,&quot;reaction_count&quot;:15,&quot;comment_count&quot;:2,&quot;publication_id&quot;:824476,&quot;publication_name&quot;:&quot;THE WIRE TAP&quot;,&quot;publication_logo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;youtube_url&quot;:null,&quot;show_links&quot;:null,&quot;feed_url&quot;:null}"></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[THE WAR CRIMINAL CAPTAIN]]></title><description><![CDATA[HOW PETE HEGSETH DECLARED WAR ON THE LAW]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-war-criminal-captain</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-war-criminal-captain</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:15:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zKAR!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa972c683-4160-499e-8c0e-00f57cf70174_1672x941.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>DEAR READER: If independent journalism matters to you, please consider a $5/month membership. I report daily from inside Ukraine&#8217;s war &#8212; through blackouts, through attacks &#8212; and your support makes that possible. These dispatches will remain free to all readers. This work depends on those willing to sustain it, and I&#8217;m grateful to everyone who does. &#8212; Chris Sampson, Kyiv, November 10, 2026, Day 1720 of the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.</em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zKAR!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa972c683-4160-499e-8c0e-00f57cf70174_1672x941.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zKAR!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa972c683-4160-499e-8c0e-00f57cf70174_1672x941.png 424w, 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class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2>I. HIS DEFENSE IS THE ISSUE</h2><p>On Tuesday morning, November 10, 2026, for the first time since May, Pete Hegseth walked to the Pentagon podium to answer a charge sheet filed against him by a member of his own party. The night before, Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky, a Republican, had reintroduced a <a href="https://massie.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hegseth_articles_of_impeachment.pdf">34-page privileged resolution</a> impeaching the secretary on eight articles.</p><p>It accuses him of waging war on Iran without authority, defying Congress&#8217;s order to withdraw, gutting the department&#8217;s civilian-protection offices before a strike that killed schoolchildren, presiding over the killing of shipwrecked men in the Caribbean, and using his office to punish a senator for a sentence about illegal orders.</p><p>Hegseth spent his time on Massie, on Lloyd Austin, on Kabul, on recruiting records, and on the troops. The sentence that carried his defense came in the second paragraph of his opening statement:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;In the 250 years of our American republic, no secretary of war or secretary of defense has ever been impeached for carrying out lawful military operations &#8212; in our case, successful at that. War Powers Resolution or not.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>The word doing the work is &#8220;lawful.&#8221; Whether these operations were lawful is the question the resolution puts to the House, and Hegseth answered it by repeating his conclusion and calling the repetition precedent. &#8220;War Powers Resolution or not&#8221; is more revealing still. He concedes that a statute might cut against him and announces that it does not matter.</p><p>The House has impeached a secretary of war once. It impeached <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/impeachment/impeachment-belknap.htm">William Belknap</a> in 1876 for corruption, and the Senate acquitted him. So Hegseth&#8217;s sentence is true only because of its qualifier. No secretary has been impeached for lawful operations, and the same is true of every official in American history. It says nothing about whether these operations were lawful.</p><p>Then came the charge that closes the circle. A congressman &#8220;loaded with personal animus for the president,&#8221; Hegseth said, was sending a signal to Iran and the cartels that Congress &#8220;will undermine their missions in real time.&#8221; He finished the thought plainly: &#8220;This is not patriotism. This is sabotage.&#8221;</p><p>In the question period he extended the charge from Congress to anyone who doubts him. Politicians who insinuate &#8220;that our troops may be committing war crimes or [are] not following the law, when everything has been [lawful] from day one,&#8221; he said, &#8220;start to sow doubt.&#8221; He described the Pentagon&#8217;s work with Latin American partners as an effort &#8220;to prevent that kind of lawfare.&#8221;</p><p>Hegseth asks Congress to accept his declarations of lawfulness and victory while accusing anyone who questions them of undermining the troops. If the wars were won, he says, criticism is sour grapes. If they were lawful, scrutiny is lawfare. And if scrutiny is lawfare, nobody gets to find out whether they were lawful.</p><p>Massie&#8217;s resolution asks whether a secretary can strip away the offices that keep American force lawful, call the result strength, and then dismiss the House&#8217;s constitutional power to examine it as sabotage. Hegseth said yes on Tuesday. I say no, and the evidence follows.</p><h3>WHERE THE RESOLUTION STANDS</h3><p>The <a href="https://massie.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hegseth_articles_of_impeachment.pdf">text posted by Massie&#8217;s office</a> leaves the bill number blank: it reads &#8220;H. Res. __.&#8221; Its operative clause says Hegseth &#8220;is impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors,&#8221; the standard language of every impeachment resolution. It describes what the resolution would do if adopted. The House has not voted.</p><p>This is Massie&#8217;s second attempt. He first offered the articles in September, which started the privileged clock. Speaker Mike Johnson called the effort &#8220;a publicity stunt by someone who wants attention,&#8221; predicted it would &#8220;immediately be tabled,&#8221; and then <a href="https://www.nbcboston.com/news/national-international/house-recess-early-hegseth-impeachment-vote-after-november-elections/4015834/">sent the House home a day early</a> for the campaign recess, which pushed any vote past the midterms.</p><p>Massie reintroduced the articles on November 9, the first day back.</p><p>Under House rules, a privileged resolution must be brought up within two legislative days of a member giving notice. Legislative days are counted by the House&#8217;s sittings, so the calendar date of a vote depends on the schedule leadership sets. Leadership can move to table, which kills the measure, or to refer it to committee, which buries it without killing it.</p><p><a href="https://abcnews.com/Politics/defense-secretary-pete-hegseth-face-impeachment-vote/story?id=137926360">ABC News reported</a> that Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries is a &#8220;hard yes,&#8221; that roughly three Republican defections would be needed for the resolution to survive, and that Republicans such as Rep. Don Bacon remained undecided while Rep. James Comer declined to support it.</p><p>If the House did impeach, the Senate&#8217;s obligations would follow its own rules and precedent. In 2024 the Senate dismissed the articles against Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas without a trial. Democrats won both chambers last week, but Republicans hold them until January. As of this writing no vote has occurred, and the outcome is open.</p><h3>THE MAN WHO BROUGHT THE CHARGES</h3><p>Hegseth&#8217;s political defense is that Massie is &#8220;disgruntled and defeated,&#8221; a man using his &#8220;final days in Congress&#8221; for revenge. Massie&#8217;s party cuts against that. A Kentucky Republican who voted with this administration on most of its domestic program is a strange vehicle for a partisan &#8220;show trial.&#8221;</p><p>The nine Democrats who introduced an impeachment resolution in April never got a vote. Massie&#8217;s resolution reached the floor clock because a member of the majority wrote it.</p><p>This publication has spent four years arguing for Ukraine&#8217;s defense, and Massie has voted against it. He voted against the April 2024 Ukraine supplemental, <a href="https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2024151">H.R. 8035</a>, which passed 311 to 112 with all 112 nays from Republicans.</p><p>He has voted against measures supporting Ukraine since 2022, and his resolution does not mention Ukraine. His motives do not make him right, and they do not make him wrong. The articles stand or fall on their evidence.</p><p>That evidence is what Hegseth needed to answer on Tuesday. He chose a different subject.</p><h2>II. WE HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTING THE DOCTRINE</h2><p>Hegseth wants the impeachment read as a sudden ambush. The resolution reads instead like the end of a long paper trail, and much of that trail runs through this publication. In April, in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/no-quarter-no-mercy-no-competence">No Quarter, No Mercy, No Competence</a>,&#8221; I traced how his public contempt for legal restraint moved from cable television into official policy.</p><p>The record has only thickened since. In order, it shows a man who told the country what he intended and then reshaped the department to match.</p><h3>THE BOOKS AND THE BROADCASTS</h3><p>Before he held office, Hegseth&#8217;s cause was the soldier accused of a war crime. As a Fox News host during Trump&#8217;s first term, he lobbied the president to clear three service members accused or convicted of war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.</p><p>Trump pardoned two and reversed the third&#8217;s demotion. The lawyers who prosecuted those cases became, in Hegseth&#8217;s telling, the enemy of the men they charged.</p><p>His 2024 book, <em><a href="https://www.inkl.com/news/pete-hegseth-told-us-soldiers-in-iraq-to-ignore-legal-advice-on-rules-of-engagement">The War on Warriors</a></em>, turned that grievance into a philosophy. He recounted arriving in Iraq and hearing a legal briefing on the rules of engagement, and he wrote that &#8220;no infantrymen like army lawyers &#8211; which is why JAG officers are often not so affectionately known as &#8216;jagoffs.&#8217;&#8221; He told readers his men should set the briefing aside.</p><p>He then asked the question that would follow him into the Pentagon:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;If our warriors are forced to follow rules arbitrarily and asked to sacrifice more lives so that international tribunals feel better about themselves, aren&#8217;t we just better off winning our wars according to our own rules?!&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>Elsewhere in the book he wrote, &#8220;Our boys should not fight by rules written by dignified men in mahogany rooms eighty years ago. America should fight by its own rules.&#8221; The &#8220;rules written eighty years ago&#8221; are the Geneva Conventions. The United States signed them in 1949 and has trained every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine in them since.</p><p>At his confirmation hearing on January 14, 2025, senators gave him the chance to retreat. He took a half step. He called the Geneva Conventions &#8220;incredibly important&#8221; while saying modern wars differ from those of 1949. On the role of lawyers, he did not retreat at all.</p><p>He told the Senate Armed Services Committee he had &#8220;thought very deeply about the balance between legality and lethality, ensuring that the men and women on the frontlines have the opportunity to destroy with and close the enemy, and that lawyers aren&#8217;t the ones getting in the way.&#8221;</p><h3>FROM WORDS TO PERSONNEL</h3><p>Thirty-eight days later, he acted on the sentence. On the night of <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/02/21/fired-joint-chiefs-chairman-top-navy-leader-air-force-vice-chief-service-judge-advocates-general.html">February 21, 2025</a>, the same night Trump fired the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Hegseth announced he was &#8220;requesting nominations&#8221; for the judge advocates general of the Army, Navy and Air Force.</p><p>That removed Lt. Gen. Joseph Berger III of the Army and Lt. Gen. Charles Plummer of the Air Force. The Navy&#8217;s top lawyer had already retired; the acting officer, Rear Adm. Lia Reynolds, was to be replaced.</p><p>Two days later, on <em>Fox News Sunday</em>, Shannon Bream asked him why. &#8220;Ultimately, we want lawyers who give sound constitutional advice and don&#8217;t exist to attempt to be roadblocks to anything,&#8221; he said. He said it was &#8220;time for fresh blood.&#8221;</p><p>Article V of the resolution renders the quote somewhat differently, as a statement at a February 25 press conference that he did not want military lawyers to serve as &#8220;roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief.&#8221; The broadcast version is the one I can verify against contemporaneous reporting, and it is damning enough.</p><p>A judge advocate is a roadblock only when the order in front of him is unlawful. That is the job.</p><p>My April article placed these firings in March 2026. That was wrong. They took place in February 2025, more than six months before the first boat strike. The lawyers were gone before the campaign began.</p><p>The removals reached the offices that count civilian harm. On May 29, 2025, according to Article IV, Hegseth sent Congress a legislative proposal to repeal <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/184">10 U.S.C. &#167; 184</a>, the statute requiring the department to run a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence.</p><p>Congress did not repeal it. The section remains law, and it opens with a command: &#8220;The Secretary of Defense shall operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence.&#8221;</p><h3>THE SLOGANS BECOME OFFICIAL</h3><p>By autumn the rhetoric had acquired a letterhead. When the administration began calling the department the &#8220;Department of War&#8221; on September 5, 2025, Hegseth summed up its spirit: &#8220;Maximum lethality, not tepid legality. Violent effect, not politically correct.&#8221;</p><p>On September 30, before the assembly at Quantico that the resolution calls the largest gathering of generals and admirals in American history, he promised, &#8220;We untie the hands of our warfighters to intimidate, demoralize, hunt and kill the enemies of our country. No more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement, just common sense, maximum lethality and authority for warfighters.&#8221;</p><p>The resolution quotes the same speech for its shorter version: &#8220;don&#8217;t fight with stupid rules of engagement.&#8221;</p><p>When the Iran war began, the language came with it. On March 2, 2026, two days in, he said American forces would face &#8220;no stupid rules of engagement.&#8221; On March 13 he described Iranian forces as confused and collapsing, and said: &#8220;Our response? We will keep pressing, we will keep pushing, keep advancing. No quarter, no mercy for our enemies.&#8221;</p><p>&#8220;No quarter&#8221; has a precise meaning in the law of war. Article 23(d) of the 1907 Hague Regulations forbids declaring that no quarter will be given, which means announcing that surrender will not be accepted.</p><p>The federal War Crimes Act incorporates Article 23. Twelve days later, at a Pentagon prayer service, Hegseth asked God for &#8220;overwhelming violence of action against those who deserve no mercy.&#8221; I documented that service, and the theology around it, in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/god-guns-and-armageddon-how-end-times">God, Guns, and Armageddon</a>.&#8221;</p><h3>THE BEST DEFENSE OF THE SLOGANS</h3><p>The best case for Hegseth is that slogans are not orders. Marko Milanovic, a respected international-law scholar, told HuffPost that the March 13 remark looked like &#8220;general political statement, the type of Trumpian hyperbole that one can expect.&#8221;</p><p>The war crime, he said, applies when a commander or leader announces that enemies trying to surrender will be killed. A slogan at a briefing is not an order to a unit. I have seen no evidence that any American unit received an instruction to refuse surrender in Iran, and nothing in the resolution claims one.</p><p>Words are not orders. But the secretary of defense speaks with an authority no commentator has. He sits between the president and the combatant commanders.</p><p>When the man in that seat mocks military lawyers for years, fires the senior uniformed lawyers, proposes repealing the civilian-protection statute, brands legal restraint &#8220;tepid,&#8221; and then says &#8220;no quarter&#8221; in wartime, his subordinates hear what leadership wants. Prosecutors call that context. Commanders call it climate.</p><p>In March, Dan Maurer, a former Army judge advocate who teaches law, published a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/133970/legal-advice-hegseth-no-quarter-hypo/">hypothetical legal memorandum</a> in <em>Just Security</em>. He wrote it as the advice a secretary&#8217;s lawyer ought to give after a &#8220;no quarter&#8221; remark, and it recommended a clear public correction.</p><p>My April article said Hegseth&#8217;s own counsel had recommended retraction and that he declined. That overstated what exists. Maurer&#8217;s memorandum is a law professor&#8217;s model of what competent counsel would say, not advice Hegseth is known to have received. I have found no public correction from Hegseth.</p><h3>THE FIRST SIGNAL ON UKRAINE</h3><p>The same weeks produced the first signal about Ukraine. On February 12, 2025, nine days before the lawyers were fired, Hegseth told the <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/petehegsethfirstnatoukrainedefensecontactgroup.htm">Ukraine Defense Contact Group</a> in Brussels that &#8220;returning to Ukraine&#8217;s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective&#8221; and that Europe &#8220;must provide the overwhelming share&#8221; of future aid.</p><p>Burden sharing is a legitimate argument. Hegseth made it to a democracy under invasion in the same month that he called legal restraint an obstacle to American commanders.</p><p>His defenders will say none of this proves a crime. They are right that slogans prove nothing. The articles rest on what the department did while those slogans were its public creed, and the first place to look is the water off Venezuela.</p><h2>III. THE PEOPLE IN THE WATER</h2><p>&#8220;More than 70 narco vessels sunk,&#8221; Hegseth said on Tuesday. &#8220;218 narco-terrorists dead, where they should be.&#8221; He offered the number as a trophy. Article V offers a different number and a different noun. It charges that Hegseth &#8220;directed the Department of Defense in a manner that resulted in the extrajudicial killings of at least 243 persons aboard seagoing vessels alleged to be smuggling narcotics.&#8221;</p><p>The resolution counts at least 69 attack events on at least 73 vessels, 46 in the Eastern Pacific, 21 in the Caribbean and two in unspecified locations.</p><p>Its count appears to include people who survived a strike and then died at sea, such as the eight men lost after December 30; Hegseth&#8217;s &#8220;dead&#8221; may count only people killed by the munitions. The two tallies also have different cut-off dates.</p><p>I cannot reconcile them from public records, and neither figure, by itself, proves anyone lied. Both confirm the scale. In fourteen months the United States military killed more than two hundred people on small boats without a declaration of war, an authorization from Congress or a trial.</p><p>Who those people were is unknown. The administration calls every one of them a narco-terrorist. The resolution calls them persons &#8220;alleged to be smuggling narcotics.&#8221; Neither label has been tested in any forum. Some of the dead were very likely smugglers.</p><p>The public has not been shown the evidence for any single strike, and I do not call the dead proven civilians or proven traffickers. The law starts with a prior question: what gave the United States the right to kill them on the basis of what it believed?</p><h3>THE LEGAL THEORY</h3><p>The administration&#8217;s answer arrived in pieces. In October 2025 it notified Congress that the United States was in a &#8220;<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/trump-tells-congress-armed-conflict-drug-cartels-venezuela-boat-strikes">non-international armed conflict</a>&#8221; with drug cartels it had designated as terrorist organizations. A classified Office of Legal Counsel opinion supplied the reasoning.</p><p>In a separate argument to Congress, administration lawyers maintained that the strikes <a href="https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2025/11/01/trump-administration-tells-congress-war-law-doesnt-apply-to-cartel-strikes/">were not &#8220;hostilities&#8221;</a> for purposes of the War Powers Resolution, because American personnel faced no danger from boats that could not fight back.</p><p>Article V describes the classified memorandum as the product of an interagency group of eight lawyers, four career officials and four political appointees. It charges that the memo rested on three claims. The first is that the United States is in an armed conflict with 24 Latin American cartels. The second is that the strikes are not hostilities.</p><p>The third is that because the cartels fight the security forces of allies such as Mexico and finance that violence with cocaine, the strikes may be described as attacks on drug shipments, with the deaths of those aboard treated as &#8220;collateral damage.&#8221;</p><p>Start with the designation. Labeling a cartel a foreign terrorist organization lets the government freeze assets, bar entry and prosecute people who provide material support. It does not authorize war.</p><p>The resolution makes the point directly: &#8220;Designated Terrorist Organizations&#8221; is &#8220;not a congressionally created designation conferring authority to use military force.&#8221; Congress authorized force against those responsible for September 11 and against Iraq. It has authorized nothing against cartels.</p><p>The armed-conflict claim is a question of fact. A non-international armed conflict exists when organized armed groups engage in protracted violence at a sufficient level of intensity with a state. Cartels are organized and they are violent, mostly against rival gangs, Latin American police and their own communities.</p><p>Smuggling cocaine to American consumers is a crime against American law. It is not an armed attack on the United States. Cartel violence against Mexican soldiers does not place the United States in a war that Mexico has not asked it to join.</p><p>The collateral-damage claim contradicts the targeting rules the administration actually adopted. According to Article V, Hegseth&#8217;s August 5, 2025 execute order required only &#8220;reasonable certainty&#8221; that a targeted person was a member or affiliate of a designated group, &#8220;a threshold lower than the &#8216;near certainty&#8217; standard established for drone strikes on suspected al-Qaeda militants.&#8221;</p><p>It also &#8220;did not require the presence of weapons or narcotics on targeted vessels.&#8221; If the targets were the drugs, the order would have required drugs. It targeted people by suspected affiliation.</p><p>Those are allegations drawn from a document the public has not seen. They are specific enough that the department could rebut them by releasing the order. It has not.</p><h3>THE LAW THAT ALREADY EXISTED</h3><p>There was an alternative, and it was not exotic. Congress has written the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, which makes trafficking on the high seas a federal crime and allows the government to board, seize and prosecute crews in American courts.</p><p>The Coast Guard has done exactly that for decades, with Navy ships carrying Coast Guard boarding teams. Article V charges that Hegseth displaced that enforcement regime, ignored the statutory limits on direct military participation in law enforcement, and substituted &#8220;summary lethal force&#8221; for &#8220;interdiction, search, seizure, arrest, and prosecution.&#8221;</p><p>Glenn Kirschner, a former federal prosecutor who spent six and a half years as an active-duty Army judge advocate, put it bluntly when he <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/48-and-30-glenn-kirshner-on-holding">spoke with The Wire Tap in October</a>. In his analysis there is &#8220;no defense in domestic law, in the law of war, in the law of armed conflict&#8221; for the boat killings, including the follow-on strikes.</p><p>He goes further than I do: he considers even the initial strikes unlawful, and he said the Coast Guard should have been interdicting the boats. That is a legal judgment, not a ruling, from a man who prosecuted homicides and advised commanders on the law of war. It matches the statutory alternative Article V describes.</p><p>In July, in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-sovereignty-he-sold">The Sovereignty He Sold</a>,&#8221; I examined the international response. United Nations experts called the strikes &#8220;extrajudicial executions,&#8221; and the U.N. high commissioner for human rights urged an investigation. A <em>Lawfare</em> analysis explored whether the campaign could meet the definition of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute.</p><p>Each of these theories has different elements. A war crime requires an armed conflict. An extrajudicial killing is a human-rights violation that presumes there is none. Murder is a domestic crime with its own jurisdictional rules.</p><p>A crime against humanity requires a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. The International Criminal Court&#8217;s jurisdiction over Americans for conduct on the high seas is far from established, and I do not assume it.</p><p>All of them assume what the administration denies: that these men had legal protections and could not simply be killed because a secretary said so. Article V puts it in a sentence: Hegseth &#8220;arrogated to himself and the Executive Branch the roles of judge, jury, and executioner and asserted a unilateral power to determine who may live and who may die.&#8221;</p><h3>SEPTEMBER 2</h3><p>The campaign&#8217;s first strike is also its gravest. On September 2, 2025, according to Article V, the Navy struck a boat carrying 11 people between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. &#8220;The strike destroyed and capsized the vessel. Approximately 45 minutes later, while two survivors clung to the wreckage, a secondary strike was ordered, killing both survivors.&#8221;</p><p>Accounts differ over who ordered the second strike and what Hegseth had instructed beforehand. <em>The Washington Post</em> reported that Hegseth gave a spoken order to &#8220;kill everybody.&#8221; <em>The New York Times</em> reported a written order to kill those aboard and destroy the boat, with no instruction about survivors.</p><p>The administration&#8217;s account is that Adm. Frank Bradley, then commanding the operation, ordered the second strike. Hegseth said he watched the first strike, then went to a meeting, and <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2025/12/02/hegseth-says-he-didnt-see-survivors-after-first-caribbean-strike/">&#8220;did not personally see survivors.&#8221;</a> He said Bradley &#8220;made the right call&#8221; and &#8220;had complete authority.&#8221; The White House said Bradley acted &#8220;within his authority and the law.&#8221;</p><p>The public record does not establish that Hegseth personally ordered the killing of the two survivors or knew they were alive when the second missile flew. It does establish that he authorized the campaign and its targeting rules, that his department places the second-strike decision with a subordinate commander, and that he defended the strike once it became public.</p><p>I have found no published Pentagon finding on the second strike. On Tuesday he said of all these operations, &#8220;I stand behind every one of these operations. I was proud to execute them, and I would do it again tomorrow.&#8221;</p><p>If the second strike was unlawful, a civilian official who sets the conditions for it, learns of it and defends it has crossed a line that impeachment exists to address, whether or not a prosecutor could prove the elements of murder against him.</p><p>The law of the shipwrecked is specific. The <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gcii-1949">Second Geneva Convention</a>, which the United States has ratified, protects shipwrecked persons who refrain from hostile acts and requires parties to search for and collect them after an engagement.</p><p>The administration says its conflict with the cartels is non-international. If so, Common Article 3 governs, and it protects anyone taking no active part in hostilities, including those put out of the fight by wounds, detention or any other cause.</p><p>U.S. officials told reporters that survivors could be struck again if they took what the United States deemed hostile action, such as communicating with cartel associates. That position concedes the default: a man clinging to wreckage is protected. To strike him again, the government must show he did something hostile. No public evidence suggests the two survivors on September 2 did anything but hold on.</p><p>Article V&#8217;s phrase about &#8220;orders denying quarter and failing to provide rescue&#8221; bundles three legal wrongs with different elements. An unlawful attack is a strike on persons who are out of the fight. Denial of quarter is an order or declaration that no survivors will be taken.</p><p>Failure to rescue is a breach of the obligation, after an engagement, to take feasible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked. September 2 raises the first. December 30 raises the third.</p><h3>DECEMBER 30</h3><p>On December 30, 2025, Southern Command struck three vessels about 400 nautical miles southwest of Oc&#243;s, Guatemala. <a href="https://www.southcom.mil/News/PressReleases/Article/4369710/lethal-kinetic-strikes-dec-30-2025/">SOUTHCOM announced</a> that the strikes were conducted &#8220;at the direction of&#8221; Hegseth. Three people were killed outright. Eight went into the water.</p><p>Article V states the rest: &#8220;Although the campaign had been underway for approximately four months, no recovery assets had been prepositioned to rescue survivors. Rescue assets did not arrive until approximately 45 hours after the strikes, by which time all 8 shipwrecked survivors had died at sea.&#8221;</p><p><em><a href="https://theintercept.com/2026/02/17/boat-strike-trump-southcom-survivors-rescue-plane-hours/">The Intercept</a></em> later reported that a Coast Guard aircraft reached the area about 45 hours after the strike, and SOUTHCOM told the outlet that 11 people died in the episode, including the eight.</p><p>This charge needs no intent to kill survivors. By late December the department had run dozens of strikes and knew some boats left survivors, because September had become a national scandal.</p><p>A campaign that keeps destroying boats in open ocean without staging any means of rescue amounts to a decision to let survivors drown. A department that strips out the people whose job is to think about human consequences makes exactly that kind of decision and calls it efficiency.</p><h3>HIS ANSWER</h3><p>On Tuesday Hegseth said that &#8220;politicians in Washington accuse the sailors and the pilots who struck narco-terrorist boats of war crimes for doing their job,&#8221; and that the resolution aims to &#8220;put the secretary on trial today and the men and women who carried out those orders tomorrow.&#8221;</p><p>The articles name one defendant, and he is a civilian. Article V&#8217;s theory of responsibility is that Hegseth built the legal fiction and imposed it &#8220;upon the chain of command,&#8221; using his office &#8220;to compel members of the Armed Forces to carry out such operations under false legal authorities.&#8221;</p><p>On that theory the pilots and sailors are among the people the secretary wronged, and he is using them as cover.</p><h2>IV. THE SCHOOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS</h2><p>Near the end of his opening statement, Hegseth reached the charge he plainly found most offensive:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;As to the claim that the American military targets civilians: well, that is a lie, and that is a slander against every professional who flew, sailed and fought on these missions. The only people who target civilians are the terrorists that we hunt, and I will dignify this claim no further.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>It was the only moment in the briefing when he mentioned civilians at all. He did not name Minab. He did not mention the school, the children or his own department&#8217;s investigation. The resolution frames the accusation differently from the one he rebutted.</p><h3>WHAT ARTICLE IV CHARGES</h3><p>Article IV&#8217;s central paragraph reads:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;Using the powers of his office, Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth directed the Department of Defense in a manner that resulted in the death or injury of more than 200 civilians at the Shajarah Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, Hormozgan Province, Iran. He did so through a scheme or course of conduct that effected the systemic deterioration and removal of Department of Defense infrastructure that Congress had mandated by law to limit collateral damage to civilians and non-military objects during military operations. &#8230; By directing the Department of Defense in a manner that foreseeably dismantled the safeguards necessary to distinguish civilian objects from military objectives, Secretary Hegseth thereby effected the murder of civilians and abused the trust of the men and women under his command by requiring them to conduct military operations within a targeting and legal-review system that he had deliberately degraded.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>The paragraph says &#8220;the murder of civilians,&#8221; but what it describes is institutional. Hegseth dismantled safeguards, and the dismantling &#8220;foreseeably&#8221; produced a catastrophic targeting failure. The article does not allege that anyone chose to kill children. It alleges that Hegseth removed the people who check targets, and that a school was then struck three times.</p><p>Hegseth&#8217;s denial misses that. He rebutted deliberate targeting, which the article does not plead. He did not address degraded verification, which it does. &#8220;Murder&#8221; is a word with elements, including malice, and an article that proceeds on foreseeability invites the defendant to answer the word and ignore the charge.</p><p>Massie&#8217;s drafters would have been on firmer ground describing an abuse of office that foreseeably caused mass civilian death. The careless word does not excuse a careless answer. Hegseth chose to refute the word.</p><p>The resolution itself states the legal standard he needed to meet:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;Under United States military doctrine and the law of armed conflict, which Secretary Hegseth is obligated to uphold, the lawfulness of an attack does not depend solely upon whether civilians were deliberately selected for the purpose of harming them. The obligations of distinction, target verification, and feasible precaution require military decision-makers to determine in good faith that an object is a lawful military objective on the basis of information reasonably available at the time.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>That is an accurate statement of the law. Civilian deaths alone do not prove an attack was unlawful; commanders acting in good faith on reasonable information can kill civilians without committing a war crime.</p><p>The question is whether the people responsible did what the law requires to verify the target and take feasible precautions. Hegseth&#8217;s sentence about &#8220;targeting civilians&#8221; never reaches it.</p><h3>FEBRUARY 28</h3><p>Operation Epic Fury began at about 9:45 a.m. local time on Saturday, February 28, 2026, the first day of the Iranian working week. Within the first hour, according to Article IV, three Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from Navy warships struck the Shajarah Tayyebeh Elementary School between 10:23 and 10:45 a.m. Between 170 and 264 students were inside, most of them girls between seven and twelve.</p><p>After the first impact collapsed part of the roof, students were reportedly moved to a prayer room deeper in the building to wait for rescuers. Then the second and third missiles hit.</p><p>The resolution puts the toll at no fewer than 156 killed, &#8220;with some reports suggesting the civilian death toll surpassed 170,&#8221; including at least 120 schoolchildren, 26 teachers, seven parents, a school bus driver and a pharmacy technician, and about 95 wounded. Iran has said 168 children died. The figures come from different sources and dates. All of them describe the same catastrophe.</p><p>On March 11, <a href="https://npr.org/2026/03/11/nx-s1-5744981/pentagon-iran-missile-school-hegseth">NPR&#8217;s Tom Bowman reported</a> that a preliminary Pentagon assessment had found the U.S. at fault and that the department had opened a formal investigation.</p><p>Two days later <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1981769">Reuters reported</a> that the investigation had been elevated and that investigators were examining outdated targeting data. As of Tuesday, eight months later, the findings had not been released.</p><p>Stale targeting data is what civilian-protection staff exist to catch. A building that once served a military purpose may have become a school. A target list built from old intelligence has to be re-verified.</p><p>That work is slow and unglamorous. People maintain no-strike lists, study the civilian environment around a target and ask whether the information is still current. Hegseth had spent the previous year removing those people.</p><h3>WHAT THE LAW REQUIRED, AND WHAT HE CHANGED</h3><p>Article IV lists what Hegseth dismantled. Some of it is statutory duty. Some of it is policy that the resolution describes as if it were law.</p><p>The statutory duty is clear. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/184">Section 184 of Title 10</a>, enacted in the 2023 defense authorization act, provides that &#8220;the Secretary of Defense shall operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence.&#8221; Article IV charges that Hegseth asked Congress to repeal that section on May 29, 2025, and that after Congress declined, &#8220;Army officials nevertheless confirmed that such civilian-harm mitigation activities had been halted.&#8221;</p><p>If true, that is a secretary refusing to carry out a statute after failing to get it repealed. That is the core of the impeachment case on civilian harm, and it does not depend on proving that any single strike would have been prevented.</p><p>The article also charges that Hegseth stalled the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, eliminated funding for the Army&#8217;s casualty-tracking database, removed &#8220;more than ninety percent&#8221; of the civilian-harm staff assigned to combatant commands, and failed to satisfy &#8220;any of the 11 objectives or complete 133 actions mandated by Congress.&#8221;</p><p>Here the drafting outruns the law. The 11 objectives and 133 actions come from the action plan the department adopted as policy in 2022. Congress funded and required parts of that work, but the specific action list is a departmental commitment. Reversing it is a policy choice that Congress can condemn. It is weaker evidence of lawbreaking than the refusal to operate the statutory center.</p><p>The staffing numbers have independent support. In August, <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/hegseth-civilian-harm-mitigation-response-trump-defense-department">ProPublica&#8217;s Megan Rose and Hannah Allam reported</a> that Hegseth&#8217;s office polled combatant commanders on three options for the civilian-harm program. Nine chose a 65 percent cut; two rejected all three.</p><p>The program&#8217;s staff fell from just under 200 to roughly two dozen. Central Command, which would run the Iran war, had 16 positions, needed nine, and was down to one by the time of the operation.</p><p>A memo from CENTCOM leaders to Hegseth&#8217;s top staff said the program had &#8220;enhanced our precision and accuracy, making us more lethal,&#8221; and called its value widely recognized.</p><p>ProPublica also reported that the Joint Staff disagreed with the Army&#8217;s recommendation to eliminate the program, and that in April 2026, after Minab, Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby proposed restoring about 70 positions. <a href="https://www.nprillinois.org/2026-08-31/pentagon-explores-partially-restoring-civilian-protection-program">NPR reported on August 31</a> that the department was exploring a partial restoration and that Hegseth had not signed off.</p><h3>CAUSATION</h3><p>Article IV&#8217;s hardest claim is causation. It says the strike was &#8220;not an isolated targeting failure divorced from the conduct of the Secretary of Defense&#8221; and lists the repeal request, the staffing cuts, the removal of the judge advocates general, the omission of civilian protection from the 2026 National Defense Strategy and Hegseth&#8217;s attacks on legal restraint.</p><p>Sequence is not proof. A school can be hit by a well-staffed military; it has happened before.</p><p>What the public record supports is this. The department removed most of the people whose job was to prevent this category of error, and then made it within the first hour of a war. Its own investigators were examining stale targeting data. Its own policy chief proposed restoring the cut staff after the strike.</p><p>That is substantial circumstantial evidence. ProPublica&#8217;s reporting does not establish that a surviving civilian-harm cell would have flagged the Minab school, and I do not claim it.</p><p>Congress can test that link. It needs the investigation report, the target folder, the date the target&#8217;s intelligence was last verified, whether the school appeared on any no-strike list, and whether any judge advocate or civilian-harm officer reviewed the target before launch.</p><p>Those records sit in Hegseth&#8217;s department. His answer to the charge was that he &#8220;will dignify this claim no further.&#8221;</p><h3>UKRAINE AND THE SCHOOL</h3><p>For four years Ukraine has documented Russian strikes on schools, hospitals and apartment blocks, and its case before the world rests on the principle the resolution restates: a military must verify its targets and take feasible precautions, and &#8220;we didn&#8217;t mean it&#8221; is no defense.</p><p>When an American secretary of defense waves away the destruction of a school by his own forces as slander, he hands Moscow its favorite argument, that every army does this and only hypocrites complain.</p><p>A country that wants to lead a coalition against Russian war crimes cannot have a defense chief who refuses to discuss his own.</p><h2>V. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPIRE WHEN HE SAYS VICTORY</h2><p>Hegseth&#8217;s case on Iran rests on a scoreboard. &#8220;In Operation Epic Fury, by every measure, we achieved a historic military victory,&#8221; he said Tuesday. &#8220;Under 40 days of sustained combat. More than 13,000 targets struck. Their navy sunk. Their air force grounded. &#8230; The ironclad blockade unbroken. We control the Strait of Hormuz.&#8221;</p><p>Three of the eight articles concern this war, and none of them asks whether it was won. They ask who decided to fight it, for how long, and whether the law that governs those decisions bound the man executing them. A scoreboard cannot answer those questions, and Hegseth&#8217;s own scoreboard, examined closely, contradicts the legal position his administration has taken.</p><h3>THE STATUTE, READ AS WRITTEN</h3><p>Three provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 drive the Iran articles.</p><p><a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2025-12-17_IF13134_27fac3b6efe508aea26aae3fca21e9462d73b6e7.html">Section 2(c)</a> states Congress&#8217;s understanding that the president may introduce forces into hostilities only under a declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization, or &#8220;a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.&#8221;</p><p>Article I charges that none existed on February 28, and quotes the March 17 resignation letter of Joe Kent, then director of the National Counterterrorism Center: &#8220;I cannot in good conscience support the ongoing war in Iran. Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation.&#8221;</p><p>Every administration since 1973 has treated section 2(c) as a statement of policy without binding force and has claimed independent constitutional power to use force in the national interest short of &#8220;war&#8221; in the constitutional sense. That is the strongest executive position, and it has never been tested in court.</p><p>It is weakest when the operation is a full-scale air war against a state of 90 million people, which is what Epic Fury was by Hegseth&#8217;s own description.</p><p><a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title50/html/USCODE-2023-title50-chap33-sec1544.htm">Section 5(b)</a> is the clock. It requires the president to terminate the use of forces within 60 calendar days &#8220;after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1), whichever is earlier,&#8221; unless Congress authorizes the operation, extends the period, or is physically unable to meet.</p><p>The president may extend the period by 30 days only if he certifies in writing that &#8220;unavoidable military necessity&#8221; respecting the safety of the forces requires it in the course of removing them.</p><p>The trigger is where presidents play games. Section 4(a)(1) requires a report within 48 hours whenever forces are introduced &#8220;into hostilities.&#8221; Presidents almost never cite it, because citing it concedes the clock has started.</p><p>On March 2 the White House <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/white-house-submits-iran-war-powers-report-to-congress">sent Congress a letter</a> &#8220;consistent with&#8221; the War Powers Resolution that cited section 4(a)(3), the provision for substantial enlargements of combat-equipped forces abroad, along with section 4(b). Article III adopts the March 2 transmission as the start of the clock.</p><p>The statute keys the deadline to the earlier of the date a report was submitted or the date an (a)(1) report was required, and a report was required within 48 hours of the bombing that began February 28. That date falls within a day or two of March 2. On either reckoning, the 60 days ran out on or about May 1.</p><p>Article III states that no certification for the extra 30 days was submitted, and that even a valid extension would have expired June 1.</p><p>Section 5(c) is the provision Article II relies on, and it is that article&#8217;s weak point. It says forces engaged in hostilities without authorization &#8220;shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.&#8221; A concurrent resolution passes both chambers but is never presented to the president for signature or veto.</p><h3>MAY 1: THE WAR ENDS ON PAPER</h3><p>On May 1, the day the clock ran out, the president <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-iran-war-powers-act-hostilities-terminated/">wrote to Congress</a>: &#8220;The hostilities that began on February 28, 2026, have terminated.&#8221; The letter&#8217;s reason was the April 7 ceasefire. &#8220;On April 7, 2026, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire. The ceasefire has since been extended.&#8221; It reported &#8220;no exchange of fire&#8221; since that date.</p><p>It gave no end date for operations. It did not mention the 60-day clock, the March 2 report or the blockade. The White House argued that the clock &#8220;no longer applies,&#8221; and Hegseth told senators it &#8220;pauses or stops&#8221; during a ceasefire.</p><p>American forces had not left. On April 13, six days after the ceasefire, the United States imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports. On Tuesday Hegseth celebrated it as &#8220;ironclad&#8221; and &#8220;unbroken.&#8221; Asked about Iranian rearmament &#8220;in this period of ceasefire,&#8221; he said of the blockade: &#8220;Nothing has gotten through.&#8221;</p><p>A blockade is a classic act of war under international law. It is enforced by warships that will stop, board or fire on vessels that try to pass.</p><p>Whether enforcing it constitutes &#8220;hostilities&#8221; under the statute is a real legal question, and the executive has an argument, developed during the 2011 Libya operation, that &#8220;hostilities&#8221; means active exchanges of fire with meaningful risk to American forces. On that theory a blockade that Iran does not contest is not hostilities.</p><p>The theory has a cost, and Hegseth ran it up on Tuesday. He cannot tell Congress the hostilities ended in April and tell the country that the blockade enforced since April is a central instrument of victory, with Central Command &#8220;locked and loaded&#8221; if Iran &#8220;makes one wrong move.&#8221;</p><p>Labels do not settle whether hostilities continued. What happened after May 1 does.</p><p>On June 3 the House passed <a href="https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2026/roll199">House Concurrent Resolution 86</a>, directing removal of forces from hostilities with Iran, 215 to 208. On June 9, after Iran downed an Apache, the United States carried out what it called self-defense strikes.</p><p>A memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad in mid-June led to the <a href="https://wnyc.org/npr/nx-s1-5863517">lifting of the blockade on June 18</a>. On June 23 the <a href="https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/senate-house-pass-war-powers-resolution-1st-time-134145998">Senate passed the concurrent resolution</a> 50 to 48, with four Republicans in favor.</p><p>Three days later, and again on June 28, American forces struck Iran; the <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-119hdoc167/html/CDOC-119hdoc167.htm">president&#8217;s letter</a> described the strikes as defensive. Around July 15 the administration <a href="https://www.kbtx.com/2026/07/15/us-reimposes-blockade-steps-up-strikes-iran-threatens-halt-mideast-energy-exports/">reimposed the blockade and stepped up strikes</a>. The Associated Press reported on Tuesday that Iran continues to attack bases and that U.S. operations continue intermittently.</p><p>The episodes differ. Self-defense after an aircraft is shot down is not a renewed bombing campaign. Taken together, they describe a war that never ended, paused by ceasefires that the executive then cited to declare the statutory clock irrelevant.</p><h3>THE CHADHA PROBLEM</h3><p>Article II says the June 23 vote marked &#8220;the first successful passage of such a legislative vehicle by both chambers of Congress in the history of the United States of America.&#8221; That is accurate only for a concurrent resolution under section 5(c). In 2019 both chambers passed a joint resolution directing the removal of forces from hostilities in Yemen, and President Trump vetoed it.</p><p>The reason Congress used a joint resolution in 2019 is the reason Article II is vulnerable now. In <em><a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2025-12-17_IF13134_27fac3b6efe508aea26aae3fca21e9462d73b6e7.html">INS v. Chadha</a></em> in 1983, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot bind the executive through a measure that bypasses presentment to the president. Most constitutional scholars, and every administration since, have concluded that section 5(c)&#8217;s concurrent-resolution mechanism falls with that holding.</p><p>Congress itself responded in 1983 by creating an expedited procedure for joint resolutions requiring removal of forces, which must be presented to the president like any other bill. Some scholars argue that war powers, which the Constitution gives to Congress, are distinguishable from the immigration statute in <em>Chadha</em>. No court has accepted that argument.</p><p>So Article II asks the House to remove a secretary for disregarding a congressional direction whose legal force is doubtful. A member can reasonably vote against it on that ground alone. What Article II does carry is political and constitutional weight: both chambers of a Congress controlled by the president&#8217;s own party told him to stop, and he did not.</p><p>Article III does not depend on <em>Chadha</em>. Section 5(b) is self-executing. It requires no congressional vote at all; it operates by the passage of time.</p><p>The executive has three answers. Hostilities ended on May 1, which the blockade, the June strikes and the July escalation contradict. &#8220;Hostilities&#8221; never meant this, which is the Libya argument and which the same facts strain. Or the statute unconstitutionally restricts the commander in chief, an argument no administration has been willing to put before a court.</p><h3>WHY THE SECRETARY ANSWERS FOR THE PRESIDENT&#8217;S WAR</h3><p>Hegseth&#8217;s best defense on Article III is that section 5(b) commands the president, and the president is not the respondent. A secretary who carries out the commander in chief&#8217;s orders, his supporters say, cannot be impeached for the commander in chief&#8217;s choices.</p><p>House Republicans rejected that argument in 2024. They impeached Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas on the theory that a cabinet secretary who willfully refused to comply with federal law could be removed even though he acted on the president&#8217;s policy. Hegseth&#8217;s party cannot hold that a secretary is impeachable for administering the border too leniently and immune for continuing a war past a statutory deadline.</p><p>Article III charges that Hegseth &#8220;continued to direct, authorize, and sustain&#8221; hostilities after every statutory period expired. He swore an oath to the Constitution, not to the president. The statute binds the department he runs.</p><h3>YEMEN AND VENEZUELA</h3><p>The resolution applies the same statute to two other operations, and the facts differ.</p><p>Operation Rough Rider against the Houthis ran from March 15 to May 6, 2025, with more than 1,100 strikes, according to Article VIII. The <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500505/html/DCPD-202500505.htm">president&#8217;s report to Congress</a> is dated March 28, two weeks after the bombing began, far outside the 48-hour reporting window.</p><p>Article VIII quotes Hegseth&#8217;s messages from the Signal chat that became public that spring, including his view that &#8220;we can easily pause,&#8221; and argues that a secretary who could contemplate a pause did not believe an imminent threat existed. That inference is fair but not conclusive; operational flexibility and imminence are different things.</p><p>The civilian toll has an official number. In its annual civilian-casualty report released in August 2026, the department acknowledged killing 153 civilians in three strikes in 2025. Airwars&#8217; independent count is higher, at least 224 killed. On Tuesday Hegseth said only that the Houthis &#8220;cried uncle.&#8221;</p><p>Operation Absolute Resolve, the January 3, 2026 raid that captured Nicol&#225;s Maduro, involved more than 200 special operations personnel on the ground and more than 150 aircraft, according to Article VII, which counts at least 83 people killed and seven American casualties.</p><p>&#8220;Casualties&#8221; in military usage includes wounded; Hegseth&#8217;s statement that &#8220;nobody was lost in the mission in Venezuela&#8221; and the resolution&#8217;s seven casualties can both be true. The administration presents the raid as law enforcement executing a federal indictment, and it has a precedent in the 1989 invasion of Panama to capture Manuel Noriega.</p><p>That precedent was itself contested, and it came with a full military operation that the George H.W. Bush administration reported to Congress.</p><p>Article VII&#8217;s sharper charge is that the law-enforcement rationale was a pretext, and it quotes the president&#8217;s own words on the day of the raid: &#8220;We&#8217;re going to run the country,&#8221; and &#8220;We&#8217;re going to have our very large United States oil companies &#8230; go in &#8230; and start making money.&#8221; Hegseth&#8217;s answer on Tuesday was &#8220;victory in 48 minutes&#8221; and &#8220;flawless success.&#8221;</p><p>Speed is not a legal authority.</p><h3>THE SCOREBOARD AGAINST HIS PROMISES</h3><p>On March 2, two days into the war, Hegseth said: &#8220;This is not Iraq. This is not endless.&#8221; In March, in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/what-i-learned-from-sun-tzu-and-what">What I Learned from Sun Tzu</a>,&#8221; I argued that a war is judged by whether force achieves its political objective at a sustainable cost. Target counts measure activity.</p><p>The record has inconvenient facts on both sides, and this publication has reported both. In June, in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/trump-said-he-would-break-iran-iran">Trump Said He Would Break Iran</a>,&#8221; I wrote that &#8220;the first phase actually ended in 39 days. Inside his range. On paper.&#8221; Hegseth&#8217;s &#8220;under 40 days&#8221; is accurate for that phase.</p><p>The same article reported a CIA assessment, first published by <em>The Washington Post</em> in May, that Iran retained about 70 percent of its missiles and 75 percent of its launchers. The phase ended. The war did not.</p><p>Eight months after Hegseth&#8217;s &#8220;not endless,&#8221; the United States is enforcing a blockade, Iran is striking American bases, and a reporter on Tuesday asked about IRGC rearmament behind the blockade during the &#8220;ceasefire.&#8221; Hegseth&#8217;s answer on the nuclear objective was that &#8220;what we can see from space, [we can] read on their name tape.&#8221; He did not claim international inspectors were back.</p><p>He did this in April too. In &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-madness-briefing">The Madness Briefing</a>,&#8221; I examined how a genuine operational success, a rescue that deserved praise, was turned at the podium into proof that the whole war was going to plan.</p><p>The rescue was real. The inference was not. Tuesday&#8217;s scoreboard works the same way: true numbers about a phase are offered as an answer to questions about the war, the law and the cost.</p><p>Eighteen Americans have died, Hegseth said, and he has been to Dover. Those deaths deserve more than a scoreboard. They deserve a Congress that decided whether the war should be fought, which is what the War Powers Resolution was written to secure.</p><p>The war has another cost that Hegseth never mentioned. In its first four weeks, Central Command struck more than 9,000 targets, according to <em>The Washington Post</em>, while Iranian missiles and drones drew down American interceptor stocks, and the Pentagon began weighing whether to divert air-defense interceptors bought for Ukraine.</p><p>Interceptors of the kind that defend Kyiv&#8217;s power plants were being fired over Gulf bases in a war Congress never authorized.</p><h2>VI. WHO IS WEAPONIZING THE LAW?</h2><p>The word &#8220;lawfare&#8221; arrived in the briefing through a friendly question. A reporter asked how the new Counter Cartel Coalition could hold together &#8220;when our own politicians don&#8217;t support taking out the narcos.&#8221; Hegseth answered:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;Also, when our politicians want to play political games, insinuating that our troops may be committing war crimes or [are] not following the law, when everything has been [lawful] from day one, they start to sow doubt &#8212; or attempt to sow doubt. And that&#8217;s the same kind of doubt they want to sow inside our partners of the ACCC as well: If you go after these cartel members in your country, maybe someone will go after you later. So we&#8217;re working really hard with these countries to prevent that kind of lawfare, to make sure they can get after these drug cartels that have decimated their communities.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>(The bracketed words are uncertain in the record of the briefing.)</p><p>Latin American officials joining an American campaign of lethal force fear that someone, someday, will prosecute them. Hegseth&#8217;s answer is to tell them the fear is the enemy&#8217;s weapon.</p><p>Their exposure comes from law, and Massie did not write it. Their own constitutions, their own courts, regional human-rights bodies and international criminal law apply to them whether or not Washington approves.</p><p>A partner whose forces kill suspects at sea on an American legal theory that U.N. experts call extrajudicial execution has a real legal problem. A secretary&#8217;s assurance that &#8220;everything has been [lawful] from day one&#8221; does not bind a prosecutor or a court in a partner country. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act already supplies a lawful path, and the administration set it aside.</p><p>In military usage, &#8220;lawfare&#8221; means using legal process as a weapon to achieve what force could not. Hegseth applies it to the ordinary means by which a democracy examines force: congressional oversight, press questions, legal analysis and, now, impeachment.</p><p>In July, in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-sovereignty-he-sold">The Sovereignty He Sold</a>,&#8221; I examined how the administration&#8217;s sanctions on international accountability institutions blurred two different things. The United States has long objected, with real arguments, to the International Criminal Court&#8217;s claims of jurisdiction over Americans.</p><p>That is a jurisdictional position. Treating the act of investigation itself as hostile is something else. Ukraine relies on that same court, which issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin over the deportation of Ukrainian children. An American government that calls accountability &#8220;lawfare&#8221; is handing the Kremlin its preferred vocabulary.</p><h3>THE SENATOR AND THE SENTENCE</h3><p>If Hegseth wants an example of the law used as a weapon against a political opponent, Article VI supplies one, and he is the respondent.</p><p>On November 18, 2025, Sen. Mark Kelly of Arizona, a retired Navy captain who flew 39 combat missions in the Gulf War, appeared in a video with five other Democratic lawmakers who had served in the military or intelligence agencies. He told service members: &#8220;Our laws are clear. You can refuse illegal orders.&#8221;</p><p>That sentence restates the law. Military courts have said it since the Vietnam era; the resolution cites <em>United States v. Keenan</em> and <em>United States v. Calley</em>. Hegseth&#8217;s own department teaches it. The video named no specific order and urged no one to refuse a lawful one.</p><p>The department&#8217;s response escalated in steps. On November 24 it posted on X that Kelly could be &#8220;recall[ed] to active duty for court-martial proceedings or administrative measures.&#8221; On November 25 Hegseth directed the secretary of the Navy to review the senator.</p><p>On January 5, 2026, he issued a letter of censure. According to Article VI, the letter cited Kelly for saying &#8220;You can refuse illegal orders,&#8221; for saying he would &#8220;ALWAYS defend the Constitution,&#8221; for questioning the legality of military operations from his seat on the Armed Services and Intelligence committees, and for criticizing Hegseth&#8217;s leadership.</p><p>It threatened &#8220;criminal prosecution or further administrative action,&#8221; including a reduction of Kelly&#8217;s retired grade, if he continued. Hegseth publicly described the senator&#8217;s conduct as &#8220;seditious in nature.&#8221;</p><p>The threat had a legal hook. Under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/802">10 U.S.C. &#167; 802(a)(4)</a>, retired members of a regular component who are entitled to retired pay remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Kelly, a career Navy officer with a pension, falls within that category.</p><p>Hegseth, a civilian who left the Army National Guard years ago, does not. He answers for his conduct through impeachment and, in principle, civilian criminal statutes such as the War Crimes Act, not through military courts. The law that reaches Kelly does not reach the man who invoked it.</p><p>Kelly sued on January 12. On February 12, Senior Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a George W. Bush appointee, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/02/12/nx-s1-5698515/mark-kelly-pete-hegseth-lawsuit">granted a preliminary injunction</a> blocking the department from reducing Kelly&#8217;s grade or pension while the case proceeds, finding that Kelly was likely to succeed on his First Amendment claim. Hegseth responded on social media: &#8220;Sedition is sedition, &#8216;Captain.&#8217;&#8221;</p><p>A preliminary injunction is not a final judgment. The government appealed. On <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/court-leans-to-mark-kelly-over-pentagon-in-free-speech-fight">May 7</a> a panel of the D.C. Circuit heard argument in <em>Kelly v. Hegseth</em>. Judges Cornelia Pillard and Florence Pan appeared skeptical of the government; Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson appeared more sympathetic to it.</p><p>The government&#8217;s lawyer, John Bailey, stated the department&#8217;s position in one sentence: &#8220;If a retired officer wants none of the obligations that come with membership in the military, they must give up the benefits.&#8221; Judge Pan asked whether a retiree who tells the public &#8220;don&#8217;t obey illegal orders&#8221; must give up &#8220;what they&#8217;ve earned by being military service members.&#8221;</p><p>As of this writing I have found no decision from the panel.</p><p>On Tuesday, with that appeal pending, Hegseth told the country that &#8220;senators in cute videos&#8221; had accused the troops of war crimes. The video accused no one. It said what the law says. The secretary who calls scrutiny &#8220;sabotage&#8221; spent a year using the Pentagon&#8217;s disciplinary powers against a sitting senator for repeating a principle the military teaches its own.</p><p>Article VI calls that an attempt &#8220;to subordinate both the Legislative and Judicial Branches&#8221; to the executive. A federal judge has found, at least preliminarily, that Kelly is likely to prove the censure violated his First Amendment rights.</p><h3>WHAT PROTECTS THE TROOPS</h3><p>Hegseth presents himself as the troops&#8217; shield. &#8220;If they want to come for the warriors,&#8221; he said, &#8220;they&#8217;re going to have to come through me.&#8221; What protects a service member who carries out an order is the law, not the secretary.</p><p>Military law presumes orders are lawful, and the accused carries the burden when he challenges one. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces described that presumption in <em><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/caaf/04-0246-AR/04-0246-AR-2006-09-27.html">United States v. Kisala</a></em>, a case about an order to take the anthrax vaccine.</p><p>When a service member is charged for following an order, <a href="https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/caaf/09-0169-AR/09-0169-AR-2010-02-04.pdf">obedience is a defense</a> unless the accused knew the order was unlawful or &#8220;a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.&#8221;</p><p>That rule protects the sailor who fires on a target he had every reason to think was legitimate. It does not protect the sailor who fires on men clinging to wreckage, because a person of ordinary sense would know that order was unlawful.</p><p>Two points follow. A disputed war does not make every order within it unlawful for the person who carries it out. I have found no case holding otherwise, and a soldier enforcing the Iran blockade or flying a strike mission is not a criminal because Congress never authorized the war.</p><p>A lawful war does not make every attack lawful either. Attacks on the shipwrecked, on surrendering fighters or on civilians are unlawful in any war.</p><p>So the real protection for American troops is lawful orders, drafted by commanders advised by independent lawyers who will say no when an order crosses the line. Hegseth removed the senior lawyers and called them roadblocks. His promise to stand between the warriors and their critics cannot protect a service member from the law of war.</p><p>Article V adds that a policy of striking survivors invites adversaries to treat captured Americans the same way.</p><h3>THE CASE THAT IMPEACHMENT IS A WEAPON</h3><p>Hegseth&#8217;s defenders have a serious argument here. Impeachment can be a partisan weapon, and many Americans believe the two impeachments of President Trump were exactly that. Hegseth invoked them on Tuesday.</p><p>These charges rest on records: war-powers letters, an execute order, an investigation, a staffing record, a censure letter. Those are documents the department produced or could produce. Asking for them is oversight.</p><p>A secretary who answers by calling the process sabotage, while using his own office to punish a senator, is the clearest example of weaponized law in this story.</p><h2>VII. HIS WHAT-ABOUT LIST, ANSWERED</h2><p>A large share of Hegseth&#8217;s briefing concerned other people: Lloyd Austin, Kabul, a Chinese balloon, Reagan, Clinton, Obama, Biden, the two impeachments of Donald Trump, and the recruiting numbers under his predecessor.</p><p>None of it answers the articles. Some of it is true, some is distorted, and some is false. A secretary who misstates history in his own defense invites the question of what else he misstates.</p><h3>KABUL</h3><p>&#8220;Five years ago America was humiliated in Kabul, Afghanistan, and every enemy on earth took notice,&#8221; Hegseth said. &#8220;But somehow &#8230; no impeachment vote for Lloyd Austin for that terrible withdrawal. Not even one.&#8221;</p><p>The humiliation was real, and the Biden administration owns the evacuation. In August 2021 the Afghan government collapsed faster than American planners expected; the evacuation that followed was chaotic, thousands of Afghans who had worked with Americans were left behind, and a suicide bombing at Abbey Gate killed 13 American service members and scores of Afghans.</p><p>President Biden made the final decision to withdraw on his own timetable and kept that decision when the conditions on the ground turned against it.</p><p>But the withdrawal did not begin in 2021. On February 29, 2020, the first Trump administration signed the Doha agreement with the Taliban, which committed the United States to withdraw all forces by May 2021 and provided for the release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners.</p><p>The Afghan government was not a party to the deal. Over the following year the administration drew American forces down from about 13,000 to <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2021/01/mil-210115-voa02.htm">2,500</a>, the level it announced on January 15, 2021, five days before Biden took office.</p><p>The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reviewed the collapse twice.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2073824/SIGAR-22-22-IP.pdf">May 2022</a> it identified the &#8220;decision by two U.S. presidents to withdraw&#8221; as a central factor, and it described how the Doha process sidelined the Afghan government, how the prisoner releases strengthened the Taliban, and how the sharp reduction in American air support and the departure of the contractors who maintained Afghan aircraft left the Afghan forces unable to fight.</p><p>Its <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2089787/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf">February 2023 report</a> reached similar conclusions. Neither report assigns a percentage of blame to either president, and neither finds sabotage. Both make it impossible to tell the story of Kabul as one administration&#8217;s failure.</p><p>Hegseth&#8217;s framing also omits that House Republicans held the majority from January 2023 onward. They could have impeached Austin. They chose instead to impeach Alejandro Mayorkas, on the theory, discussed above, that a cabinet secretary who executes the president&#8217;s policy unlawfully can be removed.</p><p>The absence of an Austin impeachment reflects choices his own party made. It says nothing about Hegseth&#8217;s conduct.</p><h3>&#8220;AWOL&#8221;</h3><p>&#8220;No impeachment vote for when he went AWOL for over a week,&#8221; Hegseth said. Austin&#8217;s January 2024 hospitalization was a genuine failure. The <a href="https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/4029584/press-release-review-of-the-responsibilities-and-actions-related-to-the-secreta/">Defense Department&#8217;s inspector general</a> found that Austin&#8217;s staff did not properly notify the White House, Congress or even his deputy, who assumed some of his duties without being told why.</p><p>The inspector general concluded that the failures increased risks unnecessarily and made 20 recommendations. An internal review found &#8220;no indication of ill intent.&#8221; A secretary of defense who cannot be located by the chain of command for days is a serious problem, and Austin deserved the criticism he received.</p><p>&#8220;AWOL&#8221; is a different claim. Absence without leave is an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which applies to service members. Austin was a civilian in a hospital bed, whose staff failed to tell the people who needed to know.</p><p>Hegseth, whose own civilian status places him beyond the reach of military courts, reached for a military crime to describe his predecessor&#8217;s medical secrecy. The inspector general found a failure of notification and judgment. It did not find desertion.</p><p>The balloon is simpler. A <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-downed-chinese-spy-balloon-carolina-coast-will-attempt-recover-debr-rcna69165">Chinese surveillance balloon</a> crossed the United States from January 28 to February 4, 2023, when an American fighter shot it down off South Carolina. Reasonable people criticized the delay. It was a presidential decision on military advice, and it has nothing to do with whether Hegseth complied with the War Powers Resolution.</p><h3>REAGAN, CLINTON, OBAMA, BIDEN</h3><p>&#8220;Not under Reagan in Lebanon,&#8221; Hegseth said. &#8220;Not [under] Clinton in Kosovo. Not under Obama in Iraq and Syria. Not under Biden in Iraq.&#8221;</p><p>The list proves less than he thinks, and in one case the opposite. In Lebanon, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution in 1983, which invoked the War Powers Resolution and authorized the deployment for 18 months.</p><p>Lebanon is a case in which Congress and the president used the statute as designed. Kosovo is the better example for Hegseth: the 1999 air war ran past 60 days without authorization, and the Clinton administration argued that appropriations amounted to approval.</p><p>Many scholars thought that argument was wrong. Obama relied on the 2001 and 2002 authorizations for the campaign against ISIS, a stretch that drew bipartisan criticism. Biden&#8217;s strikes in Iraq and Syria were limited responses to attacks on American forces, defended as self-defense under Article II.</p><p>Each of those cases drew legal objections, and some of the objections were strong. None produced an impeachment. That establishes only that Congress chose not to impeach. Non-impeachment is not legal authorization.</p><p>And none of those episodes involved a secretary who continued a war after both chambers of Congress voted to end it, or who presided over a campaign of killing shipwrecked men, or who tried to strip a senator&#8217;s pension for a sentence about illegal orders.</p><h3>THE &#8220;PERFECT&#8221; CALL</h3><p>&#8220;They impeached President Trump over a perfect phone call,&#8221; Hegseth said. &#8220;They impeached him again in his final week in office. Both times they failed.&#8221;</p><p>The House impeached Trump both times. The Senate did not convict. In the second trial, 57 senators, including seven Republicans, voted to convict, ten short of the two-thirds required. &#8220;Failed&#8221; means the Senate did not reach a supermajority. It does not mean the House acted improperly.</p><p>The first impeachment turned on Ukraine. In the July 25, 2019 call, Trump asked President Volodymyr Zelensky to &#8220;do us a favor&#8221; by looking into matters involving Joe Biden and a debunked theory about the 2016 election, while the administration was withholding congressionally appropriated security assistance for Ukraine.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/b-331564">Government Accountability Office</a> later concluded that the hold violated the Impoundment Control Act. Calling the call &#8220;perfect&#8221; ignores what it asked of a country at war.</p><h3>RECRUITING AND PAY</h3><p>Hegseth closed his list with achievements: the first increase in hostile-fire and imminent-danger pay in more than 20 years, the reinstatement of service members discharged over the COVID vaccine mandate, and a claim that &#8220;all five of our services broke historic recruiting records &#8230; for two years in a row,&#8221; after &#8220;Biden couldn&#8217;t recruit anyone.&#8221;</p><p>Pay increases for troops in danger are good news, and a secretary is entitled to claim them. But the recruiting comparison is false as stated. In <a href="https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/TAB%20A%20-%20Press%20Release_10172024_v4forMPP.pdf">fiscal 2024</a>, under the previous administration, the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Space Force all met their active-duty accession goals; the Navy fell short.</p><p>The recovery Hegseth claims as his own began before he arrived. I have not been able to verify his &#8220;historic records&#8221; claim for every service in both years, and it does not matter to the impeachment. A recruiting number is not an answer to a charge about the killing of shipwrecked men or a school struck three times.</p><h2>VIII. STRENGTH, TESTED IN UKRAINE</h2><p>Hegseth&#8217;s briefing used Ukraine exactly once, as a warning. &#8220;We lost 60,000 Americans in Vietnam over 20 years. We lost 37,000 in Korea. That many humans are lost on the front lines of Ukraine and Russia every month,&#8221; he said. &#8220;Epic Fury has never been that, and it never will be.&#8221;</p><p>The comparison does not survive arithmetic. The <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190924_RL32492_75dc0f1f826404a4728a7a3eb43ec2f8cb67905d.html">Congressional Research Service</a> counts 58,220 American deaths in Vietnam and 36,574 in Korea. Those are deaths. The <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/79446">Center for Strategic and International Studies</a> estimated in July that Russia was suffering roughly 30,000 to 34,000 casualties a month, a figure that combines killed, wounded and missing, with total Russian losses of about 1.4 million including 400,000 to 450,000 killed.</p><p>Hegseth set American dead beside a monthly count of Russian killed and wounded and called them equal. The numbers are not comparable, and the comparison makes the war sound like mutual slaughter between equivalent parties.</p><p>One army invaded. The other is defending its cities, its power grid and its people. The Ukrainians on that front line are teachers and miners and software engineers who have spent nearly five years holding back the largest military in Europe, and who have rewritten modern warfare while they did it.</p><p>Hegseth treats Ukraine as the quagmire he promises to avoid. It is also the place where American claims of strength meet a real war.</p><h3>A RECORD OF PAUSES</h3><p>At the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on February 12, 2025, Hegseth told allies that Ukraine&#8217;s return to its pre-2014 borders was &#8220;an unrealistic objective,&#8221; that NATO membership was not a realistic outcome of a settlement, and that Europe must provide &#8220;the overwhelming share&#8221; of future aid.</p><p>Each point was arguable. Delivered by the American secretary of defense before any negotiation began, together they gave away leverage for nothing in return.</p><p>Then came the pauses. According to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/hegseth-halted-weapons-ukraine-military-analysis-aid-wouldnt-jeopardiz-rcna216790">NBC News</a>, Hegseth halted shipments to Ukraine three times in his first six months, in February, May and July 2025. The first two were reversed within days.</p><p>The third, on July 2, held up Patriot interceptors, guided rockets, Hellfire missiles and artillery rounds. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell called it a &#8220;capability review&#8221; and said, &#8220;We can&#8217;t give weapons to everybody all around the world.&#8221;</p><p><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/hegseth-halted-weapons-ukraine-military-analysis-aid-wouldnt-jeopardiz-rcna216790">NBC reported</a> that the decision was Hegseth&#8217;s alone, made over a Joint Staff analysis that found American stockpiles, though low in some categories, had not fallen below the thresholds required for readiness. The <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/u-s-resumes-sending-some-weapons-to-ukraine-after-pentagon-pause">shipments resumed about a week later</a>.</p><p>A readiness concern is legitimate. NBC reported that the <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/hegseth-and-trump-lie-again">military&#8217;s own readiness analysis</a> did not support this one.</p><h3>EUROPEAN MONEY, AMERICAN SHELVES</h3><p>The administration&#8217;s answer to the cost of Ukraine&#8217;s defense was the <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-07-10_IF12040_085e5d8cfb29115f0f3829ca49be931a9d523977.html">Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List</a>, launched in July 2025, under which European governments pay for American weapons sent to Kyiv. By March 2026, according to the Congressional Research Service, allies had committed about $4.8 billion.</p><p>The program has supplied about 75 percent of the missiles for Ukraine&#8217;s Patriot batteries since the previous summer, according to <em>The Washington Post</em>. On Tuesday Hegseth celebrated the NATO commitment to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense: &#8220;Out with being a burden, in with burden sharing.&#8221;</p><p>Then the Iran war began consuming interceptors. On March 23, according to <em><a href="https://www.dailyherald.com/20260326/nation-and-world/pentagon-considers-diverting-ukraine-military-aid-to-the-middle-east/">The Washington Post</a></em>, the Pentagon notified Congress that it intended to redirect about $750 million provided by NATO countries through the program to restock American inventories. The <em>Post</em> also reported that the department was weighing whether to divert air-defense interceptors ordered for Ukraine to the Middle East.</p><p>My March 26 article, &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-750-million-betrayal-how-trump">The $750 Million Betrayal</a>,&#8221; carried a headline saying Trump &#8220;stole&#8221; Europe&#8217;s money for Ukraine. Its body said the administration had already diverted some funds and intended to divert more.</p><p>The record I can document is narrower. The March 23 notice concerned funds, not weapons already delivered to Ukraine, and it disclosed an intent to use money European governments had provided for Ukraine to refill American shelves.</p><p>Whether any specific interceptor was taken from a Ukrainian order has not been established. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said deliveries under the program &#8220;continue to flow.&#8221; Asked about the diversion at a Cabinet meeting, Trump did not deny it: &#8220;We do that all the time.&#8221; &#8220;Stole&#8221; was my judgment of the act, not a legal finding.</p><p>When the Iran war began draining interceptors, the Pentagon moved to refill American stocks with money meant for Ukraine and weighed taking interceptors ordered for it.</p><p>By October the approval queue had become a public quarrel. <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2026-10-20/zelenskyy-pentagon-patriot-delay-23208381.html">President Zelensky said</a> Ukraine had waited nearly a month for Hegseth to approve transfers of Patriot and NASAMS systems from third countries. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said there was no deliberate directive to slow them.</p><p>The NATO commander, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, said on <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/us-approves-2-1-billion-patriot-missile-sale-to-ukraine-as-nato-commander-dismisses-delivery-concerns/">October 30</a> that &#8220;every single third-party transfer&#8221; had been approved, and the State Department approved a $2.1 billion Patriot sale to Ukraine the same day. Those statements may all be accurate. A month of delay is still a month of Russian missiles against a shrinking supply of interceptors.</p><h3>THE WAR UKRAINE TRIED TO TEACH</h3><p>On March 4, five days into the Iran war, Hegseth declared that &#8220;America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy.&#8221; In the same briefing he conceded, &#8220;We can&#8217;t stop everything fired by Tehran.&#8221; In &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-lesson-ukraine-tried-to-teach">The Lesson Ukraine Tried to Teach the World</a>,&#8221; published the next day, I argued that the second sentence mattered more than the first.</p><p>Ukraine has spent four years learning that cheap drones and missiles can exhaust expensive air defenses, that interceptors are finite, and that the side that adapts its production and tactics fastest gains the advantage. I cannot prove that Iran learned a specific tactic from Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine. The similarities are evident; a documented transfer is not.</p><p>Ukraine offered to teach Washington what it knew. In &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-man-with-no-cards-said-zelensky">The Man With No Cards Said Zelensky Has No Cards</a>,&#8221; I reported on a Ukrainian proposal in August 2025, described by Axios, for drone cooperation with the United States, accompanied by a written warning that &#8220;Iran is improving its Shahed design.&#8221;</p><p>More than ten countries have sought Kyiv&#8217;s expertise in countering drones. Central Command&#8217;s own LUCAS attack drone was modeled after the Iranian Shahed. The choice available in 2025 was not exotic: take the offer, learn from the military that has fought drones longer than any other, and build the defenses before the war. The administration did not.</p><p>Craig Unger, in our September conversation &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/stop-hitting-the-thing-we-praised">Stop Hitting the Thing We Praised You For</a>,&#8221; described Army Secretary Dan Driscoll as &#8220;gung-ho&#8221; for Ukrainian drone cooperation and said Driscoll had been &#8220;pushed out by Hegseth.&#8221;</p><p>My own note on that interview still stands: &#8220;I have not independently confirmed the causal link between backing the drone offer and the departure, and readers should treat it as his reporting rather than mine until that is nailed down.&#8221; The link remains unconfirmed. I include it as Unger&#8217;s reporting, alongside the documented offers Washington declined.</p><p>The same conversation dealt with refineries. Ukraine&#8217;s long-range drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure is one of the few instruments that imposes direct economic cost on the Kremlin. As American diesel prices rose with the Iran war, reaching $6.05 a gallon on September 11, according to AAA, the administration began blaming Kyiv. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent cited Ukrainian strikes on September 2.</p><p>Trump said on September 13 that Zelensky &#8220;has to stop knocking out diesel fuel in Russia.&#8221; I documented that sequence in &#8220;<a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/donald-trumps-iran-failure-becomes">Donald Trump&#8217;s Iran Failure Becomes Another Reason to Blame Ukraine</a>.&#8221; It belongs to the president more than the secretary.</p><p>It still shows an administration that burned through interceptors in its own war and weighed taking Ukraine&#8217;s, then asked Ukraine to stop hitting Russia&#8217;s fuel supply to relieve the price spike that war caused.</p><h3>SIPHER ON STRENGTH</h3><p>In October, <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-station-chief-an-insiders-view">The Wire Tap interviewed John Sipher</a>, who served in the CIA&#8217;s clandestine service from 1986, including in Moscow in the 1990s, and later in its Senior Intelligence Service. His answer to the question of American strength had nothing to do with target counts.</p><p>&#8220;So many countries built their national security structure around the United States,&#8221; Sipher said. He estimated that &#8220;70 to 80 percent&#8221; of the intelligence reporting the United States relies on comes from partners.</p><p>On the economics of modern war, he said: &#8220;The cost of defense is much more expensive than the cost of offense anymore. We&#8217;ve spent a lot of our anti-aircraft missiles and our Patriots.&#8221; And on Ukraine, he said: &#8220;I think we in the West are missing a historic opportunity here.&#8221;</p><p>Those are a former official&#8217;s assessments, not classified facts. They name what Hegseth&#8217;s briefing left out. American power rests on allies who share intelligence and buy American weapons because they trust American commitments. It rests on a legal reputation that lets the United States lead coalitions against aggressors who kill civilians.</p><p>It rests on an industrial base that can replace interceptors faster than adversaries can launch drones, and on the sense to learn from a partner that has been fighting the war of the future since 2022.</p><p>The boat campaign and the Minab strike spent American legal credibility. The Kelly censure told every retired officer that criticism carries a price. The unauthorized war in Iran consumed interceptors that Kyiv needs.</p><p>None of this required helping Ukraine fight Russia directly; nobody serious has proposed sending American troops into that war. It required only supplying a democracy defending itself, on terms that serve American interests, with weapons Europe was increasingly willing to pay for. Hegseth paused shipments, delayed approvals and explained.</p><p>Massie, who voted against Ukraine aid in 2024, did not include any of this in his articles. It belongs in the judgment anyway, because it answers the claim at the center of Hegseth&#8217;s defense: that his record is one of strength, and that only the weak or the disloyal would question it.</p><h3>WHICH ARTICLES HOLD</h3><p>The articles do not all make equally strong cases. Some rest on the secretary&#8217;s own documents; others require evidence Congress has yet to obtain.</p><p>Article VI is the strongest. Hegseth&#8217;s own letter of censure, quoted in the resolution, penalized a sitting senator for restating the law on illegal orders and threatened him with prosecution if he kept questioning military operations.</p><p>A federal judge has found, on a preliminary record, that Kelly was likely to succeed on his First Amendment claim, and the appeal remains pending. The conduct is documented in the secretary&#8217;s own words. No further investigation is needed to judge it an abuse of office.</p><p>Article V holds in its core. The legal theory behind the boat campaign rests on a terrorist designation that authorizes no force and an armed-conflict claim the facts do not support. The December 30 strikes left eight men to die after four months of strikes without any staged rescue.</p><p>Hegseth defended the September 2 killing of two shipwrecked survivors and has published no investigation of it. The public record does not show that he personally ordered the second strike. The House does not need that to judge a secretary who commanded the campaign, wrote its rules and endorsed its worst act.</p><p>Article III is strong on the statute. Section 5(b)&#8217;s clock requires no vote of Congress and does not depend on the concurrent-resolution mechanism. The executive&#8217;s defenses are that hostilities ended on May 1 and that a blockade Iran does not contest is not hostilities. The blockade Hegseth calls &#8220;ironclad&#8221; and the strikes of June and July strain both.</p><p>Article I adds the constitutional dimension, subject to the long-standing executive claim of independent war power. Article II rests on a concurrent resolution whose binding force is doubtful after <em>INS v. Chadha</em>. It records something politically important, both chambers voting to stop a war, but members who believe the mechanism is unconstitutional can vote against that article without weakening the others.</p><p>Article IV&#8217;s strongest element is statutory: if Hegseth halted the work of a civilian-protection center that Congress requires the secretary to operate, after failing to repeal the law, he refused to execute a statute. Its causal claim about Minab is serious and supported by circumstantial evidence, and it cannot be proven without the records in the secretary&#8217;s custody.</p><p>Its word &#8220;murder&#8221; overstates what it pleads, and its description of action-plan objectives as congressional mandates overstates the law. Articles VII and VIII document large uses of force in Venezuela and Yemen, though their imminence and pretext arguments rest more on inference than the others do.</p><h3>WHAT CONGRESS MUST OBTAIN AND DECIDE</h3><p>The House should refuse to table the resolution. A vote to table is a vote not to look.</p><p>Whatever happens this week, the incoming Congress should obtain the records that decide the open questions. On the boats: the August 5, 2025 execute order and its targeting criteria, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion, the orders and video from September 2, 2025, and the rescue planning, or its absence, for December 30.</p><p>On Minab: the investigation, the target folder and its verification history, and the decision documents on civilian-harm staffing and the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence. On Iran: the department&#8217;s legal analysis of whether the blockade and the June and July strikes constituted hostilities. On Kelly: the deliberations behind the censure.</p><p>Some of this can be judged now. A secretary who used military justice against a senator for repeating the law, who commanded a killing campaign without a lawful basis and endorsed its worst moment, and who continued a war past the statute&#8217;s deadline has given the House grounds for impeachment.</p><p>Other charges require evidence that only an investigation can obtain. That is the reason the investigation must happen.</p><p>On Tuesday Hegseth told the troops, &#8220;Don&#8217;t blink. Ignore the noise.&#8221; The noise he means is the law, and the questions, and the dead. The troops cannot ignore it, because the law is what protects them. Congress should not ignore it either.</p><p>A secretary who decides for himself that his wars were lawful, that his wars were won and that anyone who asks is a saboteur has asked for exactly one thing: never to be examined. The Constitution gives the House the power to refuse him.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Sources and notes</h2><ol><li><p>Adams, Matthew. <em>Stars and Stripes</em>. &#8220;Hegseth to Address Media as House Prepares for Impeachment Vote.&#8221; November 10, 2026. <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-11-10/hegseth-pentagon-press-conference-impeachment-23421735.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Air &amp; Space Forces Magazine. <em>Air &amp; Space Forces Magazine</em>. &#8220;Will TJAG Firings Diminish the Import of Military Legal Advice?&#8221; <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/top-air-force-lawyer-fired-former-senior-jags/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Antiwar.com. <em>Antiwar.com</em>. &#8220;House Passes $95 Billion Foreign War Bills.&#8221; April 20, 2024. <a href="https://news.antiwar.com/?p=139430">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Associated Press. <em>Associated Press, via WSLS</em>. &#8220;Austin Failed to Tell Congress or the White House about His Health Problems as Required, Report Says.&#8221; January 15, 2025. <a href="https://www.wsls.com/news/politics/2025/01/15/austin-failed-to-tell-congress-or-the-white-house-about-his-health-problems-as-required-report-says/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Associated Press. <em>Associated Press, via TribLive</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Cites &#8216;Fog of War&#8217; in Defending Follow-On Strike on Alleged Drug Boat.&#8221; December 2, 2025. <a href="https://naviga.triblive.com/?p=3931049">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Associated Press. <em>Associated Press, via KBTX</em>. &#8220;US Reimposes Blockade and Steps Up Strikes as Iran Threatens to Halt Mideast Energy Exports.&#8221; July 15, 2026. <a href="https://www.kbtx.com/2026/07/15/us-reimposes-blockade-steps-up-strikes-iran-threatens-halt-mideast-energy-exports/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Bennett, John T. <em>CQ Roll Call</em>. &#8220;Hostilities with Iran &#8216;Terminated,&#8217; Trump Says in War Powers Letter.&#8221; May 1, 2026. <a href="https://rollcall.com/2026/05/01/hostilities-with-iran-terminated-trump-says-in-war-powers-letter/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Bloomberg Law. <em>Bloomberg Law</em>. &#8220;Court Leans to Mark Kelly over Pentagon in Free-Speech Fight.&#8221; May 7, 2026. <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/court-leans-to-mark-kelly-over-pentagon-in-free-speech-fight">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Bowman, Tom. <em>NPR</em>. &#8220;Pentagon Probe Points to U.S. Missile Hitting Iranian School.&#8221; March 11, 2026. <a href="https://npr.org/2026/03/11/nx-s1-5744981/pentagon-iran-missile-school-hegseth">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>CBS News. <em>CBS News</em>. &#8220;Trump Administration Tells Congress the U.S. Is in &#8216;Armed Conflict&#8217; with Drug Cartels after Venezuela Boat Strikes.&#8221; October 2025. <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/trump-tells-congress-armed-conflict-drug-cartels-venezuela-boat-strikes">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>CBS News. <em>CBS News</em>. &#8220;Trump Tells Congress &#8216;Hostilities&#8217; with Iran Have &#8216;Terminated&#8217; as Conflict Hits 60-Day Deadline.&#8221; May 1, 2026. <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-iran-war-powers-act-hostilities-terminated/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Ceder, Riley. <em>Military Times</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Says He Didn&#8217;t See Survivors after First Caribbean Strike.&#8221; December 2, 2025. <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2025/12/02/hegseth-says-he-didnt-see-survivors-after-first-caribbean-strike/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. <em>U.S. House of Representatives</em>. &#8220;Roll Call 151, H.R. 8035, Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024.&#8221; April 20, 2024. <a href="https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2024151">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. <em>U.S. House of Representatives</em>. &#8220;Roll Call 199.&#8221; June 3, 2026. <a href="https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2026/roll199">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Congressional Research Service. <em>Congressional Research Service, via EveryCRSReport</em>. &#8220;American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (RL32492).&#8221; September 24, 2019. <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190924_RL32492_75dc0f1f826404a4728a7a3eb43ec2f8cb67905d.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Congressional Research Service. <em>Congressional Research Service, via EveryCRSReport</em>. &#8220;U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine Since 2022.&#8221; July 10, 2026. <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-07-10_IF12040_085e5d8cfb29115f0f3829ca49be931a9d523977.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Congressional Research Service. <em>Congressional Research Service, via EveryCRSReport</em>. &#8220;Understanding the War Powers Resolution.&#8221; December 17, 2025. <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2025-12-17_IF13134_27fac3b6efe508aea26aae3fca21e9462d73b6e7.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Copp, Tara. <em>Associated Press, via PBS NewsHour</em>. &#8220;U.S. Resumes Sending Some Weapons to Ukraine after Pentagon Pause.&#8221; July 9, 2025. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/u-s-resumes-sending-some-weapons-to-ukraine-after-pentagon-pause">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Courier-Journal. <em>Courier-Journal, via Yahoo News</em>. &#8220;Ukraine Vote Draws Lines for Senate Race between Massie, Barr.&#8221; April 2024. <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-vote-draws-lines-senate-090011604.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Date, S. V. <em>HuffPost</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Promises Iranians &#8216;No Quarter&#8217; &#8212; A War Crime.&#8221; March 13, 2026. <a href="https://dfnihf8fcqrzv.cloudfront.net/huffpost/s-v-date/us-secretary-of-defence-hegseth-promises-iranians-no-quarter-a-war-crime/188159591">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Democracy Docket. <em>Democracy Docket</em>. &#8220;Hegseth to Appeal Court Order That Shredded His Attempt to Demote Sen. Mark Kelly over Video to U.S. Troops.&#8221; February 2026. <a href="https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/hegseth-appeal-court-order-mark-kelly-demotion-effort-unlawful-orders-video/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. <em>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</em>. &#8220;Review of the Responsibilities and Actions Related to the Secretary of Defense&#8217;s Hospitalizations.&#8221; January 10, 2025. <a href="https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/4029584/press-release-review-of-the-responsibilities-and-actions-related-to-the-secreta/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Elkind, Elizabeth. <em>Fox News Digital</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Impeachment Vote Looms as House Republicans Privately Warn It Could Pass.&#8221; November 9, 2026. <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-impeachment-vote-looms-house-republicans-privately-warn-could-pass">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Fadel, Leila; Bowman, Tom. <em>NPR Morning Edition, via NPR Illinois</em>. &#8220;Pentagon Explores Partially Restoring Civilian Protection Program.&#8221; August 31, 2026. <a href="https://www.nprillinois.org/2026-08-31/pentagon-explores-partially-restoring-civilian-protection-program">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Gul, Ayaz. <em>Voice of America, via GlobalSecurity.org</em>. &#8220;As Ordered by Trump, US Down to 2,500 Troops in Afghanistan.&#8221; January 15, 2021. <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2021/01/mil-210115-voa02.htm">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Hegseth, Pete. <em>American Rhetoric</em>. &#8220;Opening Remarks at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.&#8221; February 12, 2025. <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/petehegsethfirstnatoukrainedefensecontactgroup.htm">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Hegseth, Pete. <em>Pentagon; supplied transcript</em>. &#8220;Press Briefing on the Impeachment Resolution, November 10, 2026.&#8221; November 10, 2026. Supplied transcript; no public link provided.</p></li><li><p>Ibssa, Lalee. <em>ABC News</em>. &#8220;Congress Passes War Powers Resolution, Offering Rare Rebuke of Trump.&#8221; June 23, 2026. <a href="https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/senate-house-pass-war-powers-resolution-1st-time-134145998">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Jones, Seth G.; McCabe, Riley. <em>Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported by Kyiv Post</em>. &#8220;Russian Blood and Treasure: The Ballooning Costs of Putin&#8217;s War.&#8221; July 1, 2026. <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/79446">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Kube, Courtney, et al. <em>NBC News</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Halted Weapons for Ukraine despite Military Analysis That the Aid Wouldn&#8217;t Jeopardize U.S. Readiness.&#8221; July 4, 2025. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/hegseth-halted-weapons-ukraine-military-analysis-aid-wouldnt-jeopardiz-rcna216790">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Lawfare. <em>Lawfare</em>. &#8220;A &#8216;Sweeping Overhaul&#8217; of the JAG Corps Poses Likely Dangers.&#8221; <a href="https://lawfaremedia.org/article/a--sweeping-overhaul--of-the-jag-corps-poses-likely-dangers">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Manes, Olivia. <em>Lawfare</em>. &#8220;White House Submits Iran War Powers Report to Congress.&#8221; March 3, 2026. <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/white-house-submits-iran-war-powers-report-to-congress">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Massie, Thomas. <em>U.S. House of Representatives</em>. &#8220;H. Res. __, Impeaching Peter Brian Hegseth, Secretary of Defense, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors.&#8221; November 2026. <a href="https://massie.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hegseth_articles_of_impeachment.pdf">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Maurer, Dan. <em>Just Security</em>. &#8220;Hypothetical Legal Advice to SecDef Hegseth on &#8220;No Quarter&#8221; Statement (from Office of General Counsel).&#8221; March 2026. <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/133970/legal-advice-hegseth-no-quarter-hypo/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>McCluskey, Tomi; Turse, Nick. <em>The Intercept</em>. &#8220;U.S. Sent a Rescue Plane for Boat Strike Survivors. It Took 45 Hours to Arrive.&#8221; February 17, 2026. <a href="https://theintercept.com/2026/02/17/boat-strike-trump-southcom-survivors-rescue-plane-hours/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Middle East Eye. <em>Middle East Eye</em>. &#8220;&#8217;Unprecedented&#8217; Civilian Death Toll in Yemen from US Air Strikes in 2025, Says Report.&#8221; <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/unprecedented-civilian-death-toll-yemen-us-air-strikes-says-report">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Military.com. <em>Military.com</em>. &#8220;Fired: Joint Chiefs Chairman, Top Navy Leader, Air Force Vice Chief, Service Judge Advocates General.&#8221; February 21, 2025. <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/02/21/fired-joint-chiefs-chairman-top-navy-leader-air-force-vice-chief-service-judge-advocates-general.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Military.com. <em>Military.com, via Yahoo News</em>. &#8220;Retired Rear Admiral Who Served under Trump Warns of Plans to Politicize Military Justice System.&#8221; <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/retired-rear-admiral-served-under-214046433.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Moore, Elena. <em>NPR</em>. &#8220;Judge Temporarily Blocks Pentagon Action against Mark Kelly over Illegal Orders Video.&#8221; February 12, 2026. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/02/12/nx-s1-5698515/mark-kelly-pete-hegseth-lawsuit">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>NBC Boston. <em>NBC Boston</em>. &#8220;House to Leave Early, Punting Hegseth Impeachment Vote until after November Elections.&#8221; September 16, 2026. <a href="https://www.nbcboston.com/news/national-international/house-recess-early-hegseth-impeachment-vote-after-november-elections/4015834/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>NBC News. <em>NBC News</em>. &#8220;U.S. Downs Chinese Spy Balloon off Carolina Coast.&#8221; February 4, 2023. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-downed-chinese-spy-balloon-carolina-coast-will-attempt-recover-debr-rcna69165">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Nowakowsky, Tamara. <em>The Kyiv Independent</em>. &#8220;US Approves $2.1 Billion Patriot Missile Sale to Ukraine as NATO Commander Dismisses Delivery Concerns.&#8221; October 30, 2026. <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/us-approves-2-1-billion-patriot-missile-sale-to-ukraine-as-nato-commander-dismisses-delivery-concerns/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>NPR. <em>NPR, via WNYC</em>. &#8220;U.S. Lifts Blockade on Iranian Ports as 60-Day Clock for a Final Deal Starts Ticking.&#8221; June 18, 2026. <a href="https://wnyc.org/npr/nx-s1-5863517">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Parkinson, John; Peller, Lauren. <em>ABC News</em>. &#8220;Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Could Face Impeachment Vote.&#8221; November 9, 2026. <a href="https://abcnews.com/Politics/defense-secretary-pete-hegseth-face-impeachment-vote/story?id=137926360">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Reuters. <em>Reuters, via Dawn</em>. &#8220;Pentagon Elevates Investigation into Iran School Strike.&#8221; March 13, 2026. <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1981769">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Robertson, Noah; Francis, Ellen. <em>The Washington Post, via Daily Herald and Anchorage Daily News</em>. &#8220;Pentagon Considers Diverting Ukraine Military Aid to the Middle East.&#8221; March 26, 2026. <a href="https://www.dailyherald.com/20260326/nation-and-world/pentagon-considers-diverting-ukraine-military-aid-to-the-middle-east/">Read source</a>; <a href="https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2026/03/26/pentagon-considers-diverting-ukraine-military-aid-to-the-middle-east/">Additional source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Rose, Megan; Allam, Hannah. <em>ProPublica</em>. &#8220;Top Commanders Told Hegseth Not to Cut Civilian Protection Program, Poll Showed. He Did It Anyway.&#8221; August 25, 2026. <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/hegseth-civilian-harm-mitigation-response-trump-defense-department">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;48 and 30: Glenn Kirshner on Holding the Whole Trump Machine Accountable.&#8221; October 21, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/48-and-30-glenn-kirshner-on-holding">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;Donald Trump&#8217;s Iran Failure Becomes Another Reason to Blame Ukraine.&#8221; September 16, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/donald-trumps-iran-failure-becomes">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;God, Guns, and Armageddon: How End-Times Theology Captured the Pentagon.&#8221; March 28, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/god-guns-and-armageddon-how-end-times">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;Hegseth and Trump Lie Again.&#8221; March 19, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/hegseth-and-trump-lie-again">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;No Quarter, No Mercy, No Competence.&#8221; April 3, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/no-quarter-no-mercy-no-competence">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;Stop Hitting the Thing We Praised You For, with Craig Unger.&#8221; September 18, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/stop-hitting-the-thing-we-praised">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;The $750 Million Betrayal: How Trump Broke America&#8217;s Arsenal, Stole Europe&#8217;s Money for Ukraine, and Handed Putin a Windfall.&#8221; March 26, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-750-million-betrayal-how-trump">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;The Lesson Ukraine Tried to Teach the World, America Chose Not to Listen.&#8221; March 5, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-lesson-ukraine-tried-to-teach">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;The Madness Briefing.&#8221; April 7, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-madness-briefing">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;The Man With No Cards Said Zelensky Has No Cards.&#8221; March 15, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-man-with-no-cards-said-zelensky">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;The Sovereignty He Sold.&#8221; July 15, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-sovereignty-he-sold">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;The Station Chief: An Insider&#8217;s View of the Enemy.&#8221; October 31, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-station-chief-an-insiders-view">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;Trump Said He Would Break Iran. Iran Broke Him.&#8221; June 22, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/trump-said-he-would-break-iran-iran">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Sampson, Chris. <em>The Wire Tap</em>. &#8220;What I Learned from Sun Tzu, and What You Must Too: Lessons Trump and Putin Will Never Learn.&#8221; March 9, 2026. <a href="https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/what-i-learned-from-sun-tzu-and-what">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. <em>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</em>. &#8220;Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (SIGAR 22-22-IP).&#8221; May 2022. <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2073824/SIGAR-22-22-IP.pdf">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. <em>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</em>. &#8220;Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed (SIGAR 23-16-IP).&#8221; February 2023. <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2089787/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Stars and Stripes. <em>Stars and Stripes</em>. &#8220;House Will Not Vote on Hegseth Impeachment until November.&#8221; September 16, 2026. <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-09-16/house-hegseth-impeachment-22873869.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>States Parties to Geneva Convention II. <em>International Committee of the Red Cross treaty database</em>. &#8220;Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II).&#8221; <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gcii-1949">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>States Parties to Hague Convention IV. <em>Hague Convention IV, via Yale Law School; U.S. Code, via Cornell Legal Information Institute</em>. &#8220;Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.&#8221; <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp">Read source</a>; <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2441">Additional source</a>.</p></li><li><p>The Guardian. <em>The Guardian, via inkl</em>. &#8220;Pete Hegseth Told US Soldiers in Iraq to Ignore Legal Advice on Rules of Engagement.&#8221; <a href="https://www.inkl.com/news/pete-hegseth-told-us-soldiers-in-iraq-to-ignore-legal-advice-on-rules-of-engagement">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>The Hill. <em>The Hill</em>. &#8220;Here Are the Two Republicans Who Voted against Four Bills Related to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.&#8221; May 2022. <a href="https://digital-release.thehill.com/?p=3485384">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>The New York Times. <em>The New York Times, via GV Wire</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Vows Lethal Day in Iran as Air War Intensifies.&#8221; March 13, 2026. <a href="https://gvwire.com/?p=237416">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>The Washington Post. <em>The Washington Post, via Anchorage Daily News</em>. &#8220;Trump Administration Tells Congress War Law Doesn&#8217;t Apply to Cartel Strikes.&#8221; November 1, 2025. <a href="https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2025/11/01/trump-administration-tells-congress-war-law-doesnt-apply-to-cartel-strikes/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Toropin, Konstantin; Finley, Ben. <em>Associated Press, via CP24</em>. &#8220;Hegseth Says Bipartisan Impeachment Push Is About &#8216;Policy Disagreements,&#8217; Not High Crimes.&#8221; November 10, 2026. <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/world/2026/11/10/hegseth-says-bipartisan-impeachment-push-is-about-policy-disagreements-not-high-crimes/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Trump, Donald J. <em>GovInfo, Congressional Documents</em>. &#8220;A Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on June 26, 2026 and June 28, 2026.&#8221; June 26, 2026. <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-119hdoc167/html/CDOC-119hdoc167.htm">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Trump, Donald J. <em>GovInfo, Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents</em>. &#8220;Letter to Congressional Leaders on United States Military Operations in Yemen.&#8221; March 28, 2025. <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500505/html/DCPD-202500505.htm">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. <em>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, via Justia</em>. &#8220;United States v. Kisala, 64 M.J. 50 (C.A.A.F. 2006).&#8221; <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/caaf/04-0246-AR/04-0246-AR-2006-09-27.html">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. <em>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, via Justia</em>. &#8220;United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.A.A.F. 2010), quoting R.C.M. 916(d).&#8221; <a href="https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/caaf/09-0169-AR/09-0169-AR-2010-02-04.pdf">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Department of Defense. <em>U.S. Department of Defense</em>. &#8220;Recruiting and Retention Numbers, Fiscal Year 2024 &#8211; Thru September 2024.&#8221; September 2024. <a href="https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/TAB%20A%20-%20Press%20Release_10172024_v4forMPP.pdf">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Department of War. <em>U.S. Department of War, via Iran Watch</em>. &#8220;Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Air Force Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing.&#8221; March 13, 2026. <a href="https://www.iranwatch.org/node/13955">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Government Accountability Office. <em>U.S. Government Accountability Office</em>. &#8220;Office of Management and Budget&#8212;Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance.&#8221; January 16, 2020. <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/b-331564">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Senate Historical Office. <em>U.S. Senate Historical Office</em>. &#8220;Impeachment Trial of Secretary of War William Belknap, 1876.&#8221; <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/impeachment/impeachment-belknap.htm">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>U.S. Southern Command. <em>U.S. Southern Command</em>. &#8220;Lethal Kinetic Strikes, Dec. 30, 2025.&#8221; December 31, 2025. <a href="https://www.southcom.mil/News/PressReleases/Article/4369710/lethal-kinetic-strikes-dec-30-2025/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Ukrainian News. <em>Ukrainian News</em>. &#8220;Pentagon Chief Hegseth Single-Handedly Orders Halt to Military Aid to Ukraine &#8211; NBC News.&#8221; July 2025. <a href="https://ukranews.com/en/news/1091957-pentagon-chief-hegseth-single-handedly-orders-halt-to-military-aid-to-ukraine-nbc-news">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>United States Congress. <em>U.S. Code, via Cornell Legal Information Institute</em>. &#8220;10 U.S.C. &#167; 184(a): Civilian Protection Center of Excellence.&#8221; <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/184">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>United States Congress. <em>U.S. Code, via Cornell Legal Information Institute</em>. &#8220;10 U.S.C. &#167; 802(a)(4): Persons Subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.&#8221; <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/802">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>United States Congress. <em>U.S. Code, via GovInfo</em>. &#8220;50 U.S.C. &#167; 1544(b)&#8211;(c): Termination and Congressional Direction; see also &#167; 1543(a).&#8221; <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title50/html/USCODE-2023-title50-chap33-sec1544.htm">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Washington Examiner. <em>Washington Examiner</em>. &#8220;Democrats Call for Hegseth to Resign after Internal Watchdog Finds He Violated Policy, Put Troops at Risk.&#8221; December 2025. <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/daily-on-defense/3906740/democrats-call-for-hegseth-to-resign/">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Washington Examiner. <em>Washington Examiner</em>. &#8220;US Killed 153 Civilians in Three Strikes on Yemen in 2025, Pentagon Says.&#8221; August 2026. <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/?p=4683876">Read source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Weed, Matthew C. <em>Congressional Research Service, via beSpacific</em>. &#8220;The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice (R42699); see also Pub. L. No. 98-119.&#8221; <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R42699/R42699.12.pdf">Read source</a>; <a href="https://www.bespacific.com/?p=55851">Additional source</a>.</p></li><li><p>Wellman, Phillip Walter. <em>Stars and Stripes</em>. &#8220;Zelenskyy Says Patriot Shipment Awaits Hegseth&#8217;s Approval.&#8221; October 20, 2026. <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2026-10-20/zelenskyy-pentagon-patriot-delay-23208381.html">Read source</a>.</p></li></ol>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 10, 2026: A Ninth-Floor Fire in Kherson]]></title><description><![CDATA[Kherson&#8217;s rescue work, a critical-infrastructure fire, and November 9&#8217;s ground figures. National Air Force totals unavailable at cutoff.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-10-2026-a</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-10-2026-a</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 06:22:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Source cutoff: 08:20 Kyiv, November 10, 2026. Ground activity and daily Russian loss estimates cover November 9. Consolidated overnight Air Force results were unavailable in the checked official material.</em></p><p>The apartment burned on the ninth floor. An FPV drone hit a Kherson high-rise during the evening, injuring a civilian woman. Overnight, Russian UAVs started fires in two private single-story homes and on the roof of a two-story building. Firefighters rescued another woman while extinguishing those fires. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/80098">DSNS, November 10</a>.</p><p>One woman injured in the evening attack. Another rescued during the overnight fires. The emergency-service account does not report the rescued woman as an additional injury, and it does not put every incident into a single overnight moment.</p><p>In Holovanivsk district, Kirovohrad region, a Russian strike on critical infrastructure started a fire. The threat of repeat attacks complicated firefighting. At DSNS&#8217;s morning update, crews had contained the fire but were still extinguishing it; no injuries were reported there. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/80092">DSNS, Kirovohrad region</a>.</p><p>Dnipropetrovsk authorities reported more than twenty drone attacks across four districts. An enterprise burned in Dnipro. Infrastructure was damaged in Vilnohirsk community and Kryvyi Rih, where garages and a vehicle were also damaged. Nikopol, Marhanets and Chervonohryhorivka communities came under attack. The morning account did not give a casualty total. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33256">Regional 07:30 report</a>.</p><h2>The national air tally is missing</h2><p>A consolidated November 10 launch-and-interception result had not been located in the checked official Air Force material at this edition&#8217;s cutoff. No national overnight total is supplied here. <a href="https://t.me/s/kpszsu">Official Air Force channel</a>.</p><p>Dnipropetrovsk authorities separately reported sixteen drones downed over the region overnight. That is a regional result, not a substitute for the missing national count. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33255">Regional air-defense account</a>.</p><h2>November 9 on the ground</h2><p>The General Staff reported <strong>156 combat engagements</strong> during the previous day. Russian forces conducted one missile strike and 71 air strikes, dropped 247 guided aerial bombs, used 7,709 battlefield kamikaze drones and carried out 2,354 shelling attacks. The battlefield drone figure is a separate category and reporting period from the overnight aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42855">General Staff, 08:00 November 10</a>.</p><p>The sector account lists thirteen attacks at Pokrovsk, nine at Kostiantynivka, six each in Southern Slobozhanshchyna and Lyman, three at Kramatorsk, two each at Sloviansk and Huliaipole, and one at Orikhiv. It reports no assaults at Kupiansk, Oleksandrivka or Prydniprovske.</p><p>For Northern Slobozhanshchyna and Kursk, the text records three air strikes, five guided bombs and 52 shelling attacks, one involving multiple-launch rocket systems. It does not give a ground-assault count for that sector.</p><p>The explicitly listed ground attacks total <strong>42</strong>, against the headline <strong>156 engagements</strong>. The briefing does not explain the gap. Both figures remain attributed as published.</p><p>Ukraine estimated Russian personnel losses during November 9 at <strong>2,220</strong>. This is an official Ukrainian personnel-loss estimate, not an independently verified count of deaths.</p><p>The daily equipment-loss account reports three tanks, thirteen armored fighting vehicles, 46 artillery systems, three multiple-launch rocket systems, one air-defense system, eight ground robotic systems, 1,331 UAVs, 525 vehicles and three pieces of special equipment. These are daily increments, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42855">General Staff loss account</a>.</p><h2>The dates inside Sumy&#8217;s report</h2><p>Police reported one person killed and eight injured in their preceding-day account for Sumy region. A drone strike killed a 38-year-old man in Mykolaivka community. Another drone attack injured five men and a woman in Sumy community; a 54-year-old man was injured in Velyka Pysarivka community.</p><p>The eighth injury in the account concerns a fifteen-year-old girl who sought medical help for an injury sustained on November 5 in Hlukhiv community. Her treatment report belongs in the record, but it is not a fresh November 9 or overnight November 10 casualty. <a href="https://t.me/UA_National_Police/81661">National Police, November 10</a>.</p><h2>The outage notice</h2><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice, issued November 9 specifically for November 10, provides for industrial restrictions and rolling outages in some regions throughout the day. It specifies two to four outage groups for consumers. Groups are not hours; regional distribution operators publish the actual schedules. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5628">Ukrenergo</a>.</p><p>In Kherson, crews extinguished the fires despite the threat of another strike. They brought another woman out.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 9, 2026: Fifteen Rescued in Kremenchuk]]></title><description><![CDATA[Kremenchuk rescues, the Air Force&#8217;s preliminary 276-target result, and November 8&#8217;s ground figures.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-9-2026-fifteen</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-9-2026-fifteen</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 06:22:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Source cutoff: 08:20 Kyiv, November 9, 2026. Air-defense results are preliminary as of 08:00. Ground activity and daily Russian loss estimates cover November 8.</em></p><p>Fifteen residents came out of danger in Kremenchuk. Russian strikes hit a residential area in the city and a private enterprise in Kremenchuk district, starting fires at several locations. DSNS reported seven people injured, including a sixteen-year-old. Doctors were treating them. Crews extinguished every reported fire. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/80013">DSNS, November 9</a>.</p><p>The fifteen rescued and seven injured are different measures. The source does not establish that they are separate groups of people, so they cannot be added into a twenty-two-person casualty figure.</p><p>In Dnipropetrovsk region, authorities reported nearly twenty drone attacks across five districts. An enterprise was damaged in Dnipro, infrastructure in Kamianske and Hrechanopodivka community, and a vehicle service station and cars in Samar district. Nikopol and Pokrovske community also came under attack. The morning account did not give a casualty total. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33236">Regional 07:30 report</a>.</p><h2>The count at eight</h2><p>Russia launched <strong>317 UAVs</strong> in the attack beginning at 18:00 on November 8, the Air Force reported. The listed types included Shahed, S8000 Banderol/Dan-T, Gerbera and Parodiya decoys. The launch account identified 105 jet-powered drones.</p><p>The official headline reports <strong>276 targets downed or suppressed</strong>. Its detailed sentence lists 271 UAVs and five S8000 Banderol/Dan-T aircraft; 81 jet-powered drones appear within the 271 figure. That reading reconciles the headline as 271 plus five. The wording groups several aircraft types together, so the published breakdown is preserved here rather than silently rewritten. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/94425">Original Air Force report</a>.</p><p>Several attack drones remained airborne at 08:00. The report recorded impacts at 31 locations and downed aircraft or debris falling at nine. Locations are not individual weapon counts, and the difference between launches and interceptions is not a confirmed successful-strike count.</p><p>Dnipropetrovsk authorities separately reported 23 drones downed over the region overnight. That local figure is not added to the national result. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33235">Regional air-defense account</a>.</p><h2>November 8 on the ground</h2><p>The General Staff reported <strong>140 combat engagements</strong> during the previous day. Russian aviation conducted 84 air strikes and dropped 250 guided aerial bombs. The briefing also records 8,690 battlefield kamikaze-drone uses and 2,331 shelling attacks. Battlefield drone use belongs to a separate category and reporting period from the overnight aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846">General Staff, 08:00 November 9</a>.</p><p>The sector account lists fifteen attacks at Pokrovsk, nine at Kostiantynivka, seven in Southern Slobozhanshchyna, five at Huliaipole, four at Lyman, three in Northern Slobozhanshchyna and one at Kramatorsk. It reports no assaults at Kupiansk or Oleksandrivka and no active offensive operations at Sloviansk; no active operations were reported at Orikhiv or Prydniprovske.</p><p>Those explicitly listed attacks total <strong>44</strong>, against the briefing&#8217;s headline <strong>140 engagements</strong>. The source does not reconcile the gap. Both figures remain attributed as published.</p><p>Ukraine estimated Russian personnel losses during November 8 at <strong>2,980</strong>. That is an official Ukrainian personnel-loss estimate, not an independently verified count of deaths.</p><p>The daily equipment-loss account reports four tanks, fifteen armored fighting vehicles, 68 artillery systems, six multiple-launch rocket systems, two air-defense systems, ten ground robotic systems, 1,843 UAVs, 638 vehicles, one piece of special equipment and one heavy flamethrower system. These are daily increments, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846">General Staff loss account</a>.</p><h2>The outage notice</h2><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice, issued November 8 specifically for November 9, provides for industrial restrictions and rolling outages in some regions throughout the day. It specifies 1.5&#8211;4 outage groups for consumers. Groups are not hours; regional distribution operators publish the actual schedules. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5624">Ukrenergo</a>.</p><p>At the morning source cutoff, the checked National Police feed did not supply an additional November 9 regional casualty account to include. Yesterday&#8217;s incidents have not been relabeled as today&#8217;s.</p><p>In Kremenchuk, firefighters had extinguished the fires. Seven people, including a sixteen-year-old, needed medical care.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Realistic Policy Confronting Russia with Alexander Khara]]></title><description><![CDATA[A recording from Chris Sampson's live video]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/realistic-policy-confronting-russia</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/realistic-policy-confronting-russia</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 05:55:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/223960298/3de95420de0c9e7746e7bd8b7cb090bb.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;John Mahoney&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:167282523,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@johnmahoney43&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/dcf19b0e-2072-4f37-84c9-b8b6369c4692_2448x2448.jpeg&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;c54f450e-e2e8-4155-9cbd-9f18a2ef39d5&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Sheryl&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:132613774,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@sheryl2&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6b855de8-3ec0-4f6f-ae6c-d072e3b2fa24_639x637.jpeg&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;fd17d7b3-a9d4-40f1-8c39-b5555eeb5e5b&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Laura K&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:245723508,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@lklos&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:null,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;91845939-3457-4e2e-bcd5-572637d240a7&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Ann Sczerbowicz&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:318036240,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@amipbs1983&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/3dbcc78a-d9dd-46e9-8d65-eb91966f9c38_636x638.png&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;1c4401e1-6d76-4528-ac56-4ca2536cfaf6&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Shannon Edrie&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:3964635,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@shannonedrie&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/904ff15e-7ebf-469e-a881-e14cd43822d1_1579x1579.png&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;972d1f76-e11e-4c22-ad01-cec3e79bddc7&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, and many others for tuning into my live video with <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Alexander Khara&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:72077116,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@alexanderkhara&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/93fba624-17a1-4946-8067-e00b1365216f_1472x1472.jpeg&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;4244f2d2-a291-4efd-a6fe-a9c086695d0a&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>! Join me for my next live video in the app.</p><div class="install-substack-app-embed install-substack-app-embed-web" data-component-name="InstallSubstackAppToDOM"><img class="install-substack-app-embed-img" src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png"><div class="install-substack-app-embed-text"><div class="install-substack-app-header">Get more from Chris Sampson in the Substack app</div><div class="install-substack-app-text">Available for iOS and Android</div></div><a href="https://substack.com/app/app-store-redirect?utm_campaign=app-marketing&amp;utm_content=author-post-insert&amp;utm_source=thechrissampson" target="_blank" class="install-substack-app-embed-link"><button class="install-substack-app-embed-btn button primary">Get the app</button></a></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Kyiv Lights Out, Bridge Attacked, Disinformation Flies | Day 1718 | The Wire Tap]]></title><description><![CDATA[An Afternoon Briefing From The War You Cannot Ignore]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/russian-terrorism-day-1718</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/russian-terrorism-day-1718</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 15:41:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224015307/9dd85c62baac40f7d0963c826c278a64.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The electricity comes back, and we go live. From Kyiv&#8217;s left bank, Chris Sampson reports on blackouts, Russian attacks on the city&#8217;s bridges, and the pressure on water, power, and transportation as another winter approaches.</p><p>On Day 1718 of Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion, this Russian Terror Report covers what those attacks mean for people trying to get to work, get home, and keep living.</p><p>Also in this episode:<br>&#8226; Russia&#8217;s disinformation and the framing that shifts responsibility away from the aggressor.<br>&#8226; Stephen Kinzer&#8217;s &#8220;Boiling Point,&#8221; Ukrainian history, and what gets lost when Ukraine&#8217;s own experience is pushed aside.<br>&#8226; Tracking congressional support for Ukraine and building maps that connect votes, policy, and advocacy.<br>&#8226; Keeping independent journalism working through power cuts and wartime disruption.</p><p>The Wire Tap is viewer-supported journalism from Ukraine. Your support helps pay for reporting, filming, equipment, and the tools that keep this work going. Subscribe, share, and consider becoming a paid supporter on Substack.</p><p>Live From Kyiv.<br>Valid Reasoning Preserves Truth.</p><p>#Ukraine #Kyiv #TheWireTap</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 8, 2026: Six Hundred Thousand Customers Without Power]]></title><description><![CDATA[Dnipropetrovsk&#8217;s blackout, rescuers struck in Zaporizhzhia district, and the official overnight and ground figures.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-8-2026-six</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-8-2026-six</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 09:25:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Source cutoff: 11:23 Kyiv, November 8, 2026. Air-defense results are the preliminary 08:00 snapshot. Ground activity and daily Russian loss estimates cover November 7.</em></p><p>Hospitals switched to generators. More than 600,000 electricity customers lost power across five districts of Dnipropetrovsk region after attacks on the energy system, the regional administration reported this morning. Repair crews were working under continuing Russian fire. Customers are connections, not a count of individual people. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33199">Regional electricity update</a>.</p><p>By 10:31, more than 400 assistance points were operating in the affected districts, including more than 160 in Dnipro district. They offered charging, internet access and warmth. The regional administration directed residents to its website and the Diia app for addresses. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33200">Assistance-point update</a>.</p><p>Then another strike. At 10:48, authorities reported a drone attack on a Dnipro suburb: fire, at least one private house destroyed, and people possibly beneath the rubble. That last detail was preliminary. It is not a confirmed casualty count. The later repost repeats the same incident. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33210">Original strike report</a>.</p><h2>Rescuers under attack</h2><p>In Zaporizhzhia district, a drone struck rescuers working at the site of an air strike on a shelter, DSNS reported. No personnel were injured; specialized rescue equipment was damaged. DSNS described the November 8 morning attack as deliberate targeting of emergency workers. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79989">DSNS</a>.</p><p>In Poltava region, Russian strikes injured four people and caused destruction and fires at several locations, including private enterprises. Rescuers faced a continuing threat of repeat strikes while they worked. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79979">DSNS, Poltava region</a>.</p><p>In Khmelnytskyi, drones damaged private homes and blew windows out of apartment buildings. DSNS&#8217;s preliminary account reported one person injured, without a need for hospitalization. Explosive-ordnance teams checked the surrounding area. These are separate regional accounts, not a complete national casualty tally. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79971">DSNS, Khmelnytskyi</a>.</p><h2>The overnight count</h2><p>Russia launched <strong>164 drones and three Kh-59/69 guided air-launched missiles</strong> in the attack beginning at 18:00 on November 7, according to the Air Force. Its drone accounting included Shahed-type aircraft, Gerbera drones and Parodiya decoys; 112 were described as jet-powered.</p><p>At 08:00, Ukrainian defenses reported <strong>137 drones downed or suppressed</strong>, including 88 jet-powered aircraft. Several attack drones remained airborne. The report recorded impacts at 23 locations and downed aircraft or debris falling at six. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/94139">Original Air Force report</a>.</p><p>The official headline calls these 137 targets; the detailed result identifies all 137 as UAVs. It does not separately establish the outcome for the three missiles. Locations are not individual weapon counts, and the difference between launch and interception totals is not a verified successful-strike count.</p><p>Dnipropetrovsk authorities separately reported thirteen drones downed over the region overnight. That local figure is not added to the national result. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33197">Regional air-defense account</a>.</p><h2>November 7 on the ground</h2><p>The General Staff reported <strong>199 combat engagements</strong> during the previous day. Russian forces conducted two missile strikes and 74 air strikes, dropped 235 guided aerial bombs, used 7,557 battlefield kamikaze drones and carried out 2,369 shelling attacks, eighteen involving multiple-launch rocket systems. The battlefield drone figure belongs to a separate category and reporting period from the overnight aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42837">General Staff morning briefing</a>.</p><p>The sector account lists 23 attacks at Kostiantynivka, nine at Pokrovsk, eight in Southern Slobozhanshchyna, five at Lyman, four each in Northern Slobozhanshchyna/Kursk and Sloviansk, three at Huliaipole, two at Orikhiv and one at Kramatorsk. No assaults were reported at Kupiansk, Oleksandrivka or Prydniprovske.</p><p>Those listed counts total <strong>59</strong>, against the headline <strong>199 engagements</strong>. The source does not explain the gap. Both figures remain attributed as published.</p><p>Ukraine estimated Russian personnel losses during November 7 at <strong>2,290</strong>. This is a Ukrainian official personnel-loss estimate, not an independently verified count of deaths.</p><p>The daily equipment-loss list reports two tanks, fourteen armored fighting vehicles, 44 artillery systems, four air-defense systems, six ground robotic systems, 1,337 UAVs, four missiles, two operational-tactical missile systems, 461 vehicles and seven pieces of special equipment. These are daily increments, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42837">General Staff loss account</a>.</p><h2>The schedule and the generators</h2><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice, issued November 7 specifically for November 8, provides for industrial restrictions and rolling outages in some regions throughout the day. It specifies 1.5&#8211;4 outage groups for consumers. Groups are not hours; regional operators publish the actual schedules. This planned restriction notice is distinct from the attack-related outages reported in Dnipropetrovsk region this morning. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5622">Ukrenergo</a>.</p><p>More than 400 assistance points were open in the affected districts. Hospitals were running on generators.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 7, 2026: Broken Windows in Kyiv, Fires in Pavlohrad]]></title><description><![CDATA[The 09:00 Air Force tally, civilian damage in Kyiv and Pavlohrad, and November 6&#8217;s ground figures.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-7-2026-broken</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-7-2026-broken</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 08:00:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reporting cutoff: 09:53 Kyiv, November 7. Air Force results are preliminary as of 09:00. Ground activity and daily Russian loss estimates cover November 6.</em></p><p>The blast blew windows out of five-story apartment buildings in Kyiv&#8217;s Solomianskyi district. Elsewhere in the district, a two-story building on kindergarten grounds was damaged, and a parked truck and a nonresidential building burned. Firefighters extinguished those fires.</p><p>DSNS reported three people injured in the overnight attack, including a child. At another address, the first-floor facade of a five-story residential building was partly destroyed; rescuers reported no casualties at that location. The individual addresses sit inside the same district account, not separate casualty totals to add together. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79876">DSNS, November 7</a>.</p><p>In Kyiv region, rescuers extinguished a fire at an infrastructure site after the evening and overnight attack. Crews from Boryspil district worked alongside additional forces and the fire unit of Boryspil International Airport. The account does not identify the damaged site as the airport. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79888">DSNS infrastructure-fire report</a>.</p><p>In Pavlohrad, drones damaged apartment buildings and started fires. The first regional report said three residents were in hospital for examination and treatment. The 07:30 update clarified their conditions: a 32-year-old man remained hospitalized in moderately serious condition; a 38-year-old woman and an 11-year-old girl would receive outpatient treatment. Three people, with a later account of what happened to them. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33179">Initial report</a>, <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33181">regional update</a>.</p><p>Authorities reported nearly twenty drone attacks across four districts of Dnipropetrovsk region. In Pavlohrad, the damage also included an enterprise, vehicles and outbuildings. Infrastructure was damaged in the Novooleksandrivka and Mykolaivka communities, in Nikopol district and in Novopillia community near Kryvyi Rih.</p><h2>The air count arrived at nine</h2><p>Russia launched <strong>172 drones</strong> in the attack beginning at 18:00 on November 6, alongside missiles identified in the official account as Iskander-M, Zircon, KN-23 and S-400 types. The Air Force named Kyiv region as the main direction of attack. Its drone accounting included Shahed-type aircraft, Gerbera drones and Parodiya decoys; 137 drones were described as jet-powered.</p><p>At 09:00, Ukrainian defenses reported <strong>149 UAVs and four missiles downed or suppressed</strong>&#8212;153 targets combined. The drone figure included 117 jet-powered aircraft. Several attack drones remained airborne. The report recorded impacts at 24 locations and downed aircraft or debris falling at ten. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/93936">Original Air Force report</a>.</p><p>The report does not state the total number of missiles launched. Four intercepted missiles cannot supply that missing denominator. Impact locations are a separate measure from individual weapons, and subtracting intercepted drones from launched drones does not produce a verified successful-strike count.</p><p>Dnipropetrovsk authorities separately reported twelve drones downed over the region overnight. That local count is not added to the national result. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33180">Regional air-defense report</a>.</p><h2>November 6 on the ground</h2><p>The General Staff&#8217;s morning briefing reported <strong>190 combat engagements</strong> during the previous day. Russian forces conducted one missile strike and 75 air strikes, dropped 261 guided aerial bombs, used 6,903 battlefield kamikaze drones and carried out 2,184 shelling attacks, including 53 involving multiple-launch rocket systems. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42830">General Staff, 08:00 November 7</a>.</p><p>The battlefield drone figure describes a different category and reporting period from the overnight aerial attack.</p><p>The sector account lists fifteen attacks at Kostiantynivka, eight each at Lyman and Huliaipole, five each at Pokrovsk and Southern Slobozhanshchyna, three at Kupiansk and two at Sloviansk. It reports no assaults at Kramatorsk, Oleksandrivka, Orikhiv or Prydniprovske.</p><p>For Northern Slobozhanshchyna and Kursk, the briefing records one air strike, six guided bombs and 73 shelling attacks, four involving multiple-launch rocket systems. It does not give a ground-assault count.</p><p>The explicitly listed sector attacks total <strong>46</strong>, against the headline <strong>190 engagements</strong>. The source does not reconcile that gap. Both figures remain attributed as published.</p><p>Ukraine estimated Russian personnel losses during November 6 at <strong>2,280</strong>. This is an official Ukrainian personnel-loss estimate, not an independently verified count of deaths.</p><p>The daily equipment-loss list includes three armored fighting vehicles, 44 artillery systems, three multiple-launch rocket systems, three air-defense systems, eight ground robotic systems, 1,224 UAVs, one heavy flamethrower system, 460 vehicles and three pieces of special equipment. These are daily increments, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42830">General Staff loss account</a>.</p><h2>The dates inside Sumy&#8217;s casualty report</h2><p>Police reported one person killed and thirteen affected in their preceding-day account of attacks on nineteen Sumy-region settlements.</p><p>A drone attack in Lypova Dolyna community killed a 52-year-old man and wounded a 62-year-old man. Guided bombs injured four women and three men in Sumy community. A drone strike injured a 26-year-old man and a 48-year-old woman in Shostka community.</p><p>Three other people in the headline total sought medical help for injuries from November 5: a 23-year-old man, a 59-year-old woman and a 33-year-old man. They are delayed treatment reports from an earlier date, not three new overnight casualties. <a href="https://t.me/UA_National_Police/81461">National Police, November 7</a>.</p><h2>The outage schedule</h2><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice, issued November 6 specifically for November 7, provides for industrial restrictions and rolling outages in some regions throughout the day. It specifies two to four outage groups for consumers. Groups are not hours; regional distribution operators publish the actual schedules. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5621">Ukrenergo</a>.</p><p>In Pavlohrad, the morning update left one man in hospital and an eleven-year-old girl receiving outpatient care.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The CIA Veteran Who Says the Iran War Was Not an Intelligence Failure]]></title><description><![CDATA[Julia Curlee, 25 years in national security, on Stephen Miller as chief of staff, a Starlink throttle that cost Ukrainian interceptors speed, and what Congress should do after Tuesday]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-cia-veteran-who-says-the-iran</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/the-cia-veteran-who-says-the-iran</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 22:22:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/223339930/e265194edf77418d8f74d792b3b95acc.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Julia Curlee spent 25 years in national security, most of them as a CIA analyst. She did four tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan, served in the CIA&#8217;s China Mission Center, briefed Vice President Mike Pence on the President&#8217;s Daily Brief for a bit over a year, and then worked as a National Security Council director in both the Biden White House and the second Trump White House. She holds master&#8217;s degrees from the National War College and American University. She is now a public service fellow at Lawfare and writes for The Dispatch and The Bulwark.</p><p>I had her on The Wire Tap live from Kyiv on Friday, three days after the midterms. A ballistic warning went off near the end of the hour, which is how we do war coverage here. Here is what she said.</p><p><strong>Iran was not an intelligence failure</strong></p><p>Curlee&#8217;s position is that nobody in the intelligence community was surprised. &#8220;It was ambient that the Strait of Hormuz would be closed, that you kill the supreme leader, there&#8217;s the next supreme leader in line, that this revolutionary hardened regime is not going to collapse.&#8221; In Washington, she said, there are only two things: intelligence failures and policy successes. This one belongs to the policymakers, and her line was that they &#8220;don&#8217;t have any idea how to get us out of this war.&#8221;</p><p>Her Dispatch piece from November 3 supplies the record behind that. The Joint Chiefs warned the president before the February 28 strikes that Tehran could close the Strait of Hormuz, as Pentagon war games had assumed for decades. Twenty-one American service members have been killed, oil sits near $100 a barrel, and every major NATO ally refused the request for minesweepers. The NSC was down to fewer than 50 policy experts by June 2025, the fewest since Eisenhower.</p><p>On the war&#8217;s effect on Ukraine she was blunt: it has been &#8220;a disaster for Ukraine.&#8221; On the person running it, she said the senior people around him have every self-interest in not presiding over a failed war, and that &#8220;it&#8217;s been cowards all the way down.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Stephen Miller, chief of staff</strong></p><p>News broke minutes before we went live that Stephen Miller will be the new White House chief of staff, with Susan Wiles out. Curlee read it in one sentence: &#8220;That doesn&#8217;t strike me as a White House that&#8217;s looking to course correct.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Pence&#8217;s briefings versus this White House</strong></p><p>I asked what changed between her boss and this president. She said Pence took the briefing &#8220;religiously&#8221; and understood that he was the president&#8217;s senior advisor. She disagreed with him on plenty and said it was irrelevant, the same way it was when she worked for George W. Bush during the Iraq War, which she opposed. The first term, she said, had four-star generals running the building: McMaster, Kelly, Mattis. The second has a weekend talk show host from Fox and Friends at the Pentagon.</p><p>She put the second-term method in plain terms. The first impeachment came from the Ukraine pressure campaign, in which Trump held back security assistance to get Zelensky to hand over political dirt on his likely opponent. Someone in his chain of command went to Congress. His takeaway, in her telling, was to put loyalty above everything and replace the nonpartisan civil service with &#8220;a loyalty oath selected group of sycophants.&#8221;</p><p><strong>The CIA director</strong></p><p>Curlee and John Sipher wrote in The Bulwark on September 10 that the CIA director is a failure. On the show she named two failures. First, the director&#8217;s job is to make sure the president understands reality, and &#8220;if he can&#8217;t get the president to read his PDB or bother taking the job seriously, then he&#8217;s not fulfilling his oath.&#8221; Second, he has presided over a generational loss of talent, people with hard-target tours and technical skills that only field experience builds, whom he did not defend when they wrote something the president did not want to read.</p><p>She raised a counterintelligence problem nobody is saying aloud: thousands of people with access to classified information have been fired across the government and handed clear grievances. &#8220;That&#8217;s what the CIA is for. Please betray your country and help us.&#8221; Why, she asked, would the United States manufacture that vulnerability in its own workforce?</p><p>On the reported covert activity, including the boat strikes, her view is that the CIA is a knife and the hand holding it carries the main blame. She still said the officers who took part should be held accountable, and she expects the line officers, not the people near the Oval Office, to be the ones left in endless hearings. &#8220;We know how this movie ends.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Elbridge Colby</strong></p><p>I asked about Elbridge Colby, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Curlee said his published case for focusing on the Asia-Pacific and leaving Europe to look after itself collided with what happened on his watch: the largest debacle of a war since Iraq. In her account he drained the Pacific theater of munitions for the war in the Persian Gulf, never went to European allies before the war to ask for minesweepers, then berated them for not joining.</p><p><strong>Starlink, Musk and the tech stack</strong></p><p>I put the October Starlink throttling to her, the slowdown that cut speeds on Ukrainian interceptor terminals while Shaheds and similar drones came in at 700 to 900 kilometers per hour. Curlee said it showed every country that American technology can be turned against them. She predicted Elon Musk will be called before congressional committees and said he should be looking at Washington real estate. She wants the questions to include whether he thought about the Ukrainians who would die, and she added DOGE and the USAID cuts to the list of things he will have to answer for. Her claim on USAID: the money went to U.S. farmers who sold their crop for shipment abroad, &#8220;the money never left America.&#8221;</p><p>She extended the point to AI. A model that could help invent nuclear or biological weapons should not sit unregulated in private hands, and she said the Biden-era executive oversight mechanism and pre-release safety vetting were thrown away by this administration. Her contrast: of the government geek and the company geek, one is a public servant who works for you, and the other works for shareholders.</p><p><strong>After Tuesday</strong></p><p>Curlee said she had no idea the rebuke would be this large. Her words: &#8220;I wanted to bottle this feeling that I&#8217;ve had since Tuesday, that, oh my God, they&#8217;re still out there. Maybe it took $6 diesel and $5 gasoline to get them off the bench.&#8221; She cited firsts she was seeing in the results, including a Black woman elected governor of Georgia, a possible first Black senator from Mississippi since Reconstruction, and a Native American governor in New Mexico. She told me that in Texas, where I&#8217;m from, her family says Democrats do not have enough people to staff the statewide offices they now hold, and she noted Ted Cruz as the exception. Her point on the margin was that the Texas winner she named won by about a million and a half votes, so this was no nail-biter. (Those results are her statements from the conversation. See the fact-check notes at the end.)</p><p>Her advice for the next two years is to put a brake on the administration. Her advice for 2029 is to rebuild, with the caveat that the institutions and alliances were imperfect before the wrecking ball and Humpty Dumpty will not go back together. Allies will not simply take America back, because they know the next wrecking ball may be four years away.</p><p><strong>Why she was out of the building</strong></p><p>Curlee told our audience directly why she is no longer inside. She is transgender, she said she was about the most out trans person in the intelligence community for a decade, and no one complained when she briefed Pence. When the second Trump White House fired the rest of the NSC, they asked her to stay because they needed her. It was only when far-right influencer Laura Loomer tweeted her name that she was fired. Would she go back? &#8220;Of course.&#8221; She said the drive is the same desire to serve, adding that she would not work for a hedge fund making someone rich.</p><p>Her closing civics answer, asked what she would fix first if she could: teach people how the government actually works. &#8220;Shadowy deep state, who are you talking about? You&#8217;re talking about the Social Security Administration.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Read her work</strong></p><p>Her Dispatch piece, &#8220;How Congress Can Help Rebuild a Demoralized Intelligence Community&#8221; (November 3, 2026), recommends that Congress hear under oath from the officers who were fired, set a floor of at least 100 NSC policy professionals, and protect those who tell the truth. The Bulwark piece with John Sipher is &#8220;The CIA Director Is a Failure&#8221; (September 10, 2026). Subscribe to her at [Julia&#8217;s link], and read her at Lawfare, The Dispatch and The Bulwark.</p><p>Watch the full conversation on The Wire Tap YouTube channel. Slava Ukraini.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 6, 2026: Fifteen Drones Still in the Air]]></title><description><![CDATA[Kamianske&#8217;s sports complex fire, the preliminary air-defense tally, and November 5&#8217;s ground figures.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-6-2026-fifteen</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-6-2026-fifteen</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 09:11:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reporting cutoff: 08:20 Kyiv, November 6, 2026. The Air Force figures are preliminary as of 08:00. Ground activity and daily loss estimates cover November 5.</em></p><p>A sports complex in Kamianske caught fire after a Russian strike. A 60-year-old woman suffered an acute stress reaction, the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration reported at 08:13. That is the condition officials identified; it should not become an invented physical wound in the retelling. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33146">Regional update</a>.</p><p>The earlier 07:30 account had already listed damage to the sports complex. The later post adds the fire and the woman&#8217;s condition. It is an update to the account, not another sports complex to count. Across the region, authorities reported more than ten drone attacks affecting five districts. Homes, infrastructure and a vehicle were damaged in Dnipro district; an administrative building was hit in Rozdory community. Infrastructure and a vehicle were damaged in Kryvyi Rih. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33145">Morning regional summary</a>.</p><h2>The count was still open</h2><p>Russia launched <strong>227 UAVs</strong> in the attack beginning at 18:00 on November 5, according to Ukraine&#8217;s Air Force. The force included Shahed-type drones, Gerbera aircraft and Parodiya decoys; 86 drones were identified as jet-powered.</p><p>At 08:00, Ukrainian defenses reported <strong>196 drones downed or suppressed</strong>, including seventy jet-powered aircraft. About fifteen attack drones remained airborne. The report recorded impacts at fourteen locations and downed aircraft or debris falling at eight. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/93571">Original Air Force report</a>.</p><p>Those locations are not weapon counts. Subtracting the interception figure from the launch total does not establish how many drones hit their targets, especially with aircraft still flying when the tally closed.</p><p>The regional administration separately reported ten drones downed over Dnipropetrovsk region overnight. That local figure is not added to the national total. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33144">Regional air-defense account</a>.</p><h2>November 5 on the ground</h2><p>The General Staff reported <strong>188 combat engagements</strong> during the previous day. Russian forces conducted 79 air strikes, dropped 235 guided aerial bombs, used 7,093 battlefield kamikaze drones and carried out 2,794 shelling attacks. Battlefield drone use is a separate reporting category from the overnight aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42823">General Staff, 08:00 November 6</a>.</p><p>The briefing lists sixteen attacks at Pokrovsk, eleven at Kostiantynivka and nine at Huliaipole. It records four in Southern Slobozhanshchyna, three at Lyman, two each at Kupiansk and Sloviansk, and one at Orikhiv. No assaults were reported at Kramatorsk, Oleksandrivka or Prydniprovske.</p><p>For Northern Slobozhanshchyna and Kursk, the text gives two air strikes, four guided bombs and 185 shelling attacks, including five involving multiple-launch rocket systems. It does not provide a ground-assault count for that sector.</p><p>The explicitly listed ground attacks sum to <strong>48</strong>, against the headline <strong>188 engagements</strong>. The briefing does not reconcile the figures. Neither number has been silently changed here.</p><p>Ukraine estimated Russian personnel losses during November 5 at <strong>2,440</strong>. That is a Ukrainian official estimate of personnel losses, not an independently verified count of deaths.</p><p>The daily equipment-loss list reports two tanks, eight armored fighting vehicles, 54 artillery systems, six air-defense systems, eight ground robotic systems, 1,395 UAVs, 673 vehicles and five pieces of special equipment. These are daily increments, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42823">General Staff loss account</a>.</p><h2>Six people, two reporting periods</h2><p>The National Police&#8217;s Sumy morning headline reports six people wounded or affected, including a child. The detail matters: a drone strike in Hlukhiv community injured a 51-year-old woman and affected a 16-year-old girl during the preceding day&#8217;s reporting period.</p><p>The other four people&#8212;men aged 66 and 46 and women aged 41 and 53&#8212;sought medical care for injuries received on November 4 in Seredyna-Buda community. Those four are delayed treatment reports from an earlier day, not four fresh overnight casualties. Police recorded strikes on thirteen settlements in two districts. <a href="https://t.me/UA_National_Police/81403">National Police, November 6</a>.</p><h2>The outage schedule</h2><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice, issued November 5 specifically for November 6, provides for industrial power restrictions and rolling outages in some regions throughout the day. It specifies 2.5&#8211;4 outage groups for consumers. Groups are not hours; the actual timetable comes from the regional distribution operator. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5615">Ukrenergo&#8217;s November 6 notice</a>.</p><p>No November 6-dated civilian incident bulletin was available in the checked DSNS public feed at this edition&#8217;s cutoff. Yesterday&#8217;s rescue reports have not been relabeled as this morning&#8217;s incidents. <a href="https://t.me/s/dsns_telegram">Official DSNS feed</a>.</p><p>At the Air Force&#8217;s 08:00 cutoff, about fifteen attack drones were still in the air.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 5, 2026: Drones Still Flying After the Morning Count]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Air Force&#8217;s preliminary tally, fires in Bucha district and Dnipro, and November 4&#8217;s ground figures.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-5-2026-drones</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-5-2026-drones</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 06:35:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Morning edition: official reports checked after 08:20 Kyiv on November 5. Air Force figures are preliminary as of 08:00; the ground report covers November 4.</em></p><p>Fire crews were still soaking down the remains of logistics infrastructure in Bucha district this morning. Russia&#8217;s attack started a fire, brought in additional rescuers from across Kyiv region and injured one man. The State Emergency Service reported no deaths in its preliminary account. The fire was contained; crews continued dismantling damaged structures. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79674">DSNS, November 5</a>.</p><p>In Dnipro, drones set a private house&#8217;s roof and garages alight. Three people were wounded. The regional administration&#8217;s 07:33 update said medics treated them at the scene and all three declined hospitalization. Those are the same three casualties reported earlier this morning, counted once. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33118">Dnipropetrovsk regional administration</a>.</p><p>The damage extended across six districts. Authorities reported nearly twenty drone attacks, with infrastructure hit in Dnipro, Samar, the Novooleksandrivka community and the Slavhorod community. Private homes suffered damage in Pavlohrad; infrastructure and an enterprise were damaged in Kamianske. Nikopol, Marhanets and Pokrovske communities also came under attack.</p><h2>The count was still open</h2><p>Russia launched <strong>128 drones and two Kh-35 air-launched missiles</strong> in the attack beginning at 18:00 on November 4, according to Ukraine&#8217;s Air Force. The drone force included Shahed-type aircraft, Gerbera drones and Parodiya decoys; the report identified 65 jet-powered drones.</p><p>At 08:00, Ukrainian defenses reported <strong>105 drones downed or suppressed</strong>, including 48 jet-powered aircraft. Several attack drones remained airborne. The Air Force recorded impacts at eighteen locations and downed aircraft or debris falling at nine. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/93213">Air Force morning results</a>.</p><p>The headline of the official post says 105 enemy targets, while its detailed accounting identifies those 105 as drones. It does not separately establish the outcome for the two Kh-35 missiles. Nor does subtracting 105 from 128 produce a verified count of successful strikes: aircraft remained in flight, and impact locations are a different measure.</p><p>At 08:10, the Air Force was still reporting jet-powered drones north of Dnipro and west of Chernihiv. The morning tally was already published. The attack continued. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/93214">Air Force update</a>.</p><h2>November 4 on the ground</h2><p>The General Staff reported <strong>184 combat engagements</strong> during the previous day. Russian aviation conducted 89 air strikes and dropped 289 guided bombs. Ukrainian authorities also recorded 7,045 frontline kamikaze-drone uses and 2,449 shelling attacks. Those battlefield drone figures belong to November 4&#8217;s ground activity; they are separate from the overnight aerial attack. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815">General Staff, 08:00 November 5</a>.</p><p>The same briefing listed seventeen attacks at Pokrovsk, ten at Kostiantynivka, nine at Huliaipole, six each in Southern Slobozhanshchyna and Lyman, and two each in Northern Slobozhanshchyna and Sloviansk.</p><p>The briefing reported no assault activity at Kupiansk or Oleksandrivka and no active operations at Kramatorsk, Orikhiv or Prydniprovske.</p><p>There is an unresolved discrepancy: the listed sector attacks total <strong>52</strong>, against the briefing&#8217;s overall <strong>184 engagements</strong>. The published text does not explain the gap. Both figures remain attributed to the General Staff.</p><p>Ukraine estimated Russian personnel losses for November 4 at <strong>2,380</strong>. This is an official personnel-loss estimate, not an independently verified count of deaths.</p><p>The reported daily equipment losses were one tank, three armored fighting vehicles, 23 artillery systems, two multiple-launch rocket systems, five air-defense systems, five ground robotic systems, 1,163 UAVs, 375 vehicles and two pieces of special equipment. These are daily increments, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42815">General Staff</a>.</p><h2>A separate day in Sumy</h2><p>Police reported one person killed and four wounded across Sumy region <strong>during the previous day</strong>. These casualties belong to November 4, although the report appeared this morning.</p><p>A drone attack in the Putyvl community killed a 69-year-old woman and wounded a 57-year-old woman and a 78-year-old man. Mortar fire wounded two men, aged 53 and 40, in the Seredyna-Buda community. Police recorded attacks on twenty-two settlements. <a href="https://t.me/UA_National_Police/81326">National Police, November 5</a>.</p><p>The morning&#8217;s reports describe different clocks: yesterday&#8217;s fighting, yesterday&#8217;s casualties and an overnight attack that had not ended when the Air Force closed its preliminary count. In Bucha district, rescuers were still taking damaged structures apart.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 4, 2026: More Than Twenty Drones Still Airborne]]></title><description><![CDATA[310 UAVs launched, 272 reported downed or suppressed; fires in Odesa and Poltava, two wounded in Dnipro.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-4-2026-more</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-4-2026-more</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 06:43:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Reporting cutoff: 08:45 Kyiv, November 4, 2026. Air-defense figures below are the Air Force&#8217;s preliminary 08:00 snapshot.</em></p><p>A shopping center burned in Odesa after a Russian strike. Firefighters extinguished the flames despite repeated air-raid alerts, and emergency-service psychologists helped people at the scene. DSNS&#8217;s preliminary account reported no deaths or injuries in that incident. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79580">DSNS, November 4</a>.</p><p>In Dnipro, two men, aged 38 and 57, were hospitalized with shrapnel wounds after a strike on an enterprise. Doctors assessed their condition as moderately serious. The enterprise caught fire. The regional morning account also described a farm fire in Bohynivka community, Synelnykove district. These are this morning&#8217;s incidents, separate from yesterday&#8217;s attacks. <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33105">Hospitalization report</a>; <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33107">07:30 regional update</a>.</p><h2>The drones still airborne</h2><p>The Air Force reported 310 UAVs in the attack beginning at 18:00 on November 3 and continuing into November 4. The categories included Shahed-type drones, Gerbera drones and decoys; 81 were described as jet-powered.</p><p>By 08:00, air defenses reported 272 UAVs downed or suppressed, including 64 jet-powered drones. More than 20 attack drones remained airborne. The report recorded impacts at 19 locations and fallen debris at 15. Those are locations, not individual weapons or casualty counts. <a href="https://t.me/kpszsu/92980">Original Air Force report</a>.</p><p>The remaining difference between launch and interception figures is not a confirmed impact count. This was a snapshot of an attack still in progress.</p><h2>The previous day&#8217;s ground war</h2><p>The General Staff&#8217;s November 4 morning briefing estimates Russian personnel losses during November 3 at 2,180. It records 208 combat engagements, 86 airstrikes, 242 guided aerial bombs, 7,134 battlefield kamikaze-drone uses and 2,740 shelling incidents. These drone figures describe battlefield use, a separate category from the overnight aerial attack.</p><p>The daily equipment-loss list includes one tank, seven armored combat vehicles, 39 artillery systems, two air-defense systems, five ground robotic systems, 1,104 UAVs, 52 missiles, 408 vehicles and four special-equipment units. Personnel losses are Ukraine&#8217;s estimate, not an independently verified death count. These are daily figures, not cumulative totals. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802">General Staff, 08:00 November 4</a>.</p><p>The briefing lists 24 attacks on the Kostiantynivka axis and 15 on Pokrovsk. It records 12 on Northern Slobozhanshchyna/Kursk, nine on Sloviansk, six on Huliaipole, five each on Southern Slobozhanshchyna and Lyman, three on Orikhiv and two on Kramatorsk.</p><p>There is an unresolved discrepancy: the listed sector counts sum to 81, while the briefing&#8217;s overall total is 208. Both figures are preserved as published; the source does not explain the difference. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802">Source briefing</a>.</p><h2>Firefighters at work</h2><p>In Poltava region, Russian attacks started fires at several locations, including an enterprise in Poltava and a private property in Kremenchuk. DSNS initially reported no deaths or injuries in those incidents. That statement applies to the cited locations, not to the whole country. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79576">DSNS, November 4</a>.</p><p>The damage to the electricity system carried over from the previous day. In its November 3 afternoon update, Ukrenergo reported emergency outages in several regions, including Kyiv, and said critical infrastructure would receive priority during restoration. That is a dated account of the preceding day&#8217;s disruption, not a newly verified November 4 outage schedule. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5607">Ukrenergo, November 3</a>.</p><p>By the Air Force&#8217;s morning cutoff, more than twenty attack drones were still in the air.</p><p><em>Official sources checked: General Staff, AFU StratCom, Air Force, DSNS, National Police, regional authorities and Ukrenergo. Reposts are not independent confirmation. Civilian incident counts are not combined into a nationwide toll. Later reports may revise the figures.</em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Russians Targeting Civilians]]></title><description><![CDATA[A recording from Chris Sampson and Shaun Pinner's live video]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/live-with-shaun-pinner-and-chris</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/live-with-shaun-pinner-and-chris</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 19:53:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/223374759/b09985a897f4b5f91cbbe409ad9c1ad8.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ballistic missiles near Shaun&#8217;s home in Dnipro. Blackouts and water outages in Kyiv. The war keeps coming, and we keep broadcasting.</p><p>YOUTUBE VERSION: WATCH TO ADD SUPPORT - SHARE FOR OTHER DEVICES AND PLATFORMS:</p><div id="youtube2-h7z-RA7zfrc" class="youtube-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;videoId&quot;:&quot;h7z-RA7zfrc&quot;,&quot;startTime&quot;:null,&quot;endTime&quot;:null}" data-component-name="Youtube2ToDOM"><div class="youtube-inner"><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/h7z-RA7zfrc?rel=0&amp;autoplay=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;enablejsapi=0" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" gesture="media" allow="autoplay; fullscreen" allowautoplay="true" allowfullscreen="true" width="728" height="409"></iframe></div></div><p>Shaun Pinner and Chris Sampson discuss life under Russian attack, the responsibility of showing the world what is happening in Ukraine, and what America&#8217;s midterm elections could mean for Ukrainian support and holding Trump accountable.</p><p>In this episode:<br>&#8226; Shaun describes the overnight strikes near his home and filming an attack on energy infrastructure.<br>&#8226; Reporting under fire: what to publish, what to withhold, and protecting people on the ground.<br>&#8226; Life without reliable electricity and water&#8212;and how Ukrainians organize to keep their buildings running.<br>&#8226; Russian propaganda, claims circulating about an incident near Kyiv, and the need to examine the footage.<br>&#8226; Starlink, military dependence on Elon Musk, and the search for alternatives.<br>&#8226; Why reporting from Ukraine matters&#8212;and why independent journalists need your support.</p><p>VOICES FROM THE FRONT &#8212; Shaun Pinner, live from Dnipro<br>THE WIRE TAP &#8212; Chris Sampson, live from Kyiv</p><p>Recorded before the November 2026 U.S. midterm election results.</p><p>Subscribe, share this conversation, and support the journalists doing the work on the ground.</p><p>#Ukraine #ShaunPinner #TheWireTap</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Our Ukrainian Journalist Colleagues have a vital message]]></title><description><![CDATA[The War Is Not Over. It is accellerating. We cannot ignore this as the press in the west goes near silent on Ukraine.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/our-ukrainian-journalist-colleagues</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/our-ukrainian-journalist-colleagues</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 12:24:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/223314558/3960c9b69caee7053f13adfb2d606ab9.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear Friends,</p><p>When I saw this video two days ago, the first feeling I had was a strong solidarity to so many people in this video that I have worked beside in attack after attack over nearly five years. I am thankful to each of them. They are like brothers and sisters in my life as we arrive to terrible moments at the same time, do our jobs then go back to our lives. Yet, we always see each other. We always know who is there doing the work.</p><p>The news sphere here is very competitive, but look at this video and pass their message to the world. </p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 3, 2026: The Rescue Work Cannot Wait for the All-Clear]]></title><description><![CDATA[Dnipro rescues, the Kharkiv hospital evacuation, and the General Staff&#8217;s daily figures. Air Force totals unavailable at cutoff.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-3-2026-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-3-2026-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 07:19:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Air Force numbers are not available for this edition. The attack was ongoing at the 09:14 Kyiv reporting cutoff; no consolidated launch or interception tally is included.</strong></p><p>Nine people came out of the wreckage in Dnipro. By the time the regional administration updated its account, the number wounded had risen to 15. Three men were in serious condition. The threat of another strike was interrupting the search.</p><p>DSNS&#8217;s earlier report counted five injured and nine rescued after an administrative building and apartment buildings were partly destroyed. Five became 15. Those are successive accounts, not twenty casualties. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79462">DSNS</a>, <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33068">Dnipropetrovsk regional administration</a>.</p><p>In Kharkiv, a strike hit the passage between buildings at a medical facility in Nemyshlianskyi district. The regional authorities reported 62 people affected and 226 patients being evacuated to other hospitals. Windows were damaged in four apartment buildings nearby. <a href="https://t.me/synegubov/27326">Hospital damage</a>, <a href="https://t.me/synegubov/27327">casualty and evacuation update</a>.</p><p>The wider regional morning account counted two killed and 114 affected over its stated preceding-day reporting period, including 64 in Kharkiv city. It includes other attacks and acute stress reactions. The hospital&#8217;s 62 are not another group to add on top. <a href="https://t.me/synegubov/27328">Regional summary</a>.</p><h2>The previous day&#8217;s ground war</h2><p>The General Staff&#8217;s 08:00 November 3 briefing puts Russian personnel losses for November 2 at an estimated 2,060. It reports 206 combat engagements, 68 airstrikes, 234 guided aerial bombs, 8,297 battlefield kamikaze-drone uses and 2,491 shelling incidents.</p><p>The reported equipment losses include 39 artillery systems, four armored combat vehicles, one multiple-launch rocket system, one heavy flamethrower system, four ground robotic systems, 1,413 UAVs, 363 vehicles and four special-equipment units. Personnel losses are an official Ukrainian estimate, not a verified count of deaths.</p><p>The briefing lists 21 attacks on the Kostiantynivka axis and 13 on Pokrovsk. It records ten on Southern Slobozhanshchyna, nine on Lyman, eight on Northern Slobozhanshchyna/Kursk, seven on Huliaipole, three on Kupiansk and one each on Sloviansk and Orikhiv.</p><p>There is an unresolved discrepancy in the source: the listed sector counts sum to 73, while its headline total is 206. Both figures are attributed as published. There is no basis here to invent the missing activity or silently change the total. <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42784">General Staff morning briefing</a>.</p><h2>No final air-defense tally yet</h2><p>At the reporting cutoff, the Air Force was still issuing alerts. A consolidated November 3 launch-and-interception result had not been located in the checked official material. This edition therefore carries no national overnight interception total. Yesterday&#8217;s figures cannot fill today&#8217;s blank. <a href="https://t.me/s/kpszsu">Official Air Force channel</a>.</p><p>The battlefield kamikaze-drone figure above is a separate reporting category. It is not the number of long-range drones sent across the country overnight.</p><h2>The lights and the reporting periods</h2><p>In Zhytomyr region, officials reported roughly 130 settlements and more than 180,000 electricity customers disconnected after strikes on energy infrastructure. DSNS said crews extinguished fires at critical infrastructure sites in two districts; no deaths or injuries were reported in those accounts. <a href="https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18873">Regional administration</a>, <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79455">DSNS</a>.</p><p>Ukrenergo&#8217;s notice for November 3 provides for industrial restrictions and rolling outages in some regions throughout the day, involving 0.5&#8211;4 outage groups. Groups are not hours; actual schedules come from regional distribution operators. <a href="https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5605">Ukrenergo</a>.</p><p>Police in Sumy region reported one killed and seven affected. Five of those seven sought treatment for injuries from earlier days. In Kherson region, seven people were wounded during the explicitly stated window from 06:00 November 2 to 06:00 November 3. These accounts cannot be combined into a clean nationwide overnight toll. <a href="https://t.me/UA_National_Police/81173">Sumy police account</a>, <a href="https://t.me/khersonskaODA/70663">Kherson regional account</a>.</p><p>At Komyshuvakha, the latest retrieved DSNS account of the November 2 strike put the dead at 26, including two rescuers and four police officers. Five people were injured. The earlier 18-death account carried by StratCom had been overtaken by the rescue operation. That is yesterday&#8217;s attack and its revised toll, not a new November 3 incident. <a href="https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79452">DSNS update</a>, <a href="https://t.me/AFUStratCom/36084">earlier StratCom account</a>.</p><p>In Dnipro, the search continued under the threat of another strike.</p><p>*Source cutoff applies to this edition, not to the end of the attack. Later official updates may revise casualty and air-defense figures.*</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Daily — November 2, 2026: The Drones Were Still Overhead]]></title><description><![CDATA[Russian loss estimates, 205 combat engagements, and the civilian toll reported by rescuers in Odesa and Izyum.]]></description><link>https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-2-2026-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thechrissampson.substack.com/p/ukraine-daily-november-2-2026-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Sampson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 10:46:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rpai!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8d0bc78c-8183-4f6f-a739-04bd35e9dc40_1024x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia sent 193 drones into Ukraine overnight. At 08:00, more than six were still in the air.</p><p>Ukraine&#8217;s preliminary air-defense report counted 154 downed or suppressed, impacts at 26 locations and debris at nine others. The count was still open. [1]</p><p>In Odesa, the State Emergency Service reported warehouse fires and damage to a gas pipe, a home and a garage. Elsewhere in the region, a bakery building lay destroyed. Five people were reported injured across the city and region; more than 150 rescuers responded. [3]</p><p>Then came Izyum.</p><p>DSNS reported one person killed and 14 injured after Russian guided-bomb strikes. Apartment buildings, private homes and shops were damaged. Cars caught fire. Rescuers extinguished the fires. Those casualty figures were preliminary. [4]</p><p>The ground war</p><p>The General Staff recorded 205 combat engagements during November 1, including 31 attacks on the Pokrovsk axis and 20 on the Kostiantynivka axis. [2]</p><p>Its daily Russian personnel-loss estimate was 2,500. This is a Ukrainian estimate of personnel losses, not an independently verified death count.</p><p>Reported equipment losses: one tank, seven armored fighting vehicles, 46 artillery systems, two multiple-launch rocket systems, one air-defense system, nine ground robotic systems, 936 UAVs, 371 vehicles and two pieces of special equipment. These are daily figures, not cumulative totals. [2]</p><p>Russia also carried out 71 airstrikes, dropped 235 guided bombs, used 6,578 kamikaze drones and conducted 2,256 shelling incidents, according to the General Staff. The overnight drone raid is a separate reporting category; these figures should not be added together. [2]</p><p>The military briefing covers the previous day. The overnight air report runs into November 2. The DSNS updates below were published later on November 2, as rescuers reported what happened on the ground.</p><p>Sources</p><p>[1] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Overnight air-attack update, November 2, 2026. Preliminary situation as of 08:00. https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42767</p><p>[2] General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Operational information as of 08:00, November 2, 2026. https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42766</p><p>[3] State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS). Odesa region attack consequences, November 2, 2026. https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79388</p><p>[4] State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS). Guided-bomb strikes on Izyum, November 2, 2026. https://t.me/dsns_telegram/79406</p>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>