Peace Through Profit: How Steve Witkoff’s Business Partnerships Shape Trump’s Ukraine Strategy
How a $500 million crypto deal, frozen Russian assets, and a billionaire network converged to turn diplomacy into an investment strategy
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The Wall Street Journal broke the story on February 1st, 2026. Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan—the UAE’s national security adviser, intelligence chief, and one of the world’s most powerful figures in global finance—had secretly purchased a stake in World Liberty Financial, the Trump family’s cryptocurrency venture, through his firm G42. The investment arrived through a British Virgin Islands entity called Aryam, designed to obscure the ultimate beneficial owner. When the structure unraveled under scrutiny, it revealed something larger than a single transaction: a network connecting Emirati intelligence capital, Russian-linked financiers, and an informal American envoy whose authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States government has never been clearly established.
Steve Witkoff stands at the center of this network. A New York real estate developer with decades-long ties to Donald Trump, Witkoff emerged in November 2025 as the administration’s primary channel for Ukraine-Russia negotiations—not through Senate confirmation, not through a formal State Department appointment, but through presidential designation as “Special Envoy to the Middle East” with what appears to be an expanding mandate that now encompasses Eastern Europe. His diplomatic activities run parallel to business partnerships with figures whose interests align closely with Russian economic and strategic objectives. The question is not whether these relationships exist—the documentation is extensive—but whether American institutional safeguards designed to prevent conflicts of interest retain any force when an administration operates outside traditional governance structures.
The physical setting matters. On June 8th, 2022, as Russian forces consolidated control over portions of Ukraine’s Donbas region and international sanctions against Moscow reached unprecedented scope, Witkoff met with Kirill Dmitriev at the Faena Hotel in Miami Beach. Dmitriev runs the Russian Direct Investment Fund, a sovereign wealth vehicle that functions as an extension of the Kremlin’s economic statecraft. He has been under U.S. Treasury Department sanctions since 2018 for his role in Russian interference operations and was added to enhanced sanctions lists in February 2022 following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Faena, a glittering Art Deco tower on Collins Avenue, represents a different kind of power—the intersection of luxury hospitality, international capital, and the permissive regulatory environment that allows such meetings to occur without immediate legal consequence if structured carefully.
Witkoff’s connection to the Faena runs through the property’s developer, Alan Faena, and more significantly through his business relationship with Len Blavatnik. The Ukrainian-born, British-American billionaire controls Access Industries, an industrial and investment conglomerate with deep ties to Russian aluminum and energy sectors through historical partnerships with Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg—both sanctioned Russian oligarchs. Blavatnik himself has not been sanctioned, a distinction that matters legally but does not erase the structural connections his business empire maintains to Russian economic interests. Access Industries and Witkoff Group have collaborated on multiple real estate ventures, including properties where the flow of international capital intersects with the kind of discretion that high-end hospitality provides.
The June 2022 meeting occurred as if Witkoff couldn’t resist the opportunity. Dmitriev was in the United States despite sanctions, the war in Ukraine was four months old, and Witkoff—at that time a private citizen with no government role—chose to engage with someone whose organization exists primarily to advance Russian state interests abroad. What they discussed remains undisclosed. The fact that it happened establishes a pattern of engagement that continued after Trump returned to office.
By November 2025, Witkoff had been designated Special Envoy to the Middle East. The appointment, if it can be called that, came through presidential announcement rather than the procedures governing Senate-confirmed positions or even formal executive orders establishing special representative roles with defined authorities. He began conducting what sources describe as “back-channel diplomacy” on Ukraine, meeting with Russian and Ukrainian officials, participating in discussions about frozen Russian assets, and helping shape what became known as the 28-point peace plan presented to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
A leaked transcript from a November 25, 2025 call between Witkoff and Yuri Ushakov—a senior aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United States—reveals the substance of these negotiations. The conversation focused on Ukrainian territorial concessions, the mechanics of redirecting approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank assets held primarily in European financial institutions, and the establishment of what Witkoff described as “joint oversight” mechanisms that would give Russia direct involvement in determining how assets seized as sanctions are ultimately deployed. Ushakov pressed for details on timeline and implementation. Witkoff provided assurances about the administration’s commitment to the framework and suggested that resistance from European allies could be overcome through American pressure.
The 28-point proposal that emerged includes provisions fundamentally incompatible with international law governing state sovereignty and the rules established after World War II to prevent territorial conquest through military force. It calls for Ukraine to cede occupied territories, accept “neutrality” enforced through mechanisms that would prevent future security alignments with NATO or the European Union, and participate in a reconstruction framework where frozen Russian assets—money seized specifically because Russia violated international law—would be redirected not to Ukrainian recovery efforts but to joint projects managed partly by Russian entities. Point 14 addresses this directly: reconstruction funding would come from these frozen assets, with Russia receiving a percentage of returns on infrastructure investments it would help oversee.
The European Union formalized its position on December 12, 2025, prohibiting any transfer of immobilized Central Bank of Russia assets back to Russian control. The Council decision cited the need to maintain sanctions effectiveness and preserve the legal basis for eventually using these funds for Ukrainian reconstruction and reparations. Euroclear, the Belgian financial institution holding approximately €197 billion of the frozen Russian assets, released its 2023 annual report showing the scale of funds under its custody and the interest income generated—money that European policymakers have discussed redirecting to Ukraine through legal mechanisms that respect both property rights and accountability for aggression. The American proposal, by contrast, envisions these assets as leverage in negotiations that would normalize territorial theft.
Witkoff’s business interests during this period complicate any assessment of his role. World Liberty Financial—the cryptocurrency platform where Sheikh Tahnoun’s G42 acquired its stake through Aryam—launched in September 2024 with promises to revolutionize decentralized finance using blockchain technology. The Trump family controls significant equity. Witkoff serves on the advisory board alongside other figures from Trump’s business and political orbit. The platform announced plans to issue USD1, a stablecoin pegged to the U.S. dollar, which would require substantial reserves and financial infrastructure to maintain credibility in cryptocurrency markets.
On May 1st, 2025, MGX—an Abu Dhabi investment vehicle controlled by Sheikh Tahnoun—announced a $2 billion commitment to Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, with Reuters reporting that World Liberty Financial’s USD1 had been selected as the official stablecoin for this partnership. Binance operates under ongoing scrutiny following founder Changpeng Zhao’s guilty plea in December 2023 to violating the Bank Secrecy Act and facilitating money laundering. The U.S. Department of Justice’s criminal case detailed how Binance failed to implement adequate anti-money laundering controls, processed transactions for sanctioned entities, and deliberately structured operations to evade American regulatory oversight. The $2 billion MGX investment came with commitments to strengthen compliance, but the selection of a Trump family-affiliated stablecoin for a platform with that enforcement history raises questions about whether business considerations influence diplomatic priorities.
G42, Sheikh Tahnoun’s artificial intelligence and technology conglomerate, operates across multiple strategic sectors. The UAE National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority describes Tahnoun as leading efforts to position the Emirates as “a global platform for shaping the future of emergency and crisis management,” language that obscures the scope of his intelligence and economic influence. G42 has announced partnerships worth tens of billions of dollars with American technology firms, including discussions reported by Reuters in June 2025 about a massive AI data campus deal that would position the UAE as a critical node in global computing infrastructure. These negotiations occurred while Witkoff conducted Ukraine diplomacy, and the overlap—American technology policy, Emirati strategic investment, and geopolitical negotiations affecting Russian interests—exists within the same network of relationships that Sheikh Tahnoun’s secret stake in World Liberty Financial exemplifies.
The legal framework governing conflicts of interest in federal service exists precisely to prevent this kind of entanglement. Title 18, Section 208 of the United States Code prohibits any executive branch officer or employee from participating in government matters where they have a financial interest. The Office of Government Ethics administers these standards through mandatory disclosure, divestiture requirements, and recusal procedures. Senate-confirmed officials undergo extensive vetting. Even special envoys appointed through executive authority typically receive ethics guidance and operate under defined mandates that specify their responsibilities and limitations.
Witkoff’s position appears to fall outside these structures. He has not disclosed whether he maintains financial interests in World Liberty Financial while conducting diplomacy. He has not explained how his partnerships with Blavatnik, whose business empire connects to Russian industrial interests, affect his approach to negotiations where Russian asset seizures are central. He has not clarified under what statutory authority he operates when discussing Ukrainian territorial concessions with Putin’s senior advisers. The designation “Special Envoy to the Middle East” does not obviously encompass Ukraine policy, yet Witkoff’s activities have centered increasingly on Eastern Europe rather than the Arab world.
Delaware corporate records show World Liberty Financial registered as a limited liability company on April 15, 2024, listing an address in Wilmington—the standard practice for entities seeking Delaware’s business-friendly legal environment and privacy protections. The ownership structure remains opaque beyond public statements about Trump family control. Sheikh Tahnoun’s Aryam vehicle acquired its stake sometime between the September 2024 launch and the February 2026 Wall Street Journal exposure, meaning the investment occurred either while Witkoff served as Special Envoy or during the transition period when his appointment was being arranged.
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, passed after Watergate to restore public confidence in federal governance, requires senior officials to disclose financial interests and establishes mechanisms for managing conflicts. But the law applies to “officers and employees” as defined through formal government structures. If Witkoff operates as a purely presidential agent without compensation, civil service classification, or Senate confirmation, he may technically fall into a regulatory gap—empowered to speak for the United States in negotiations affecting billions of dollars and territorial sovereignty, but not subject to the disclosure and recusal requirements that would apply to a State Department official performing identical functions.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy rejected the 28-point proposal in a November 21, 2025 address, stating that “we need unity more than ever, so that there can be a dignified peace in our home.” The phrase “dignified peace” carried specific weight in Ukrainian political discourse, referring to an outcome that preserves sovereignty and holds Russia accountable rather than rewarding aggression through territorial concessions and sanctions relief. Protests in Kyiv during summer 2025, covered by The New York Times, reflected public anger at perceived corruption in reconstruction contracting and concern about international pressure for compromise with Russia. Zelenskyy’s government faced the political impossibility of accepting a framework where stolen territory becomes negotiable and frozen Russian assets—money that should fund Ukrainian recovery—get redirected to projects that benefit Moscow.
The architecture Witkoff helped construct treats Ukraine’s sovereignty as a tradable commodity in a larger transaction involving cryptocurrency ventures, Emirati strategic investment, Russian sanctions relief, and the Trump family’s business expansion. Whether this violates specific criminal statutes remains a question for prosecutors and courts. What it clearly demonstrates is the collapse of institutional boundaries designed to keep private interest separate from public authority.
The Bloomberg transcript of Witkoff’s call with Ushakov shows Witkoff discussing implementation timelines, European resistance, and mechanisms for overcoming allied objections to asset redirection. These are not the conversations of a facilitator or messenger. They are negotiations conducted by someone with apparent authority to commit American policy, yet operating without the Senate confirmation, public disclosure, or ethics oversight that would accompany such responsibility in a functioning constitutional system.
The Faena Hotel, where this network’s public exposure arguably began with the June 2022 meeting, still operates as a luxury destination on Miami Beach. Dmitriev presumably returned to Russia. Blavatnik continues managing Access Industries from London and New York. Sheikh Tahnoun runs UAE intelligence while directing tens of billions in global investment. Witkoff moves between real estate development, cryptocurrency advisory roles, and diplomatic missions that blur the line between business development and statecraft.
The funds remain frozen in European accounts. The war continues. Ukraine has not ceded territory through negotiation, though Russia controls approximately 18 percent of Ukrainian sovereign territory through military occupation. The 28-point plan exists as a document, not policy, because implementation would require European cooperation that has not materialized and Ukrainian consent that will not come.
What remains unresolved is the authority question. By what legal mechanism does Steve Witkoff negotiate on behalf of the United States? Under what statute does he discuss Ukrainian territorial concessions with Russian officials? Through what ethical framework does he serve simultaneously as Trump business associate and diplomatic representative? Which oversight body reviews his financial interests for conflicts? Who authorized him to engage with sanctioned Russian entities? Where is the formal documentation establishing his mandate?
These questions have been asked by congressional Democrats, European allies, Ukrainian officials, and transparency advocates. They have not been answered. The administration has provided no legal memorandum establishing Witkoff’s authority, no ethics clearance demonstrating conflict review, no Senate testimony subjecting his background and interests to public scrutiny. He operates in the space between formal government and private agency, wielding influence without clear accountability.
The Wall Street Journal investigation into Sheikh Tahnoun’s secret investment opened one window into this structure. The leaked Witkoff-Ushakov transcript opened another. The 28-point proposal and its provisions for redirecting frozen assets opened a third. Together they reveal not a conspiracy hidden in shadows but a system operating in plain sight, where the absence of institutional constraints becomes its own form of governance.
The precedent being set extends beyond Ukraine. If an American president can designate personal business associates to conduct diplomacy affecting hundreds of billions in seized assets, territorial sovereignty, and international security commitments—all without Senate confirmation, ethics review, or documented legal authority—then the regulatory framework built after Watergate has no practical force. The question becomes whether democratic institutions possess mechanisms to reassert accountability when executive power operates through informal networks that treat conflicts of interest as standard practice rather than disqualifying fact.
Ukraine’s rejection of the proposal preserves its sovereignty but does not resolve the American institutional crisis that the proposal’s development represents. The European Union’s prohibition on asset transfers maintains sanctions effectiveness but does not address whether American diplomatic processes have been captured by private interests. Sheikh Tahnoun’s investment in World Liberty Financial generates returns but does not answer who authorized an informal envoy to negotiate terms that would benefit entities in which he holds financial stakes.
The Faena meeting happened. The cryptocurrency partnerships exist. The diplomatic negotiations occurred. The peace plan was presented. The business relationships connect Russian-linked capital, Emirati intelligence investment, and American executive authority through structures that evade traditional governance safeguards.
Whether this constitutes criminal conduct, impeachable offense, or merely the erosion of norms that lack enforcement mechanisms remains contested. What is documented, verified, and indisputable is that Steve Witkoff—real estate developer, Trump business partner, World Liberty Financial board member, and self-described peace broker—has shaped American policy toward Ukraine while maintaining financial relationships with entities whose interests align with Russian strategic objectives, all without demonstrating the formal authority or ethical clearance that would legitimize such influence in a system where rules matter more than relationships.
The question is not what happened. The question is whether American institutions retain the capacity to enforce boundaries between private profit and public authority when those boundaries are systematically ignored by individuals operating with presidential backing but without constitutional accountability.
Footnotes
The Wall Street Journal, “’Spy Sheikh’ Bought Secret Stake in Trump Company,” February 1, 2026, https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/spy-sheikh-secret-stake-trump-crypto-tahnoon-ea4d97e8 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202000000/https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/spy-sheikh-secret-stake-trump-crypto-tahnoon-ea4d97e8).
Delaware Division of Revenue, “Delaware Business Licenses Search,” https://revenue.delaware.gov/business-license-search (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202062819/https://revenue.delaware.gov/business-license-search).
National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority (UAE), “HH Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan: The UAE Is a Global Platform for Shaping the Future of Emergency and Crisis Management,” May 8, 2023, https://www.ncema.gov.ae/en/media-center/news/8/5/2023/hh-tahnoun-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-the-uae-is-a-global-platform-for-shaping-the-future-of-emergency-and-crisis-management.aspx (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20230508000000/https://www.ncema.gov.ae/en/media-center/news/8/5/2023/hh-tahnoun-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-the-uae-is-a-global-platform-for-shaping-the-future-of-emergency-and-crisis-management.aspx).
G42, “G42 | Inventing a Better Everyday,” https://www.g42.ai/ (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202092131/https://www.g42.ai/).
MGX, “News,” https://www.mgx.ae/en/news (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202021642/https://www.mgx.ae/en/news).
Reuters, “US-UAE Multi-Billion Dollar AI Data Campus Deal Far from Finalised, Sources Say,” June 6, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-uae-multi-billion-dollar-ai-data-campus-deal-far-finalised-sources-say-2025-06-06 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20250606001931/https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-uae-multi-billion-dollar-ai-data-campus-deal-far-finalised-sources-say-2025-06-06).
Bloomberg, “Witkoff Discusses Ukraine Plans With Key Putin Aide: Transcript,” November 25, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-25/witkoff-discusses-ukraine-plans-with-key-putin-aide-transcript (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20251125194900/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-25/witkoff-discusses-ukraine-plans-with-key-putin-aide-transcript).
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Prohibits Transactions with Central Bank of Russia and Imposes Sanctions on Key Sources of Russia’s Wealth,” February 28, 2022, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20220228 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20220228000000/https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20220228).
Council of the European Union, “Russia’s War Against Ukraine: EU Sanctions,” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202003142/https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia).
ABC News, “Trump Administration’s 28-Point Ukraine-Russia Peace Plan Presented to Zelenskyy,” November 20, 2025, https://abcnews.go.com/International/trump-administrations-28-point-ukraine-russia-peace-plan/story?id=127735249 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20251120210100/https://abcnews.go.com/International/trump-administrations-28-point-ukraine-russia-peace-plan/story?id=127735249).
Euroclear, “Euroclear Delivers Strong Performance in 2023,” February 1, 2024, https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2024/2024-mr-04-strong-performance-fy2023.html (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20240201000000/https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2024/2024-mr-04-strong-performance-fy2023.html).
Council of the European Union, “Council Decides to Prohibit Transfers of Immobilised Central Bank of Russia Assets Back to Russia,” December 12, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/12/council-decides-to-prohibit-transfers-of-immobilised-central-bank-of-russia-assets-back-to-russia (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20251212000000/https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/12/council-decides-to-prohibit-transfers-of-immobilised-central-bank-of-russia-assets-back-to-russia).
U.S. Department of Justice, “United States v. Changpeng Zhao,” December 11, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/criminal/case/united-states-v-changpeng-zhao (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20231211000000/https://www.justice.gov/criminal/case/united-states-v-changpeng-zhao).
Reuters, “Trump’s Stablecoin Chosen for $2 Billion Abu Dhabi Investment in Binance, Co-Founder Says,” May 1, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/wlfs-zach-witkoff-usd1-selected-official-stablecoin-mgx-investment-binance-2025-05-01 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20250501000000/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/wlfs-zach-witkoff-usd1-selected-official-stablecoin-mgx-investment-binance-2025-05-01).
Cornell Law School, “18 U.S. Code § 208 — Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/208 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202121022/https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/208).
Office of Government Ethics, “Compilation of Federal Ethics Laws,” January 1, 2025, https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Compilation+of+Federal+Ethics+Laws (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20250101000000/https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Compilation+of+Federal+Ethics+Laws).
U.S. Government Publishing Office, “Ethics in Government Act of 1978,” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-title5/pdf/USCODE-2010-title5-app-ethicsing.pdf (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20260202000000/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-title5/pdf/USCODE-2010-title5-app-ethicsing.pdf).
Office of the President of Ukraine, “We Need Unity More Than Ever, So That There Can Be a Dignified Peace in Our Home — Address by the President,” November 21, 2025, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/yednist-potribna-nam-yak-nikoli-abi-v-nashomu-domi-buv-dosto-101493 (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20251121000000/https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/yednist-potribna-nam-yak-nikoli-abi-v-nashomu-domi-buv-dosto-101493).
The New York Times, “Facing Outcry Over Corruption, Zelensky Says He Will Reverse Course,” July 23, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/23/world/europe/zelensky-protests-ukraine-corruption.html (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20250723000000/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/23/world/europe/zelensky-protests-ukraine-corruption.html).
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